Vyaptipanchakam

Author(s): Gangesa, Mathuranath, Raghunath, Jagdish
Publisher: Shrutbhuvan Sansodhan Kendra
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/009266/1

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Vyapti-Pancakam (With Mathuri, Didhiti, Jagadisi) - Translator Dr. Balirama sukla (M.A. Ph.D.)

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Vyapti-Pancakam (Five definitions of Vyapti) With commentaries Mathuri by Mathuranatha Didhiti by Raghunatha Vritti on Didhiti by Jagadisa : Translation and Footnotes : Dr. Balirama Sukla (M.A. Ph.D.) Shrutbhavan Research Centre

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Book Author Pune : Commentary: Translator Editor Publisher Ahmedabad : : : : : : Type-setting: Vyapti-Pancakam Gangesa Mathuranatha, Raghunatha, Jagadisa Dr. Balirama H. Sukla (M.A.,Ph.D.) Muni Vairagyarati vijaygani Shrutbhavan Research Centre, Pune Distributors:~ Shrutbhavan Research Centre 47/48, Achal Farm, Nr. Saccai mata mandir, Katraj-Pune-411046 Mo. 7744005728 (9.00 am to 5.00 pm.) www.shrutbhavan.org Email: shrutbhavan@gmail.com Shrutbhavan Research Center (Ahd. Branch) C/o. Umang Shah B-424, Tirthraj Complex, Opp V.S. Hospital, Madalpur, Ahmedabad-380006, M. 9825128486 Virati Graphic Phone: 08530520629, 7383183665

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Publisher's Note 'Shrutbhavan Research Center' as it is newly born in Katraj, Pune, works in various field of oriental research-projects. Also, encourages them who have keen interest in them. There are boundless research-works such as 1. Critically editing of rare texts which are not published till now, 2. Making dictionaries of narration of peculiar terms 3. Making dictionary of only terms used in widely existing Jaina literature that may cause to know where a word is used in what sense. 4. Re-editing of published-works with the help of handwritten manuscripts. and 5. Publication of such treaties which endorse our basic oriental research work. Of them, this present work of English-translation by the late Dr. Baliram Sukla, is uncommon and an absolute-concurrence of them who are keenly interested in science of Navya Nyaya. This text namely Vyaptipancakam being taught even in foreign, is really expensive in field of science of logic and language also. Such a more treaties are required to be translated into universal languages. Today's the late Dr. Baliram Sukla had truly assisted to us with the English-translation of Vyapti-pancakam along with Mathuri, Didhiti, Jagadisi we are ensured that publishing this work by us, will lead a hand to them who are desirous to know the system of philosophy viz. Navya Nyaya. This book is published with the contribution of Juhu Scheme Jain Sangha Jnankhata. Readers are requested to deposite fixed amount in Jnanadravya. We, always Heartily thankful to Smt. Chandrakalaben Sundarlal Sheth Family, Mangrol (Gujarat), and Bhaishree (International Jain Foundation - Mumbai) for their dedication as well as truly become a pillar for our entire activities of Shrutbhavan Research Centre,Pune. Bharat Shah (Hon. President)

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Editorial As, someone Sanskrit poet said - "There are many of holly texts and various types of vidyas but time is more less than that.' Same like that happens with the late Dr. Baliram sukla, who finished the translation work of 1. Vyapti-pancaka-rahasya composed by Mathuranath Tarkavagisa 2. Didhiti composed by Raghunath Siromani 3. Didhiti-vivritti composed by Jagdisa Tarkalankar, but could not evaluate them and breathe his last breath. Since, he was my teacher on Navya nyaya, he handed over that to me with the purpose of further finishing. Even though, not having supreme perfection in morden language i.e. English, the present work is edited as it is with the assistance of Rajendra C. Jain [Research Scholar], Pankaj Jaje (Ph.D. Fellow, C.A.S.S. Uni, of Pune), and Shailesh Shinde (Research Trainee, Shrutbhavan Pune.) Mistakes, occurred while editing the text, are being believed to get with their appropriate judgement. Date. 23-3-2011 - Vairagayarati vijay

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: Contribution : Juhu Scheme Jain Sangh Pleasant Palace, N. S. Road No.5, JVPD Scheme, Mumbai Shri Adinath Jain Shwetamber Murtipujak Sangh, Old Bhaji Bazar, Tajana Peth, Akola-444001 (Mah.)

