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CHAPTER V
139
further treatment of the nature and content of identity in relation to an important problem in modern metaphysics and of an important distinction concerning the nature of difference, will also be found necessary to enable us to obtain a somewhat closer grasp of the Jaina solution to the problem of reality. This will also be found in the sequel'.
Now the questions (a) and (b)—which lay down that either identity should obliterate difference or vice versa, owing to their inherent mutual opposition-may be jointly stated, together with all the further erroneous consequences imputed to be entailed in their subsistence. The Jaina hypothesis that identity and difference can somehow (kathañcit): exist together in the same medium is untenable (na yuktam) owing to Virodha (contradiction) and the other erroneous consequences (dosas) implied (upalakṣita) by Virodha." If, it is argued, the paryāyas are, in any sense, of the same nature' as the dravya, their continuant locus (āśraya), then
1. Vide infra, Chap. VIII. "Is dravya a concrete universal?" and
“What is Paryāya?”--these two controversial problems will be discussed immediately after the Jaina attitude to the present
questions is studied. 2. See infra, p. 141 ff.
The Jaina view is characterised as kathañcit bhedābhedavāda in contrast with the theories of absolute identity (ekāntika abhedavāda) and of absolute difference (ekāntika bhedavāda)
which are rejected by the Jaina. 4. Hemacandra succinctly puts the argument as follows:
dravyaparyāyayor aikāntikabhedābhedaparihāreņa kathañcid bhedābhedavādaḥ syādvādibhir upeyate, na casau yukto virodhā
didoşāt / PMHS, p. 28. 5. Because the Jaina admits that the relation between dravya
and its paryāyas is bhedābheda.
