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CHAPTER III
93
distinction (abhinna) should, despite their difference, form a single entity, on the ground that their essence is brahman, then the critic will point out that they become liable to the opposite error of holding non-distinction, or identity, as the fundamental reality.
Thus none of the three possibilities, which correspondingly centre round the notions bhinnābhinna (simultaneous distinction and non-distinction), bhinna (distinction), and abhinna (non-distinction), is, according to Rāmānuja, tenable; and consequently bhedābhedavāda, it is concluded, falls to the ground.
Bhedābhedavādins, however, defend themselves against this, as against Advaitic attacks, on the firm ground that the co-existence of bheda and abheda in reality is an indisputable, and, therefore, uncontradictable, verdict of pramāņa or valid knowledge. If this co-existence is a valid truth, then the several objections of Rāmānuja will lose their force. The fact that bhedābhedavādins have not fully succeeded in defending this truth does not detract from the value of their recognition of the truth. It is needless to go minutely into the polemical subleties of bhedābhedavādins in defence of their position. Some of the arguments from the bhedābheda viewpoint have been outlined in the course of our account of the several schools of bhedābheda philosophy.
1. Cf. Vedānta sūtras, pp. 134-135, 189-193 and 195 f.
Cf. the following observation which represents the general bhedābheda attitude to the problem: pramānataś cet pratīyate ko virodho'yam ucyate / virodhe cāvirodhe ca pramānam karanam matam //
