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194
JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
which is but a conjunction of dravyavāda and kşaņikavāda (paryāyavāda), is shown by Hemacandra and the other Jaina thinkers, to lend itself doubly' to the lack of any play of causal efficiency.
In view of the incongruities indicated in course of the present question the Jaina rejects ubhayavāda in favour of jātyantaravāda which is claimed to avoid the pitfalls met with in the present and the previous questions.
Jātyantaravāda
It has been discovered, in course of our attempt to answer the three questions (a), (b), and (c) concerning the nature of reality, that neither the pure identity-view (dravyaikāntavāda)', nor the pure difference-view (paryāyaikāntavāda), nor even the composite view of identity and difference (ubhayavāda or parasparaviviktadravyaparyāyaikāntavāda)' but only an integral view of
1. Doubly' because the Buddhist charges (with which the Jaina
identifies himself subject to the two limitations indicated on p. 173, supra) made against the paryāyaikāntavāda (in the course of the previous question) of the Buddhist, will together hold against the mechanical theory of the Vaiśeşika who conjoins the above two extreme theories into his ubhayavāda. Although the Advaita view of reality is generally considered to be the dravyaikāntavāda (the identity-view) par excellence, the Sankhya view is also considered by the Jaina writers to be a very good example of a dravyaikāntavāda. Therefore, the Jaina writers sometimes refer, in this connection, to both or to either (as Gunaratna does in the phrase where reference to the paryayaikānta of the Buddhist also is made: sānkhyasaugata
bhimata-dravyaparyāyaikāntayoḥ / TRD, p. 231) of the two. 3. See supra, p. 187 (f.), f.n. 5, etc.
