Sambodhi 2009 Vol 32

Author(s): J B Shah, K M patel
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 73

Vol. XXXII, 2009
Philosophical Concepts in Ancient Jaina Literature
67
object.23 Vādideva says: That jñāna is pramāna which has the determination of itself as well as of the object. It is able to tell us what is desirable and what is undesirable. Hence, it can be knowledge only.24 According to Jaina classification, there are two kinds, known as direct and indirect.25 From the practical point of view they are called perceptual and non-perceptual.
Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda
According to Jainism, a particular object can be viewed from different points of view. It possesses infinite attributes. These attributes or characteristics (dharmas) are not conceptual but they really exist in the object. The term ‘anekānta' means that every object possesses infinite aspects. When an object, which is anekāntātmaka (possesses many characteristics), is expressed in a particular form of judgment, the expression is known as Syādvāda. We can express the characteristics of an object from different points of view and these points of view are expressed by the word 'syât'. As it is said : The judgment about an object possessing many characteristics is called 'Syādvāda'.
The theory of 'Syādvāda' is also called 'Anekāntavāda,' because the relativity of judgment is nothing but a relative judgment about an object that possesses infinite aspects or qualities.
The Jainas believe in the theory of Relativity called the Sapta-bhanginaya or the Syādvāda :- (1) Relatively, it is ; (2) Relatively, it is not; (3) Relatively, it both is and is not ; (4) Relatively, it is indescribable; (5) Relatively, it is and is indescribable; (6) Relatively, it is not and is indescribable; (7) Relatively, it both is and is not and is also indescribable. Theory also says that a thing may be one as well as many, eternal as well as momentary.
Śankara, like Dharmakîrti and Śhāntarakṣita, bitterly criticizes this theory. He points out that contradictory attributes like existence and nonexistence, unity and plurality, eternity and momentariness etc., cannot belong to the same thing, just as light and darkness cannot remain at the same place or just as the same thing cannot be hot and cold at the same time. According to this view, the theory of Syādvāda itself may not be correct. Relativity cannot be sustained without the Absolute which is rejected by the Jainas. The theory looks like words of a lunatic. Again, the judgments cannot be indescribable, for they are clearly set forth. To describe them and to say that they are indescribable is a contradiction in terms.