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Index Navya Nyaya Introduction: Vyapti-Pancaka Vyaptipancaka-rahasyam - prathamaM lakSaNam (First definition) - fecitei 800 (Second definition) - tRtIyaM lakSaNam (Third definition) - agef &014 (Fourth definition) - paJcamaM lakSaNam (Fifth definition) 74 76 Vyapti-pamcaka-Didhiti-Jagdisi - prathamaM lakSaNam (First definition) - Facile 80 (Second definition) - aatei 48014 (Third definition) - caturthaM lakSaNam (Fourth definition) - paJcamaM lakSaNam (Fifth definition) 84 85 100 117 122 126 Appendix-1 A Terminology (San.-Eng.) Appendix-1 B Terminology (Eng.-San.) Appendix-2 A Figures (Eng.) Appendix-2 B Figures (San.) Appendix-3 Brief Introduction of Dr. Baliram sukla Appendix-4 Bibliography 131 136 138

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NAVYA-NYAYA - Dr. Baliram sukla The history of the Buddhist and Jaina logic is considered to be the history of the middle period of logic. The great conflict of the Brahmana Nyaya and the sramana Nyaya resulted in the new trend of logic named 'Navya Nyaya.' (Hol Rp) The old Brahmana Nyaya as if was completed with Udayanacarya (udayanAcArya) and the further development took a new turn resulting in origination of Navya Nyaya. The vigorous flow of logic became speedy with "Tattvacintamani' (arafaalhfut) written by Gangesa, (FT'TST) which not only influences all the orthodox systems of the Indian philosophy but left its traces also in all the later disciplines of learning in India. After the conflict with the Jaina and Bauddha logic which took place around 1000 A.D. the Brahmanic logicians decided to establish 16 categories of the Nyaya system. Among them the development of the category of pramana (941) is the most essential. Without the solid foundation of pramana the establishment of prameyas (YAT:) would not be possible. Hence Gangesa, the author of Tattvacintamani, established the Navya Nyaya philosophy as pramana-pradhana-sastra (4411912012) instead of concentrating on prameyas. From this time onwards Pracina Nyaya is known to be prameya-sastra (TAPa) and Navya Nyaya is known to be pramana-sastra (441217).

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8 Navya Nyaya as pramana-sastra became pure logic. The main purpose of it was not to show the path of liberation but to establish reliable pramanas. Navya Naiyayikas have left the speaking about the path towards liberation or purusarthas (f) etc. They have laid emphasis on the correct apprehension of thing. This in their view will be a good ground for realization of truth. So rather than speaking about the goal they started considering the means of achieving this goal. For the solid base for the discussion of pramanas Navya Naiyayikas had neglected the sixteen categories of Pracina Nyaya and had accepted only the seven categories of Vaisesika () such as Samanya, Visesa, Samavaya, Abhava (, fa, 41, 3119) etc. Besides the Navya Nyaya trend concentrated on the expressing of the reality of things by using the specific technical terms which will enable to struck a precise report between the speaker and the listener, and so there will be no misunderstandings while disobeying the real nature of the things. Not only these technical terms were introduced. Also the new categories like Pratiyogita, Avacchedakata (f, 3) etc. were used. Navya Nyaya puts forward the new qualities and attributes and the nature of the things which is different from the things generally apprehended by us due to these new qualities and attributes. We all know that in category of realities the changes happen according to the circumstances and these changes are always realized by us, but we usually do not express them in words. Navya Nyaya by introducing pratiyogita, avacchedakata etc. tried to express these changes already in the very definition of things. Then the scholars were astonished and glad being provided these new series of words used by Navya Nyaya which were expressing the circumstantial

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changes of things. It seems that by that time these scholars belonging to all the schools of thought were already realizing the difficulty of expressing their thoughts in the traditional way of argumentation. Therefore after the introduction of the terminology of Navya Nyaya it was readily accepted by all the systems of the Indian learning instead of the previous patterns used till now. In this way the Navya Nyaya school increased the capability of valid and precise argumentaion. Even though there was the discussion in Pracina Nyaya from the nature of reasoning to nigrahasthana (FUETTA) which also were the aspects of argumentation, but still the main aim of Pracina Nyaya was prameya, not pramana. The categories mentioned by Gautama (tilah) were widely used by this later trend of Navya Nyaya. Unfortunately later Navya Nyaya texts became very difficult to understand because this extensive usage of the technical terms like pratiyogita, avacchedakata etc. which were totally incomprehensible for a layman. This might be also the reason why so few persons also nowadays choose to study the Navya Nyaya systems. To become master in this system there is a necessity of intellectual hard work opens the entrance in this field. This also is the reasons why Navya Nyaya was criticized by other schools. The opponents had told that the Naiyayikas are making simple things difficult by using formula and technical phrases. But their objections are not correct as without the using of the terminology of Navya Nyaya we are unable to differentiate even between the absence of only a jar from the 'absence of a jar and a cloth both.' We do realize the difference between these two types of absences but we cannot express this difference without using the technical terms of Navya Nyaya. Similarly there is the difference between the

