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CHAPTER V
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his conception of reality as astitvanāstitvarūpātmaka in as much as both astitva and nästitva are concurrently revealed to exist together in concrete fact. If the two states, viz., astitva and nāstitva, are consecutive, or exclusive, then when astiva prevails all would be indistinguishably existent, and similarly, when nästitva prevails all would become totally nonexistent. In such circumstance the occurrence of astitva when all is nāstitva and vice versa becomes an absurd proposition: sarvathaiva satah punar ātmalābhābhāvāt, sarvathā cāsataḥ punar abhāvaprāptyanupapatter naitayos sahānavasthānam yujyate'.
Hence to avoid this anomaly it is appropriate to assume that astitva and nāstitva are concurrent in reality.
3. Pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva, or the obstructive opposition, is said to occur between two events or facts when one obstructs the occurrence of the other. The removal of the obstructing fact is, under this form of contradiction, the necessary antecedent condition for the occurrence of the other. To quote a traditional example, under the protective influence of a 'moonstone' (candrakāntamaņi, the fictitious gem with cooling property) the rays of the sun cannot, it is said, burn us. That is, the occurrence of the burning effect is conditional upon the removal of the heat-obstructing stone. Similarly heat, which is an obstructing factor to cold, needs to be removed before a body feels cold. The Jaina view of astitvanāstitvasvarūpatva of reality is not accepted to be liable to this form of virodha also. The obvious reason
1. SBT, p. 88.
