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CHAPTER VI
201
AY
The most serious objection associated with the confusion of the aina theory with that of the Yaisestikto a ctitical reference has been already made to the other two ekānta theories at the beginningļof thje?piksdrit, Question—is thật the Jaina teory, like its erroneous counterpart, involves contradiștion in the contatičutibní dl2d8feathonda briation, on the part of the Jainą:of the mutual complimentariness or the integratedness of identity and difference in a real in contrast to the mere extraneous or composite togetherness of the two, as maintained by the ubhayavādin, has been observed under the treatment of ubhayavāda, to knock the bottom out of the charge of the contradiction. That is, the integrated or the indissoluble (parasparānanuviddha) structure of the real directly gives the lie to the opponents' charge of contradiction against the Jaina conception of a real. Anekāntasvarūpatva, the raison d'être of the integrated concreteness of a real, is hereby asserted to be the negation of contradictoriness, or the affirmation of complimentariness. The proof of contradiction would, therefore, mean the disproof of the anekāntasvarūpatva of all reality. But the possibility of such a proof is flatly denied by the Jaina on the strength of the warrant of experience, at perceptual and other levels, which is maintained to reveal the ultimacy of the anekānta truth in all reality.
Constructively, uniqueness or 'singularity' is a positive trait attending upon every phase of causal process which
the principle of jātyantaravāda or pakşāntaravāda is proximately directed against ubhayavāda (which has the semblance of jatyantaravada) although its indirect criticism against the other ekānta doctrines also is indubitably implicit.
