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CHAPTER V
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diversity or manyness, and become identically the same (svabhāvānām vaikatvam prasajyeta') since they are said to proceed from a single cause, or, for that matter, become the cause itself, inasmuch as they are non-different from it (tad avyatiriktatvāt teșām tasya caikatvāt)' or (b) the cause itself
—which is admitted to be of a single or identical nature—will become diversified because of the fact that the plurality of natures and the variety of effects (svabhāvabhedah kāryasāňkaryañ ca) will inevitably split its integrity. Arguing on the part of the Buddhist that this contingency of plurality of natures and diversity of effects would not arise in this case, owing to the fact that such plurality and diversity are due to the cause being upādāna (material) at one place (that is, with respect to rūpa or colour in the present example), and sahakāri (auxiliary) at another (that is, with respect to rasa or taste in the present example), would not be helpful to him." For this plea will not, in the least, mitigate the tendency of the cause to diversity and plurality which are too obvious in the Buddhist arguments. Hence the argu
1. SM (text), p. 19. 2. Ibid. 3. SM (text), p. 19. Moreover, if the Buddhist denies, as he does,
interaction between the so-called upādāna and the sahakāri factors in a causal event he will fall into the error of treating a causal connection as a casual coincidence. For instance if the seed (upādāna) on the one hand and the co-operative (sahakāri) factors of soil water and light, etc., on the other are treated simply as several independent series of potencies extraneously conjointed to bring a sprout (the effect) into life, then how such erratically casual coincidences could form a nexus of uniformly recurrent cause-effect relation becomes hard to explain.
