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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
ontological background for the refutation of the various objections (contradiction being the most important one among them) referred to in the foregoing account, and of forming the basis of a discussion of the doctrines of nayavada and the syādvada-saptabhangi which will be briefly presented in the sequel. Lastly, in the course of the Jaina answer to bhedavāda [the question (b)] we have tried to disprove the Buddhist contention that causal efficiency (arthakriyākāritva) can have an operative force only within the ontological scheme of kṣaṇikavāda, and to establish the validity of that principle within the exclusive sphere of a dravyaparyāyātmaka reality.
There still remain two more questions, viz., (c) and (d), which demand our attention before the treatment of the fourfold questionnaire is brought to a close. The question (c) concerns ubhayavada or the theory of two-fold nature of reality, or of identity and difference, and the question (d) concerns jātyantaravada or the theory of uniquenessuniqueness obtaining in every manifestation of identity-indifference constituting an object in reality-which aims at remedying the defects of ubhayavada. We may begin with the first of these two questions.
Ubhayavāda
Ubhayavada postulates that identity and difference are separate, or at any rate, separable, entities entering into the making of an object. It may be, therefore, described as a mechanical or a composite theory of reality in so far as it
