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1354
SAHRDAYĀLOKA vakṣye vyañjana-rūpaņe. (III. 27 S.D.) ratyā"di-jñāna-tādātmyād eva yasmād raso bhavet, atósya sva-prakāśatvam
a-khaņdatvam ca siddhyati.” (III. 28 S.D.) (pp. 86-93, ibid) -
The substance of the above nine karikás is understood as follows. But prior to that it may be noted that as compared to M. or Abhinavagupta himself, V. has admirably summerised the wisdom of the Kashmir School of thought in flowing and lucid karikās, the substance of which proceeds as -
Rasa is not an object of knowledge, i.e. it is not knowable or jñāpya, as it is never absent from its own cognition. When rasa is there it is invariably cognised. This is not so with reference to physical objects such as a jar and the like, which, in the absence of light or revealer, ceases to be an object of cognition. In short, rasa is ‘pari-passu' with its apprehension. It does not exist beyond the existence or scope of its own apprehension. Physical objects such as a jar, even though existing, may not be apprehended.
Rasa can not be said to be of the nature of physical effect i.e. it is not 'kārya' or 'caused' either: Rasa can not be said to be caused' or kārya, because it is cognised along with the cognition of the combination of the vibhāvā”dis. If rasa were caused by the vibhāvā"dis then its cognition would continue even after the cognition of vibhāvā”dis is over. But this is not so. As Abhinavagupta has put it, rasa is “vibhāvā"di-jīvitā'vadhiḥ” - i.e. rasa is apprehended neither a moment before or after the cognition of vibhāvā”dis. Thus if it were “kārya” or caused, during the apprehension of rasa, the cognition of vibhāvā”dis should cease. The karana-jñāna and kārya-jñāna are never simultaneously cognised. The knowledge of the application of sandal-paste and the knowledge of the feeling of happiness that results from the former are sequential and never simulataneous. But rasa is simultaneously cognised in the same breath as when the vibhāvā"dis are also cognised. Thus rasa-bodha has no 'vibhāvā"di-jñāna' as its cause.
Rasa, says Viśvanātha, can not be said to be 'nitya' or eternal, which is ‘anādi' and 'ananta' i.e. which has neither beginning nor end. Rasa can not be ‘nitya' for we do not apprehend it in moments prior to the apprehension of vibhāvā"dis. Thus as it is 'bereft of prior cognition' - "pūrva-samvedanójjhita", it can not be said to be
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