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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
that if they remain two independent or separate facts they would not be opposed. If opposition could come into play even when they are separate or unconnected factors, then no serpent could ever exist in a world which is inhabited by the species of mongoose. Similarly there would be no fire left in a world where there is water. The paradox of the situation is that the two factors cannot, however, be brought together into a state of lasting union owing to their inherent opposition to each other. Even if they are coerced into a union the stronger member would destroy the weaker one and become the sole occupant, or the content, of the situation. Such a union of being and non-being with an imminent danger of a destructive union hanging upon it is not admitted to exist even for a moment (kṣaṇamātram api) between sat and asat in the anekānta ontology. This is so because the participant factors are admitted to be of equal strength (tulyabalatvāt) and, therefore, of a co-ordinate nature which admits of no fissure, in a real which can be described as unified complex or a complex union.
2. Sahānavasthānabhāva, or the congruent opposition, is a form of contradiction which occurs in the case of two states which can not exist together in one substratum. It is possible for the two states in question to exist at different periods of time (kālabhedena) but they cannot do so, it is stated, at the same period of time. In a raw state a mango, for instance, is green (śyāma). In a ripe state the same mango becomes yellow (pīta). But the raw and the ripe states cannot, it is admitted, exist together in the mango since the two states are, in the present case, consecutive (pūrvottarabhāvinau). The Jaina maintains that this form of virodha also cannot affect
