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1576
SAHRDAYALOKA
worldly perceptions as direct knowledge (pratyaksa), inference (anumāna), āgama or verbal authority, or observation of similitude which at local level give birth to the apprehension of worldly ratyādi-i.e. delight, etc. It is different from the knowledge of a mita-yogin which is like a third person's observation. (taṭastha). It is also different from a para-yogins experience of the self, which a compact one. The reason is that in this perception of the higest yogin, all worldly objects melt away,and hence the beauty imparted by the colouring by contact with these worldly objects is missing here. Thus there is "saundarya -viraha"-in a-mita-yogin's perception. Perception, of rasa differs from all these perceptions because, as explained. by Abhinavagupta, in the apprehension of delight (rati) etc. by worldly means, there is possibility of an attitude to possess and avoid what is agreeable or pleasure-giving and non-agreeable or pain-giving respectively thus there is "hānòpādāna-buddhi." This creates an obstacle in rasa-percepation. In the case of mita-yogin, because of taasthya there is lack of distinctness-a-sphutatva, and in -case of rasana-vyāpāra 'sphuaṭatvábhāva" is absent. In case of para-yogin's apprehension, there is absence of beauty or 'saundarya-viraha', for the material that causes colouring has vanished. In the gustation-rasanātmaka samvedana-there is no tāṭaasthya as the self of the enjoyer enters into it, i.e. the enjoyer feels being part of the experience. He does not feel that whatever he is experiencing belongs to someone else. In the act of aesthetic chewing- rasa-carvaṇā-the sāmājika apprehends the ratyā"di, staying as impressions in his own mind, through the agency of generaized determinants, etc. This apprehension is of the nature of aesthetic chewing-"rasyamāna-svabhāvā." The idea is that the taste of this special apprehension is only during the time of the apprehension of vibhāvā"dis; i.e. it is of the form of a perception. To say that 'rasa' is an "object" of perception is resorting to metaphorical expression, for, in fact, the perception, the process, itself is tasting. There is no possibility of the rise of obstacles here, as this perception, when it takes place, is beyond obstacles, i.e. it is a "vita-vighnā pratītiḥ."
Simply for this reason only the vibhāvā"di-s can not be said to be the production causes-kāraka-hetu-of rasa-perception, for, in that case rasa-perception should continue to occur even when the vibhāvā"di-s cease to exist. But this is not the case. The moment the curtain drops rasa-perception is over and the sāmājika again crashlands on the ground of everyday reality. In the same tune the vibhāvā❞di-s can not be said to be the causes of cognition (jñapti-hetu) of rasă"di, for 'rasa' has no prior objective existence. As a pot lying in a room in darkness is revealed by torch, in the same way rasa, pre-existing before the art-performance begins, is not
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