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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
of exclusive momentariness (bhedaikānta) and admits what he has all along fought against.
The Buddhist fares no better in his plea for the other mode, viz., the simultaneous functioning of the causal efficiency which might be supposed to repose in the vanishing moments of his conception. This may be illustrated by means of the example of a fruit which simultaneously reveals diverse effects like colour, taste, etc. In this case a question which naturally arises is whether the colour-moment' (rūpaksana) and the 'taste-moment' (rasaksaņa) arise from an identical or single nature of the moment, or from different or many natures of it. If they were to arise from a single nature, then they would all be the same for the obvious reason that they arise from the self-same nature (yadyekena svabhāvena janayet tadā teşām ekatvam syād ekasvabhāvajanyatvāt) and, therefore, would not admit of diversity. If they were to arise, on the contrary, from many natures—some effects like colour arising from a material cause (upādānabhāvena) and others like taste arising from co-operative auxiliary factors (sahakāritvena)—then the Jaina would ask whether the many natures are integral (atmabhūtāḥ), or non-integral (anātmabhūtāḥ), to the causal moment. If they are non-integral—that is, if they do not belong-to the cause then evidently they cannot in any sense claim to constitute the intimate nature (svabhāvatvahānih) of the cause in question. If they are, on the contrary, integral to the nature of the cause, then either (a) they will lose their
1. That is, rasādikşaņānām. 2. PMHS, p. 27.
