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CHAPTER V
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The Nyāya-Vaiśeșika no doubt accepts the reality of bhāva and abhāva, but as "things which are in themselves separate”. This method of treating the two as being mutually exclusive (paraspara-vivikta) does direct violence to the integral character of reality (hence the Jaina maxim : sarvabhāvānāṁ hi bhāvābhāvātmakaṁ svarūpām"). "The Naiyāyika errs” a discerning critic observes in this connection,
by emphasising the one or the other as the exclusive characteristic. But the nature of reals, as has been sufficiently proved by the Jaina, is not exclusive or extremistic. It is existent-cum-non-existent."*
This conception of reality as bipolar is the cornerstone of the anekānta ontology. Its wide operative force will become evident in course of the account, in the sequel, of syādvāda-saptabhangi and nayavāda, the two main methods originating from the fundamental conception of anekāntavāda, whose ontological aspect is suggested or hinted by the formula of Umāsvāti."
however, the position seriously maintained by the Voidist (šūnyavādin), if we are to believe the interpretation of Candrakīrti, the commentator of Nāgārjuna, and the criticism of the rival philosophers constitute a faithful representation of the position of Nāgārjuna". JPN, p. 82. Whether or not the śünyavādin believes in a transcendental realm of truth (vivștisatya) is immaterial in so far as he repudiates 'essencelessness' (nissvabhāvatā) in the so-called empirical world which, for the Jaina at any rate, is a genuine reality. Gunaratna, therefore, describes this school as : Kānādayaugabhyupagataparaspara-vivikta-dravya-paryāyaikānta / TKD, p. 231
SM (text), p. 91. 3. JPN, p. 68. 4. Regarding the identification of anekāntavāda or anantadharma
tmakavāda with the truth of Umāsvāti's formula, viz., utpada
i ci si
