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Rasa-nispatti-vicāra in Abhinavagupta
1575 and because in worldly life, in the stage, that is, of the knowledge of the feeling of others'-a knowledge, let us say, truly indispensable as regards the consent of heartwe are able to apprehend the permanent feelings of delight, etc. from things as gardens, brisling of the hairs, and so on. The transitory mental state, is no doubt a feeling, but, since it is enjoyed in so far as it is entirely dependent on the principal one, it is reckoned by Bharata among the determinants and the consequents.
Therefore, the 'brith of Rasa', mentioned in the sūtra, must be intended as the birth of a relishing-which relishing is a sort of immersion in gustation, appearing as superior to all the other ordinary feelings of delight, etc., that may be aroused by different causes, as, f.i., meeting with a friend, and appear to develop gradnally. This gustation, therefore, is only a manifestation, not a revelation-which is the operation of the means of knowledge., and not even a production which is the operation of the means of action.
"but", -at this point someone might argue-“If this gustation is neither a cognition. nor a production, then what is it ?- But we reply-have we not said that this Rasa is of a non-ordinary nature ? What are then, these determinants ? Are they revealing causes or producing cause? We reply to this question that they are neither revealing nor peoducing, but only something which serves to realize the gustation. Does any such thing appear elsewhere ? But for the very reason why it does not appear we say that it is of a non-ordinary nature. But (someone might say) in this way Rasa is not an object of cognition (a-prameya). Let us admit itwe reply -and what of it? For, since from its gustation, pleasure and instruction derive, what other do you desire ? But you might say, it is not ascertained by any means of knowledge. This is untrue we reply, because its real existence is unconfutable datum of our own consciousness; besides, this gustation is a particular form of knowledge. And that is enough. Therefore, the said Rasa is of a non-ordinary nature-so that even alliterations of harsh or soft sounds can be suggestive of it, though they are of no use as to meaning. Here, then, there is not even the shadow of the metaphor.”
We will once again attempt a summary of Abhinavagupta's ideas on the nature of rasa and on the nature of rasa-experience.
A.G. is very clear that the perception of rasa is not of the form of memory for rasa is not an object experienced beforehand, with the help of other means of knowledge - i.e. it is not “pūrvánubhūta', which is remembered at this given moment. This aesthetic chewing.,, gustation-sarvaņā’ is brought about by, the combination of extra-ordinary vibhāvādi-s. So this perception is different from such
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