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10 instances of knowledge there is fire on the mountain' and the 'mountain is fiery' (parvate agnih and parvath agniman (900 37117:, yaa: 341141). But this minute difference can not be expressed nor explained without taking the help of the technical terms of Navya Nyaya like prakarata, visesyata (Yohlar, fagterai) etc. The ordinary words of the ordinary language are simply unable to express the subtle difference of these two sentences. There are many other examples for which we need to take the help of the technical terms of Navya Nyaya and this proves the uniqueness of this system. Not only in the field of philosophical discussions. But without the terms of Navya Nyaya it is difficult to explain the meaning of the first sloka of Amarakosa yasya jnanamayasindho.' (pey 511441FT-ET) Why the pronoun yat (Tl) denotes this particular thing and not another ? The answer to this question can be found only with the help of the Navya Nyaya terminology. The well-known fourth sutra of Gautama has only fifteen letters. But Gangesopadhyaya had written the whole his treat Tattvacintamani consisting of 2000 lines only on it. Besides Tattvacintamani, later was so widely commented. It is wellknown that the scholars from Mithila, Bengal, Dravida regions and Maharashtra had written enumerable commentaries on this treat on which later so many great scholars, have written subcommantaries and sub-sub-commentaries and so the Navya Nyaya writings of many million lines came into existence. In this way Navya Nyaya being a new school has also quite an old and lengthy tradition. And the commentaries and sub-commentaries like Didhiti, Jagadishi, Gadadhari, Mathuri and Krodapatras (afufa, HNTGIRIT, PIIGTETT, Htech, sh1597) can not be considered to be just useless gossips. Expressing the weighted of this system a

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11 scholar had written all study Nyaya with enthusiasm and also write alse books on this system but only few can understand the secrets of this system. Here the question arises : What is the difference between the Pracina and Navya Nyaya ? Regarding this there are so many different views of the scholars. Some say that this is the type of discourse by using in abundance the words avacchedaka, avacchinna (avacchedaka, avacchinna) etc. what matters most in Navya Nyaya. But this is not correct. In the definition of God in Samadhipada (samAdhipAda) of Patanjalisutras (pataMjali sUtra) as sa purvesamapi guruh kalenavacchedat. (A danufa Te: CHI TIGIT) Here also the word avaccheda is used. But this text is not even related to Navya Nyaya. Then some other scholars say that Maharshi Gautama etc. to refute nairatmyavada, vijnanavada (tretag, fasllwait) of Carvaka (alaido), tenets of Bauddha etc. established existence self by inference. The aspects of inference for other's sake which are accepted in Nyaya were described in Sutra, Bhasya, Vartika and Tatparya-ika (FE, 94704, alac, dicefalcot) etc. and this should be considered to be Pracina Nyaya. And the treatises like Tattvacintamani, its commentaries and sub-commentaries which discuss only the components of pramans for the valid knowledge of categories should be considered to be Navya Nyaya. But such an approach also is not proper. If only due to the discussion of pramans some texts would be considered to be belonging to Navya Nyaya then the treaties of Jain Nyaya and Bauddha Nyaya where pramans are discussed also would be considered to be belonging to Navya Nyaya.

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12 Other scholars opinion that the refutation of the doctrines of Carvaka and Bauddha which are found in the ancient treatises prior to Tattvacintamani should be considered as belonging to Pracina Nyaya and the works after Tattvacintamani and its commentaries where the refutation of the views of other orthodox systems like Mimamsa, Nyaya (H14141, ) etc. is undertaken such works are to be considered as belonging to Navya Nyaya. But this view also is not quite correct as in the more ancient works also there is the criticism of the tenets of the orthodox systems of the Indian Philosophy. The term "Navya Nyaya" is a technical term. Gangesa who was an exceptionally great logician after the study of Nyayabhasya and its commentaries and sub-commentaries and also after the study of works by Dignaga (Fern) etc., wrote "Tattvacintamani" in the form of the essence of all these treatiese. From this work Nyayasastra was named as Navya Nyaya. The treatises prior to "Tattvacintamani" are known as Pracinanyaya. Some scholars do divide the Nyaya philosophy into three trends: Pracina, Navya and Navya-Navya. The period from Gautama sutras to Udayana is considered to be Pracina Nyaya. From Udayana to Didhitikara the trend is considered to be Navya Nyaya. From Didhitikara onwards it is Navya-Navya Nyaya. But in fact there is no ground for a such division in ancient new and modern Nyaya. Because almost in all these works we find a novelty of some issues. If the division is made in such a way then even more multiple divisions are possible and it may lead to the regresses and infinitude. Therefore it is better if we stick to the division accepted earlier.

