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Rasa-nişpatti-vicara in Abhinavagupta
1511
Gnoli translates (pp. 35, 36, ibid): "If you say that for this very reason what is perceived is not delight but the reproduction of delight, this answer, we reply, could only be made by a man of dull wits. For a thing different from the usual one can be inferred from more apparently similar effects, only if the effect, from which it is inferred is really derived from a different cause and is recognised as such by a person of experience. An inexperienced person can infer from them the usual cause only. From some perticular scorpions, for instance, it is legitimate to infer that their cause is cow-dung; and the inference, from them, of another scorpion, as their cause, would be nothing but a false cognition. But when the cognition of logical reason e.g. The Smoke - is erroneous, the inference based on this apparent logical reason will itself be invalid. The inference from mist (whether it be supposed by the observer to be smoke, or whether the latter is aware of its being only a reproduction of the true logical reason) of something which is a reproduction of fire, is nodoubt unsound. Indeed, a veil of mist something which reproduces smoke and is recognised as a reproduction - does not legitimate the inference of a heap of red roses, (we take 'jasmine') namely something that reproduces fire."
Gnoli (pp. 35) adds a foot-note here (No. 2) (pp. 35, 36) which reads as -
"Bhatta Tota's reply (set out in the following lines) may be summarized: Assuming that the Determinants, etc., are perceived as unreal or artificial (kṛtrima), they cannot legitimize the inference of either Delight or an imitation of Delight. From a mistaken or apparent logical reason, (e.g. a cone-shaped cloud mistaken for a pillar of smoke; the cone-shaped cloud does not stand in any causeeffect relation to fire, and is thus a mistaken logical reason. We cannot infer fire (in this case, mistaken cognition would occur) nor, still less, anything imitating fire (e.g., as A.G. says, a heap of read roses). A person of experience can undoubtedly infer from two things, which to the layman are apparently the same, the respective causes of each of them (example: the scorpions. According to tradition there are two kinds of scorpions, one kind being bron from other scorpions, and the other kind from dung); but in the present case the logical reason is nevertheless mistaken or apparent (the determinants, etc., are perceived as 'Krtrima') and as such an effect is neither of delight nor of an imitation of the delight. Thus, for a person of experience the inference of something which imitates delight is impossible. The inference of delight made by an inexperienced person is a from of mistaken cognition. H.C. explains ayam bhavaḥ prasiddhād rati-lakṣaṇāt kāraṇād ratyanukaraṇam nāma kāraṇa'ntaram tat-prabhavāś ced anubhāvāḥ syuḥ.
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