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(dik), ākāśa' and time (kāla). These substances are said to be so absolutely eternal that they do not give rise to the products (dravyabhāvinaḥ) of the transient realm.'
This bifurcation of the world into two or three independent orders of permanence and change, or identity and difference, does not commend itself to the Jaina.
1.
Lastly, even arthakriyäkäritva or causal efficiency cannot, according to the Jaina, come into play in such a world of being so sharply separated. How causal efficiency cannot operate in the static realm of a mere dravya has been already pointed out from the point of view of the Buddhist philosophy. Hemacandra is in total agreement with the Buddhist in regard to the inapplicability of causal efficiency, either at the level of simultaneity or of succession, in a static dravya. He goes further in demonstrating how it cannot be operative even in a world of discreet momentariness which is the view of the Buddhist himself. This aspect of the problem also has been pointed out earlier." The Vaiseṣika's ubhayavāda,
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CHAPTER VI
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Dik or space and ākāśa are different in the Vaiśeşika system. Akāśa is some 'ethereal substance' filling the space and having sound as its distinction.
Hemacandra describes the entire position as follows:
kanādastu dravyaparyāyavubhāvapyupāgaman pṛthivyādīni guṇādyādhārarūpāņi dravyāņi, guṇādestvādheyatvāt paryāyaḥ/ te ca kecit kşanikāḥ, kecit yāvaddravyabhāvinaḥ, kecin nityā iti kevalam itaretaravinirlunţhitadharmidharmābhyupagamāṁśasamicinavādinaḥ/
He concludes the argument by stating:
ekāntabhinnānām kenacit kathañcit sambandhayogādityähnikyapakşe'pi visayavyavasthā / PMHS, p. 27.
See supra, pp. 52-56, and also the Sec. on Arthakriyäkäritvavāda (p. 172 ff.).
See supra, p. 174 ff.