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13 Navya Nyaya. (1) Gangesopadhyaya. Gangesopadhyaya is considered to be the founder of the Navya Nyaya school. By writing Tattvacintamani he had created the revolution not only in the field of the Nyaya philosophy but in all the branches of the Indian learning. This treatise changed the nature of thought and the method of the discussion of the philosophical doctrines. After the composition of Tattvacintamani mostly all the branches of the Indian philosophy, Rhetoric, Grammar, Literary criticism and even Ayurveda had accepted the new terminology and the method of argumentation of Navya Nyaya inspect of the technical terms like pratiyogita, avacchedakata etc. contained in it. All the writers of the later period made the language of Navya Nyaya the medium of expression of their idea. Since the 13th century in India the language of Navya Nyaya had been utilized in all the branches learning. The contribution of Gangesa to the Indian systems of learning is unparallel in the whole history of indology. There was not even a single writer in the medieval age who was not inspired very much by the magnumopus of Gangesa named Tattvacintamani. Tattvacintamani of Gangesa is divided into four chapters in which the four pramanas : perception, inference, analogy and the verbal testimony had been discussed. Gangesa had made a promise in the beginning of his work by writing the words pramanatattvamatra vivicyate (pramANatattvamatra vivicyate ) (here the essence of the means of attaining of the valid knowledge will be discussed). Only because of this reason the Navya Nyaya

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14 philosophy of often called pramanasastra. When reading Tattvacintamani we can see that Gangesa was influenced very much by Pracina Nyaya and inspired by the Prabhakara (prabhAkara) school of Mimamsa. The main conflict for Gangesa was not with the Buddhists as it was in the case of Udayanacarya. The main opponents of Gangesa were the Prabhakara Mimamsakas. During the time of Gangesa there was a very great influence of the Prabhakara Mimamsa in Mithila. Therefore the most of the arguments of Gangesa were developed on the opposition to the Prabhakara Mimamsa Philosophy. This is first of all obvious from the commentary on Tattvacimtamani by Rucidatta ( rucidatta). Gangesa was also very much impressed by Nyayamanjari (nyAyamaMjarI) by Jayanta Bhatta (jayanta bhaTTa). This Kashmir (kAzmIra) scholar was referred to for the first time in the Eastern India exactly by Gangesa. Gangesa was also a distinguished poet as it was mentioned by his son Vardhamana Upadhyaya. Gangesa himself also had mentioned that he was a poet. Regarding the family of Gangesopadhyaya the scholars had traced the reference to his family in the gotrapanthi (mach1/2f) of Mithila. His village was named Chidden (f) and situated in the state of Mithila. Unfortunately the more detailed information about it is still inaccessible. Gangesa belonged to Kasyapa gotra (). He was having three sons: Vardhamana, Supan and Hari (vardhamAna, supana, hari). In the register of gotra he had been described as pramanaguru. Nyayakoshakara Pt. Bhimacarya Zhalakikar (nyAyakozakAra paM. bhImAcArya jhaLakIkara) has mentioned Gangesa to be a resident of Bengal state, but perhaps it is just an obvious mistake. The time of Gangesa is stated to be the 11th century of Samvat (H). Some scholars say that Gangesopadhyaya was prior to 1030 A.D. They base this conclusion on the fact that the

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15 king Laksmanasena (7&HUTTA) was ruling Bengal in 1030 A.D. and there was a Pundit Halayudh Bhatt (EcliET VE) in his court. Gangesopadhyaya is considered to be prior to Halayudh Bhatt. Prof. Dinesa Chandra Bhattacarya (FGANG Elarf) had criticized the view of Dr. Keat, Dr. Vidyabhusana, Dr. Hari Prasad sastri etc. (ET. faahu, RUHIG girait) and had proved that the time of Gangesa was the 13th century A.D. according to historical evidence found in Mithila. Dr. Vidyabhusana had established that Gangesa was the native of the village Kharian (afen) situated in the state of Mithila. He had pointed out that some scholars point that Gangesa was a native of Mangroni (HIR) village situated near Madhubani (pari) in the state of Mithila. It is known that the earlier name of Mangroni was Mangalvani (Han). (2) Paksadhara Misra After Gangesa, Paksadhara Misra was the only scholar who established his own independent traditon in the field of Navya Nyaya by writing the commentary on Tattvacintamani name Aloka (341611). Aloka was the main treatise for study of Navya Nyaya all over India for so many years. Aloka was written on the three chapters of Tattvacintamani except Upamana (34717). The commentary Aloka was the only work of Paksadhara Misra known to scholars for very long time. Later after search and investigation two more works by Paksadhara Misra were found : Dravyaviveka and Nyayalilavativiveka (garaach, peccanicach). The manuscripts of them were found in the India Office Library together with a commentary of Vardhaman Updhyaya on Dravyaviveka. This is referred to in Nyayalilavativiveka. Nyayalilavativiveka is a more voluminous work but there is no any reference to Paksadhara Misra in it.

