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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
because they are different-as indicated by the very expression : substance and its attributes, which implies a distinction between the two.
There is an important trend in Dvaitism which deserves notice in our discussion of the role of identity "amidst' difference. In spite of the claim that Dvaitism is a "radical pluralism” and that "everything is unique" etc., the only "independent entity” in this system is God and everything else is "absolutely dependent upon his will". As a matter of fact, it is pointed out that “Madhva goes so far as to ascribe even the being of everything also to God”.! It is not, therefore, surprising that Dvaitism maintains that all words are said ultimately to refer to God. Even a moderate twist of his 'God-intoxicated' monotheism will yield first-rate material for a monistic idealism which can install identity as the sole reality and, thereby, banish difference by which Dvaitism, rather incongruously, sets such a high store.
1. Cf. “There is 'Višeşa' which will step in and account for the
fundamental identity between the essential nature of anything and the thing itself...” RRS, p. 506. Also, "The object and so many differences are identical with one another and yet separate from one another. There is no mystery in that sort of relationship. There is no miracle either. There is what Madhva calls Višesa in every object". Ibid., pp. 297-8. See also p. 511. This would mean that viseșa is not merely the basis of difference, as it ordinarily means, but also of identity although identity is secondary in relation to difference. The entire
position, however, does not seem to hang together consistently. 2. EIP.
Ibid., p. 5.9. 4. Cf. ibid., p. 192, and RRS. 5. RRS, p. 500. 6. Cf. EIP, p. 190, para 2.
