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CHAPTER VI
The Externalistic Doctrine of Identity-in-Difference
(Ubhayavāda)
versus The Doctrine of a Unique and Integral Synthesis of
Identity-in-Difference (Jätyantaravāda)
Starting with a brief statement of the Jaina view of reality, as embodied in the basic formula of Umāsvāti, we have so far addressed ourselves to the task of seeking confirmation for that view from three great representative thinkers, and then of launching out on a dialectical examination of the implications of that view under a scheme of the statement and the refutation of four questions. Two of the four questions have been jointly stated and refuted. In the process of their examination the Jaina view has been found to be confronted with a series of objections, among which contradiction, confusion, infinite regress and a few others are notable ones. In order to clarify the Jaina stand against those objections, it has been found necessary to dilate upon, incidentally, the means by which being and non-being are synthesised in concrete reality, as well as upon the significance of negation as an element of reality. The treatment of the mode of synthesising being and non-being as well as of the significance of negation as a component element of reality is aimed at serving the dual purpose of having provided the necessary