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16 Only in the colophon of an available manuscript there had been written. So Nyayalilavativiveka written by Paksadhara Misra is completed The other two works of Paksadhara Misra had been traced in Varanasi (arti). One of them is a commentary in the form of notes on Tattvacintamani and the other is the commentary on Nyayasiddhantadipa by sasadhara (ReFHGIAGIY PTSTETT). The Nephew of Paksadhara Misra named Vasudeva (vAsudeva) who was also his student had referred to another work named Pramanapallava (pramANapallava). The earlier name of Paksadhara Misra was Jayadeva Misra (hega A). There is aligned that once he was called for a debate and there he presented one of his doctrines for complete forthnight (paksa). After this he was named as Paksadhara. Most of the scholars are of the opinion that Jayadeva who is the author of Candraloka (Eigirild) was the same person as Paksadhara Misra. There is a famous legend that Raghunatha siromani (raghunAtha ziromaNi) after having completed his study on Navya Nyaya from Vasudeva Sarvabhauma (anyga HIDHTH) in Bengal was still not fully satisfied with his achievement. Having heard about the renowned scholarship of Paksadhara Misra, Siromani came to Mithila for further study from Paksadhara Misra. During that time the gurukul (Th) of Paksadhara Misra was very famous. And there were so many scholars there. There was also the restriction for newcomers to see Paksadhara Misra directly. Usually there were five pandits at the external gate and three pandits used to sit at the internal door. New students first met the scholars at the external gate. Only after the logical debate with them the newcomeras could proceed towards the internal door. Only after defeating the pandits at the internal gate a

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17 newcomer could meet Paksadhara Misra. Raghunatha Siromani defeated all the scholars and was introduced to Paksadhara Misra from whom he later got vast and deep knowledge of Navya Nyaya. There is a dispute among the scholars regarding the excellent scholarship of Paksadhara Misra in the subject of Navya Nyaya. In Paksataprakarana of Anumanakhanda (T&a1 prakaraNa anumAnakhaMDa) of Aloka the declines of samsayapaksata and samsaya-yogyata-paksata (HP9AT, H ered19&A) had been established. They indicate independent brilliant scholarship of the author. Influence of the thought of Paksadhara Misra on the development of doctrine of samanyalaksana (HIARIA&TUTT) and pragabhava (141a) is found even in the later works on Navya Nyaya. The time of Paksadhara Misra is believed to be the 13th century A.D. It is said that the statue of Paksahdara Misra was erected in front of Navadvipa university in Bengal. This statue was retched by Raghunatha siromani, his student and devotee. (3) Raghunatha siromani Tarkikasiromani, the jewel of logicians Raghunatha was a native of Bengal. He had lost his father already in his childhood. His mother sent him to the school of Vasudeva Sarvabhauma. Vasudeva started to teach Raghunatha from the very beginning. Later this child became the greatest logician of India of all the times. During the study years of Raghunatha, Paksadhara Misra was a very renowned scholar of Navya Nyaya in Mithila. No opponent could come even close to him in debate. There is as saying in praise of Paksadhara stating that there was a similarity between Sankara (Picha) and Vacaspati (aleyfa) but there was no

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18 opponent in debate for Paksadhara. Hearing about the renowned scholarship of Paksadhara Misra, Raghunatha Siromani came to Mithila to study under him. When after the debate with the pandits at the gate Raghunatha reached Paksadhara the aged scholar seeing Raghunatha being blind with one eye slightly ridiculed the new student by saying. "Indra (5-5) has thousand eyes, the lord Shiva has three, we all have two eyes, who are you having only one eye ?" Siromani on the spot gave a very befitting and answer, "It is correct that Indra has thousand eyes and the lord Shiva is having three eyes. As well that it is true that all of you are blind (having no eyes) when I see with the one eye of Nyaya." Receiving such a reply Paksadhara Misra was very much pleased and accepted Siromani as his disciple. By his excellence in the field of Nyaya, Raghunatha had superseded his teacher Paksadhara. He had directly refuted several theories of his teacher in his famous commentary of Tattvacintamani named Didhiti. The commentary of Paksadhara Misra on Tattvacintamani is also a very outstanding work. But Raghunatha Siromani in his treatise had proved that the doctrines which had been thought to be faultless unanimously by the galaxy of the scholars before him were defective and those which were proved by them to be wrong were declared faultless by Raghunatha when he argued in the debate. The same we can find in all of the works by Raghunatha. For example, he differs with Paksadhara Misra on the issue of samanyalaksana. At the time of debate Paksadhara Misra had said to Raghunatha Siromani :- "single eyed by birth, why are you refuting samanyalaksana which is obvious in the case of doubt ?" This was answered by Didhitikara in the chapter on samanyalaksana

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19 under the introductory heading atriya vadanti. (atrIyA vadanti ) The commentary by Raghunatha Siromani on Tattvacintamani named Didhiti is a very outstanding work in the field of Navya Nyaya. There are so many commentaries written on Tattvacintamani but the honor given to Didhiti by the scholars are not given to any other work. Later Didhiti was commented upon by many well-known subcommentators like Jagadisa, Gadadhara, Bhavananda, Mathuranatha etc. (jagadIza, gadAdhara, bhavAnaMda, ) and their works are studied and discussed all over India from Himalaya to Kanyakumari even nowadays. Apart from this work Raghunatha Siromani had also written commentary on other works like Khandanakhandakhadya, Nyayamanjari, atmatattvaviveka, Kiranavali (khaMDanakhaMDakhAdya, nyAyamaMjarI, Atmatattvaviveka, fault) etc. Besides these he had written an independent work named Padarthatatva-nirupana (padArthatattva - nirupaNa ) where he had refused the view about separateness being a quality and space and time being categories. In his works Raghunatha Siromani had criticized the theories established by his predecessors like samanyalaksana, kevalanvayi, kevalavyatirekanumana, pragabhava (sAmAnyalakSaNA, kevalAnvayi, kevalavyatirekAnumAna, prAgabhAva) and the theory that the knowledge of the counterpoisitive is the cause of the knowledge of absence. Raghunatha had also established arthapatti (presumption) (f) to be a separate means of valid knowledge etc. In this way he had given a revolutionary turn to the development of the Navya Nyaya school of the Indian logic. Therefore without any hesitation we can accept that Raghunatha Siromani was a true Siromani, a jewel on the crest of Navya Nyaya.

