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154 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE without, of course, being confused with their positive counterpart (svatattva) in an intimate union. If these negative traits were mere non-existents-non-existents' (tuccha) in an unreal sense of the word--then they could not be described as clothness' or 'fruitness' etc. Total negation is one thing and negation of determinate, or even determinable, traits with reference to an existent is quite another. The latter type of negation is negative in a particular ontological setting, although in a different ontological setting these traits may assume a definitely positive character like the jarness in the present context. In other words, position and negation are relative terms and what is the one under one set of circumstances may become the other under a different set of circumstances.'
The factors determining whether an aspect of a particular factual situation is positive or negative depend upon the material (dravya), the place (kşetra), the time (kāla) and the state (bhāva) attaching to the situation. The first and the last among these four factors specify the internal and the remaining two factors specify the external condition of the fact or the object in question. In other words, the material
as such, produces the cognition of its non-existent form in the jar". SVJha, p. 244. The italics and what is included within the brackets are as in the original.
Another kā., also of Kumārila, bears out the same truth :
nästītyapi ca samvittir na vastvanugamädste /
jñānam na jāyate kiñcidupastambanavarjitam // MSV, p. 478, ka. 16 and SVJha, p. 245. 1. Cf. svadharmyapekṣayā yo dharmaḥ sattvādih / sa eva svadhar
māntarāpekṣayā dharmi / evam evānekāntātmakavyavasthopapatteḥ / TRD, p. 235.
