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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
Another argument which is mentioned, in passing, as meeting with the Buddhist objection is tendency to treat the notion of continuousness', or nairantarya—which means absence of any gap or interval (antarabhāvarūpam)' between the two terms—as constituting the rūpaśleșa relation. This idea of continuousness is summarily rejected by the Buddhist as a negative (atättvika' or tāttvikatvāyoga“) one (because the absence of something is passed for a positive entity which, in his opinion, militates against the opponents' (Naiyāyika’s) acceptance of sambandha as a positive entity.
Stretching the argument further, the Buddhist questions why his opponent should not accept “the presence of a gap" (sāntaratā)' or the lack of continuousness, as the rūpaśleșa relation. This implies that nairantarya is as arbitrary as
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1. nairantaryam tayo rūpaśleșaḥ; na / PKM, p. 505. See also TSV,
p. 147, and SRK, p. 812. Also the next f.n. 2. Vidyānanda vividly renders it as chidramadhyaviraha. TSV,
p. 148. This notion of gaplessness attributed to the Naiyāyika, seems to be intended to defend his position against a split which cuts asunder a related whole into two independent, and therefore, unrelated entities. This is viewed, of course from the Buddhist angle. The Buddhist, however, contends, and rightly so, according to what rūpaśleşa ought to be, that the acceptance of gaplessness does not, as stated at the end of the paragraph, save the Naiyāyika from playing into the
hands of the Advaitin and accepting an unqualified identity, 3. The editor gives the equivalent of 'atāttvika' as "abhāva'
(tucchabhāvarūpatvād abhāvasya). PKM, p. 505, f.n. 3. 4. Both Vidyānanda and Vādidevasūri use this phrase. TSV,
p. 147, and SRK, p. 812. 5. nirantaratāyāś ca sambandharūpatve sāntaratā'pi katham sam
bandho na syāt? PKM, p. 505. anyathā sāntaratvasya sambandhaprasangatvāt / TSV, p. 148, and NKC, Vol. I, p. 305.