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20 (4) Yajnapati Upadhyaya ( ustufa 347827121 ) Yajnapati Upadhyaya was a Maithil Brahmin resident of Mithila. He was grandson of Gangesa Upadhyaya and son of Vardhaman Upadhyaya. He was born in the begining of 14th century. He had written an independent commentary on Tattvachintamani. Except pervasion his opinion is being quoted in all matters of Nyaya. Later critics have quoted him as Upadhyayastu' or 'Yajnapatyupadhyayastu.' (39157171FT) (yajJapatyupAdhyAyAstu) The commentary of Yajnapati Upadhyaya 'Prabha' (TH) on 'Tattvacintamani' is on there parts-Pratyaksa, Anumana, and sabda (979& 3T71 2706). He had left Upamana. The manuscripts of Prabha are very few. One copy is found at Goverment library of Darbhanga, in which its time is quoted 1428 saksamvat means 1486 A.D. Prof. Dinesh rejects about his heredity that he was son of Vardhman Upadhyaya and grandson of Gangesa Upadhyaya. He had also rejected the quotation of Sabda Kalpadruma (910G chc45h), that he was pupil of Vardhaman and Gangesa. He is of opinion, his father was Sivapati (fprayfa) who had written ane independent book on Nyaya on the base of same Yajnapati had written his Prabha. (5) Mathuranath Tarkvagisa ( H atet charitat) Mathuranath Tarkavagiaa was a Bengali Brahmin. His father Sriram Tarkalankar (STTH nafciatori) was a famous logician. The Primary learning of Mathuranath was from his father only. Then he went be learn Nyaya at famous logician Raghunath siromani. He was resident of Manihari (HffERT) town of Bengal.

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21 His period is being considered at 16th century. He had written commentaries on Tattvacintamani and Tattvacintamani Didhiti, which are famous by the name Mathuri (H1deg). It's name is 'Rahasya' (TE). He has his commentaries on "Kusumanjali' ( HiG ) and Atmatattva vivek (3416Hatalado). He has also written Mathuri on Pakshadhar Misra's Alok, but it is still unpublished. He has also an independent volume on Nyaya as 'Nyaya-Rahasya' (F4-FER). He was not only scholar but lucky also. His descendants are still at Manihari town. (6) Jagadisa Tarkalankara ( Heigt Achiricha) Jagadisa Tarkalankara was pupil of Bhavanand Tarkavagisa (alia ndaritzt). He has written a criticism on Didhiti which is famous and now known as "Jagdisi (HKGIYIT). On the Anuman chapter of Didhiti, Jagdishi and its pervasion is so scholarly written he supersedes Gadadhara ("TGTETT) and Mathuranatha. In addition to Didhiti he written commentary on Pakshadhara Misra's 'Alok' also. 'Sabda-Sakti-Prakasika' (1091f76 4 121061) 'Tarkamruta' (afqa) and 'Nyayadarsa' (PRIGES) are his independent volumes. 'Sabda-Sakti-Prakasika? is the best work in linguistics. Similarly he had tried to fill up the ocean of Nyaya in a jar in 'Tarkamruta. His period is being considered in 16th century. (7) Visvanatha Pancanana ( fartet UEFA ) Vishvanatha Pancanana was Bengali Brahmin and was resident of Bengal. Sriniwasa Bhattacarya (Pftar Harf) was his father. As a favour on his pupil Rajiv (Tula) he had written 'Nyaya-Siddhant-Muktavali (Priftian Tamt) in 1556 Shak.

