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CHAPTER IV
111 unique atomistic entities, viz., the viśesas conceived by the Vaišeșika philosopher, have, despite their divergent traits in other respects, a close resemblance to the unique and discrete particulars conceived under the Buddhistic doctrine of svalakṣaṇavāda. The Vaiseșika is, however, saved from propounding, like the Buddhist, a philosophy of total difference by introducing into the Vaišeșika theory of reality the principle of samavāya, or the necessary relation, which may be loosely described as the element of identity in the system.
Samavāya represents the relational bond between such two inseparable (ayutasiddha) relata as dravya (substance) and guna (property). It would, therefore, be better to describe it as a unifying or synthesising principle than as identity, although it is the nearest equivalent to identity in the Vaiśesika system. A somewhat closer treatment of it may be reserved for a later occasion.' It has, however, already been suggested that samavāya, despite its being a so-called intimate or necessary relation, is after all external in nature and therefore does not make any difference to the inward being of the entities it connects. This external character, therefore, weakens its claim for being treated as genuine identity. In maintaining the external character of samavāya, the Vaiseșika is no doubt in keeping with the temper of his "philosophy of distinctions”. It is difference rather than unity or identity which is the basic rule of the system. If samavāya were invested with a rich internal character it would cut at the root of his atomistic, pluralistic
1. See Chapter VII. 2. See Chapter VII.
