________________
130
JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
ment for the simultaneous functioning of the causal efficiency in a momentary real also becomes a nullity.'
Thus the above account indicates that neither in the dravyaikāntavāda nor in the paryāyaikāntavāda is there any logical warrant for the function of the principle of causal efficiency. That conjunction of these two hypotheses into a mechanical theory, called ubhayavāda, will also prove equally unsatisfactory in this regard will be shown in course of the treatment of the next question immediately following this.
The Jaina understands by arthakriyāsāmarthya a capacity for generating the practical consequences as indicated by Hemacandra in his sūtra: arthakriyāsāmarthyāt.? This meaning is the same as what the Buddhist means by causal efficiency. The Jaina maintains also that arthakriyākāritva constitutes a unique property (asādhāranarūpa or laksana) of a concrete real. This is laid down by Hemacandra in his sūtra on the subject : tallaksanatvādvastunah.' The concrete real, however, is an integral synthesis of continuity and transience or identity and difference. This is signified by his adherence to the dravyaparyāyātmakatravāda.' Accordingly, the only kind of reality which offers an adequate field for the operative play of arthakriyākāritva is believed by the Jaina to be the one which is contemplated by his integral view.
1. tasmātkṣaṇikasyāpi bhāvasyäkramenárthakriyā durghaţă etc. SM
(text), p. 20. 2. Vide ibid., sūtra 32 and the vștti thereon. 3. Vide ibid., sūtra 32 and the vștti thereon. 4. Cf. dravyaparyāyātmakasyaiva vastuno'rthakriyāsamarthatvād itu
arthaḥ. PMHS, p. 25. Also cf. kşaņo'pi na khalu so'sti yatra vastütpadavya yadhrauvyātmakam năsti (SM, text, p. 20).