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22 Eventhough he created 'Karikavali (or clasit) was rather difficult for his pupil as such again with kind heart he wrote commentary 'Muktavali' on 'Karikavali'. Also one criticism is found on Nyaya aphorisms known as Visvanatha Vritti (vizvanAthaafe). He was resident of Navadvipa (79814) but was stabled at Vrindavana (@GICA). He was trained in tradition of Raghunatha Siromani. The commentary on Nyaya-Siddhant-Muktavali known as 'Dinkari (FG71068) and its criticism "Ramrudri (T4651) are famous all over for its scholarship. (8) Gadadhara Bhattacarya ( HTGTETT TETaref) He was son of Jivacarya (alar) and resident of Bengal. He completed his study of whole Nyaya at Navadvip (navadvIpa) with Harirama Tarkavagisa (harirAma tarkavAgIza). His period is considered at middle of 17th century. He had written so many books, some of which are unavailable. Some of them are - (1) The criticism of Nyaya Kusumanjali (P11454HisKi), (2) 'Didhiti' on 'Alok' of Tattvacintamani, (3) Gadadhari (FTIGTETT) Atma-tattva-viveka, Didhiti-Prakasika (3415hlarafaa , afafayohiffroht). (4) Commentary on Muktavali (uhlasit) (5) The criticism of Durga-sapta-sati (GUTHHEINT) (6) Bahyanirnaya (qafufa) and by Vad-granth (alget) as, out of which most are not reliable. In this Saktivada (zaktivAda) Vyutpttivada (vyutpattivAda) are main. Some others Avacchedak-vada (379 759 Garg) Karanatavada (76 xurdian) Muktivada (final) Akhyatvada (AkhyAtavAda) Nahyarthvada (nArthavAda) Smritisamskarvada (Aialaig) Paryaptivada (qeifhaig) Sadrusyavada (HEX(15) Visayatavada (viSayatAvAda) Navyamatavada (navyamatavAda) Karakvad (Folha1c) are famous. Other "Vada' are not available. After Gadadhar the flow of Navya Nyaya was

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23 progressive. There were so many famous logicians who had enriched the store of Navya Nyaya. The nominated logicians after Gadadhar are as under. (1) Ramrudra Tarkvagisa (3745&adaritet) (1700 A.D.) The writer of criticism Didhiti, Vyaptivada (Zulharc) criticism etc. Shri Krisna Nyayalankara (sics PATITI) (1650 A.D.). Bhavadipika (Hracificht) (3) Krisnakant - Vidyavagisa (Eh our chiaraa anta) (1780 A.D.) Nyayaratnavali etc. (nyAyaratnAvalI) (4) Mahadeva Punatambekara (Helgaquaia ) (1790 A.D.) Nyayakaustubha (741471 FEL97) Vyapti-rahasya-criticism (QuilheRecht) etc. Later on Nyaya and Vaisesika (a 911906) are combinated. On the base of which so many volumes are constructed, out of which 'Tark-sangraha' (HAHE) is main. It was written by Annambhatta (37719) who was resident of south (1623 A.D.) There are so many criticism on his Tark-sangrah. It has been translated in so many Indian language. It's english translation is also published. This is prescribed in curriculum of so many universities all over. Similarly Nyaya-Sidhdhant-Muktavali of Visvanath Pancanan is unparallal work in Nyaya-Vaishesik. There are so many criticism on it. It has also translated in so many Indian languages and English.

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Introduction: Vyapti-Pancakam -- Dr. Balirama Sukla In our tradition of teaching on Navya Nyaya system of logic we start teaching of Navya Nyaya from Vyapti - pancakrahasya (mathuri) of Mathuranatha. There are different names have been used for vyapti by different schools of Indian logic, Viz. Avinabhava, Sahacarya, Niyama, Anaupadhikasambandha, Samaya, etc. (avinAbhAva, sAhacarya, niyama, anaupAdhikasaMbaMdhasamaya). In the Tattvacintamani of Gangesa it is stated as Avyabhicaritatva, (state of not having deviation) Vyapti is most important part of inference. Taking in to account its importance in the process of inferential knowledge, Acarya Annambhatta has said "Anumanasya dve Ange vyaptih Paksadharmata ca." (anumAnasya dve aGge, vyAptiH pakSadharmatA c|) There are two parts of inference, Vyapti and Paksadharmata, (existence of the reason in the subject.) Though the Tattvacintamani has been commented by several authors but Mathuri commentary on this portion, is taught first to get enter in this system. Because the Mathuri commentary on this portion is neither long nor short, therefore it is appreciated to enter in the field on Navya Nyaya system. Generally in north India naiyayikas start teaching on Navya Nyaya by Vyapti-pancaka-Mathuri but in South India they start this teaching by Gadadhari commentary on Didhiti on Tattvacintamani. Though the nature of vyapti relation is

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25 expressed in the phrase "where ever the smoke there is fire", but question arises how can we say 'where ever the smoke there is fire' with confidence ? and What is the theory behind this belief? Someone may doubt 'let there be smoke without fire' how can we remove this doubt about deviation? These are some questions should be answered. To answer these questions we will have to make universality of the relation. Without it we can't establish any theory, therefore Gangesa has narrated negative form of vyapti there would not be universality without negation. Avyabhicaritattva (absence of deviation) can't be defined without using negative term. Though naiyayikas have accepted pure affirmative form of inference but in day to day practice generally negative cum affirmative inference is used, therefore for universality of vyapti relation, vyapti should be defined in negative form, and so to say Gangesa has stated Avyabhicaritattva as vyapti which means 'absence of deviation.' When the absence of deviation is accepted as the nature of vyapti there is no need of observation of existence of all hetus (reasons) with all sadhyas (that which is to be established.) The deviation (vyabhicara) can be grasped in one instance of reason also, and the knowledge of deviation causes the knowledge of absense of deviations, this is because the knowledge of counterpositive is the cause of knowledge of absence. When someone looks fire in a hot-iron-ball, where is the absence of smoke, he realizes deviation between smoke and fire, thus he apprehends deviation in the form of Sadhyabhavavadvrittitva (sAdhyAbhAvavadvRttitva) 'occurrence of reason in that which has the absence of sadhya.' In this way there may be so many forms of deviation viz. 1. Sadhyabhavavadvrittitva (H&Haqqfara) 2.

