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CHAPTER V
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does not perish and, therefore, enables the moments to be successive, then the Jaina propounds to his opponent an inescapable problem :
In the first place, santāna or the continuous series is an unreal fiction (santānasyāvastutvāt). Even the opponent has to admit this, since there is, according to him, nothing else than the self-sufficient moments.
Secondly, supposing the reality of santāna is conceded for the sake of the argument, even then the Buddhist position will be as illogical as before, for santāna also would then have to share, ex hypothesi, the momentary character of the units in it. This would be a needless duplication of momentariness in another medium (santāna) which is not merely imposed, falsely, on the momentary units, but also can never sustain any continuance in it.'
Lastly, if any continuance or non-momentariness is acquiesced in by the Buddhist, then the poignant sarcasm? (suggesting self-impeachment or self-conviction) of Jayanta and Hemacandra would be fully deserved by the Buddhist who thereby compromises his ardent passion for the notion
This Buddhistic notion of santāna like its analogous notion of "logical construction" or "symbolic fiction” as developed by Russell, has been criticised earlier. See pp. 44 (-50), f.n. 2. Jayanta disarms his opponent by the following observation : athāpi nityaṁ paramārthasantam santānanāmānam upaişi bhāvam / uttiştha bhikṣo phalitās tavāśaḥ so'yam samāptah kşanabhangavādaḥ // NM, p. 464 (quoted by Hemacandra also in PMMS, p. 27). Hemacandra also remarks in the same strain : athākşaņikatvam; susthitaḥ paryāyaikāntavādah. PMHS, p. 26. See also SM (text),
p. 19.
