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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
called the ekāntanityavāda or paryāyavāda-although the Buddhist himself considers causal efficiency as the very essence of his doctrine. The Jaina endeavours to prove his contention by analysing the only possible two modes in which causal efficiency can function in a reality which consists of discrete and perishing moments (pratikṣaṇavināśibhāva) without any thread of inner necessity connecting them into some kind of unity. The two modes are succession or consecutiveness (krama or paurvāparya) and nonsuccession (akrama) or simultaneity,
The causal efficiency cannot, the Jaina maintains, function successively owing to the fact that the momentary existence (kşaņas) lack abiding nature and, therefore, can have neither spatial nor temporal extension. Successionspatial or temporal—involves the notions of 'before' and * after which are absent from the moment. In confirmation of this contention both Hemacandra and Mallişeņa cite a stanza which may be rendered as follows : “Whatever is a a point of space is there alone and whatever is at an instant of time is also exclusively there. Thus in this (hypothesis, viz., the paryāyaikāntavāda) there is no spatial or temporal extension for the entities."' \
If the Buddhist replies to this contention by stating that although the moments perish and have no extension in space or time they do form a continuous series (santāna), which
1.
The stanza runs:
yo yatraiva sa tatraiva yo yadaiva tadaiva sah / na deśakālayor vyāptir bhāvānām iha vidyate //
SM (text), p. 19.