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134 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE of the bheda (anya) view and the abheda (ananya) view each of which (aikāntikam) is characterised as fallacious (mịşā).'
Kant
"The actual objects of our experience," observes Watson, interpreting Kant's 'Analogies of Experiences', are necessarily conceived of as substances, i. e., as things which in all their changes, yet maintain their identity ... If we suppose that substances could come into being or cease to be, we destroy the condition under which alone there is any unity in our experience ... There is no experience, then, except of objects which are determined as permanent in the process of change." Showing how 'both elements’, viz., 'the succession' (change) and the permanent' ('the abiding') are ‘indeed, inseparably involved in all existence Norman Kemp Smith clearly states: "Substance, Kant insists, is not a bare static existence in which changes take place, but a dynamic energy which by its very nature is in perpetual necessitated change. Change is not change in, but change of, substance.""
1.
duśitā sādhitā vāpi na ca tatra balabalam / kadăcin niścitaṁ kaiścit tasmān madhyasthatā varam // tato'nyanānyate tasya sto naştaś ceti kirtyate /
tasmāccitravadevāsya mrşā syādekarūpatā // MSV, p. 633. 2. PKEW, p. 199.
In the words of Kant himself : "I find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the common understanding, has preposited this permanence as a substratum of all change in phenomena; indeed, I am compelled to believe that they will always accept this as an indubitable fact. Only the philosopher expresses himself in a more precise and definite manner, when he says: "In all changes in the world the
substance remains, and the accidents alone are changeable." 3. CPRM, p. 138, CPRMax, pp. 161-166. 4. CKCPR, p. 362,
