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CHAPTER V
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No. 1, cannot be found together without bringing about a "split in the integrity of the locus”. An endeavour to locate the two in two different abodes will, it is said, violate the Jaina answer to the objection that the two characters refer to two aspects of the same thing, and not to two different things, and would in turn become the target of a new difficulty, viz.,
3. Anavasthā or regressus ad infinitum, for the following reason : each of the two 'aspects of a thing-identity and difference--will have to be at once both identical with, and different from, the other, if at least for the reason of avoiding absolutism or extremism (ekāntatva), to which the Jaina objects. This bifurcation, once started, will go on ad infinitum.
4. Sankara or confusion is another difficulty which is assumed to overtake the Jaina in the pursuit of his theory. It arises when there is an incidence of two mutually opposed natures in either of the two elements, viz., 'identity' or
difference'. That is, identity will be an abode both of itself and of its opposite'. Difference also will behave in a similar way. Such behaviour on the part of either is thought to introduce a state of confusion into the abode concerned.
5. Vyatikara or “Mutual Exchange of natures is yet another of the erroneous consequences attributed to the Jaina view. The incidence of the two opposed natures of identity and difference in a common abode leads, it is stated, to a 'mutual exchange”', of their natures. This would result in the
1.
yugapadubhayaprāptis sankaraḥ / PMHS, f.n. 3. Vimaladāsa, however, describes it as: sarveşāṁ yugapat prāptis sankaraḥ /
SBT, p. 82. 2. Cf. parasparavişayagamanam vyatikaraḥ / SBT, p. 82.
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