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CHAPTER V
173
bhedavādin to the Jaina view of reality have been jointly stated and the answers from the Jaina point of view also have been outlined. There is, however, one important principle which the Buddhist claims to be closely connected with his bhedavāda and on which it is necessary to ascertain the Jaina stand. It is the principle of arthakriyākāritva or causal efficiency which is considered by the Buddhist to form the essence of reality. The Buddhist's arguments against the applicability of this principle to any kind of abhedavada or dravyavada have already been considered' at some length. The Jaina shares the Buddhist's opposition to dravyavāda almost entirely, although some Buddhist critics imagine1, not rightly, as will be shown in the process of answering the present as well as the next question, that this opposition to dravyavāda affects the Jaina position as well, in so far as the Jaina theory is concerned with the dravya as an element of reality.
There are, however, two important points of difference between the Buddhist and the Jaina in the meaning they attach to dravyavada in their common denunciation of the view which connects this notion of arthakriyäkäritva with dravyavāda. First the Buddhist is against dravyavada of any kind, while the Jaina is against ekantadravyavāda. Secondly, the Buddhist's attack actually turns out, whatever his profession may be, to be on the hypothesis of the static (kuṭasthanitya) dravya whereas the Jaina's attack is also on
4.
1. See NBD, p. 103, NBTD, p. 17, PVD, II. 3, and HBT, p. 145 ff. See supra, pp. 52-56.
2.
3. See, for instance, TBV, p. 327 ff., PHMS, pp. 25-26, AVP, St. 26
and the SM. thereon, etc.
See infra, p. 187, f.n. 4, p. 190, f.n. 1, and p. 193.
