________________
138
JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
ability or self-contradictoriness with regard to his hypothesis of the ultimacy of the dual postulate, then an unequivocal answer would be demanded to the following question :
(d) Could the Jaina formulate a satisfactory theory which would avoid the objections under (a), (b) and (c) as well as suggest a constructive view of reality?
Of these four questions, the first and the second are evidently advanced from the points of view of the theorists of identity (abhedavādin) and of difference (bhedavādin) respectively. Prima facie, the third question is directed against the Jaina because the target of the criticism under question is some kind of identity and difference or ubhayavāda. The Jaina, however, does not identify himself with the kind of theory implied by (c) since it is, according to him, suggestive of a mechanical combination of the theories implied by (a) and (b). His own theory-which is undoubtedly a type of the philosophy of identity-in-difference, but sharply distinguished from the schools bearing the same description by its unmistakably unique approach to the nature of reality—is described as “Jātyantaravāda' which may be rendered as the theory of uniqueness or theory of unique synthesis. Besides avoiding the pitfalls under the abovementioned first three questions, this theory is claimed to put forth a distinctive view of the nature of reality.
A consideration of the four questions may now be undertaken. In carrying out this procedure it will be both convenient and necessary to treat the first two questions, viz., (a) and (b), jointly, and the other two separately. A
