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CHAPTER VI
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school. At present we are, therefore, concerned only with noticing how the mechanical hypothesis of ubhayavāda (which also applies to the Vaišeșika philosophy in so far as the predominant difference and the subordinate identity form a mechanical combination in the hypothesis) is unsatisfactory. This consideration will point to the necessity of treating bheda and abheda as two different aspects of an integral or vital synthesis instead of as two external entities conjoined in a composite object, which would evidently be two entities in one, although it (the composite object), is erroneously treated as one. It will also bring into the picture of reality the important trait of jātyantarată by virtue of which each real would be cognised as something sui generis. The second factor, viz., jātyantaratā, will receive a greater stress in the next question, than the first one, because it has not figured so far in our inquiry into the nature of reality, except by a casual reference to its name on a few occasions.
To resume our consideration of the present question, the externalism between dravya and paryāya (guņa) makes ubhayavāda not into one consistent theory which it is supposed to be, but into a conjunction', or mixture (miśra or miśravāda) of two independent, or even opposed' theories of dravyavāda and paryāyavāda. The reason for this is that dravya and paryāya are treated as numerically different entities, although they are supposed to exist as a single object. This is why Arcața is right in urging against this theory that
1. Abhayadeva describes it as: svavişayapradhănatăvyavasthitā
nyonyanirapekşobhayanayāśritam / TBV, p. 704. 2. Cf. viruddhadharmayogena stambhakumbhädibhedavat / TSS, kū.
561.
