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1574
SAHṚDAYALOKA
so, there is little room, in this case, for a power inherent in words. But, instead of answering to this objection, I will pose a question to this clever logician, (actually, the term is Mīmāmsaka, not naiyāyika)-who knows so well the mature of perception, and it is the following: Do you think that the apprehension of Rasa is merely apprehension of the feelings of some other person? You do not deserve to fall into such a mistake. In this case, indeed, the said apprehension would be but an inference of the feeling proper to such and such people; what sort of a Rasa could it then possess? But the tasting of Rasa, which is made up of a non-ordinary camatkāra, and is animated by the gustation of the determinants, etc., proper to poetry, cannot certainly be so cendemned as to be placed on the same level as the ordinary processes of memory, inference, etc. Rather, the truth is that he whose heart possesses the latent traces of the ordinary inferential process from the effect to the cause etc., does not apprehend the determinants and so on, as if he were indifferent; being instead at the mercy of his own sensibility-which quality is also called consent of heart-, he rather apprehends them without mounting on the path of memory, inference, etc., as if merged in a gustation, suitable to an identification (with the determinants, etc.), which is, so to say, the sprout of the tasting of Rasa, about to appear in all its fullness. This tasting, again, is not already born in the past, from some other means of knowledge, so that it is, now, a form of memory; nor is it arisen now from some other means of knowledge, for as to a non-ordinary thing, the direct perception, etc., are devoid of any power. Hence, the expressions 'determinants', etc. are of non-ordinary nature; for as Bharata himself had said: "The word 'determinant' is used for the sake of clear knowledge." In everyday life, they are called causes, not determinants. The term 'consequent', is, it too, nonordinary: "Because the representation"-Bharata says "by means of words, gestures, and the temperament, makes one experience (the mental states) it is called "Consequents". This experiencing, provoked by the consequents, is nothing but an identification with the said feelings. In everyday life, they are called effects, not consequents. Therefore, just with this view in mind, namely, that we do not apprehend a feeling of others, Bharata has made no mention of the permanent mental states, in the sutra "Out of the union of the determinants, the consequents and the transitory mental states, the birth of Rasa takes place on the contrary, mention of it would have been a source of difficulty. Such expressions, as "The permanent mental state becomes Rasa", are due to correspondence only-because, that is to say thods, 19, that is to say the gustation arises, beautiful, as it is, thanks to the trace, latent within us, of the feeling corresponding to the determinants and the consequents; i gnist Jod! bas some to nonqs199 907 2wollof Waterbomun SH to all 995 26
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