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discreet by nature, and, as such, do not admit of any relation whatsoever.
Then Dharmakirti proceeds to unravel two more rifts in the conception of relation as a real entity combining two terms, or relational factors, involved in it.
It is impossible to conceive a relation without the relata it combines. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider relation, he pleads on behalf of his opponent, as involving, or forming the basis (āśraya) of, the duality (dvişțatva) of its terms. In other words relation cannot be conceived of as a distinct entity without its attribute (dharma) of the terms contained in it. When this is conceded Dharmakirti probes into the implications of this view and tries to show an inconsistency. In view of the fact that relation is admitted as an objectively real and independent entity (sat) it ought to be, on the strength of this admission, a self-sufficient entity; that is to say, it should not have any lack or 'expectancy' (apekṣā) for 'anything else' (para; the reason is described as sarvanirāśaṁsatvāt). If it shows any kind of lack' or ' expectancy', then it forfeits its claim for its very existence (anyathā sattvavirodhät) owing to the fact that nothing can, according to the opponent, exist without the condition necessary for its existence-here the condition for its existence are its relata-being fulfilled. Therefore, if relation is to be considered an absolute entity it should not, the Buddhist
1. rūpaśleşo hi sambandho dvitve sa ca katha bhavet/ tasmāt prakstibhinnänāí sambandho nästi tattvataḥ"//
PKM, spd., p. 505, kā. 2. 2. The lack' here refers to the existence of relation being
conditional upon the existence of the relata.
