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CHAPTER V
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are in a co-ordinate synthesis marks also the measure of success and reasonableness of the Jaina metaphysical position. In order, therefore, to demonstrate that identity and difference are harmonious co-existents, and not irreconcilable or contradictory elements, a critical examination of the Jaina view may be attempted in answer to the following four questions :
(a) Does not identity infect difference with its own character, i. e., identity, and convert the latter, i. e., difference, into something of its own nature, in a substance?
(b) Or, alternatively, does not difference infect identity with its own character, i. e., difference, and convert the latter, i. e., identity, into something of its own nature, in a substance ?
In other words, (a) and (b) mean, respectively, that identity should eschew difference, or difference should eschew identity; and that either the one, or the other, but not the two together, can be the ultimate ontological postulate. Consequently, the truth of (a) indicates a triumph of the identityview, and the truth of (b) of the difference-view.
If the truth of neither (a) nor (b) is conceded, and the ultimacy of the postulate of identity-and-difference is adhered to, then the following question would be raised :
(c) Does not the hypothesis of identity-and-difference in a substance invoke upon itself the combined evils of both (a) and (b)?
If the opponent still finds the Jaina, even under the threat of (c), not pleading guilty to the charge of the irreconcil