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26 Sadhyasamanyadhikaranatva (HTZIARIETC uca) 3. Sadhyavaiyadhikaranyadhikranatva. (Heya afya yugtfurca) 4. Sadhyavadanyabhavadhikranatva. (sAdhyavadanyAbhAvAdhikaraNatva) 5. Hetvadhikaranavritti abhavapratiyogikatva. (hetvadhikaraNavRttyaHayfeifcora) etc. On the basis of absence of sadhya many definitions of deviation can be made. When in the end of definitions of deviation the term absence (abhava) is used that definitions become definitions of vyapti. The sadhyabhava-vadavrittitva (H2H10aGaraia) is first definition is personated by Gangesa. For the condition of vyapti, there is no need to see the coexistence of hetu and sadhya in all aces. Similarly there is no need to perceive all counterpositives of absence to grasp absence, after knowing one instance of smoke one can cognize the absence of smoke in the hot-iron-ball, and when one instance of absence of smoke is found in the locus of reason viz. fire the deviation becomes clear in between smoke and fire and when the perception of smoke does not happen in the locus of the absence of fire the deviation is not cognizer in between fire and smoke, therefore vyapti' in the form of absence of deviation is recognized. Thus the non-apprehension of deviation brings out the vyapti, in the form of non-deviation. 1. Sadhyabhava-vadavrittitvam. (HTEZH10acqarah) 'the mountain has fire because of smoke'-this inference is based on the definition of vyapti as "Sadhyabhava-vadavrittitvam." Here sadhya is fire, the absence of fire is sadhyabhava, the locus of it is water etc. there smoke does not exist. Therefore there is absence of occurrence in the smoke, hence this definition is applied in this inference. But if some one wants to infer smoke on the basis of fire, this definition of vyapti can't be applied, because in the locus of absence of smoke viz. hot-iron-ball the

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27 fire is located, therefore there is no absence of occurrence in the fire. According to Mathuranath the meaning of nondeviation is 'Sadhyabhavadhikarananirupitavrittitvabhava' (sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNanirUpitavRttitvAbhAva) the absence of occurrence indicated by the locus of absences of that which is to be established. Though this definition is based on 'Vyadhikranabahuvrihi (gif) compound which is not considered correct to apply in every case, but there is no other way to maintain the reason as non-occurrent (avritti f) in the locus of the absence of sadhya without tripada vyadhikrana bahuvrihi (tripadavyadhikaraNabahuvrIhi) compound. Raghunath Siromani has stated the reason of rejection of this definition pointing out the fault of too narrow application (avyapti ) in the inference sadhya of which has incomplete occurrence (avyapyavritti f), therefore the second definition in the form of 'sadhyavadbhinnasadhyabhavavadavrttitvam' (sAdhyavadbhinnasAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvam) is introduced. In this inference 'this tree has the conjunction of monkey because of this-tree-ness', the first definition can't be applied because the reason viz. 'this-tree ness' occurred in this tree which has absence of conjunction of monkey in the root of this tree which is the substratum of the absence of sadhya. A monkey is conjoined with a branch of tree and not the root of tree, hence there is occurrence (vrittitva qft) indicated by the substratum (adhikarana (3) of the absence of sadhya, so there is a fault of too narrow application. Mathuranath has tried to remove this fault by modifying this definition. According to him 'the absence of occurrence of the reason indicated by the substratum which is the locus of that substratum-ness which is not delimited (avacchinna

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28 37910gal) by any characteristic and which is indicated by early mentioned sadhyabhavatva. (HTZT410a) The idea is here the absence of conjunction of monkey always with a part of tree viz. a branch and not root, there is absence of conjunction on monkey therefore the substratum-ness of the absence of mokey is determined by its root it is not 'niravacchinna' (Farosgal). The absence of monkey in quality etc. is not delimited by any attribute, therefore the locus-ness of the absence of conjunction on monkey non-determined is in quality and not in the tree, hence the quality would be locus of non-determined locus-ness and there tree-ness does not exist, therefore definition of vyapti is applied, but there would be fault of avyapti in the inference 'this has the absence of monkey because of existence here then on determined locus of absence of sadhya is not established. The conjunction of monkey is delimited by branches etc. Mathuranath answers that Acarya Gangesa has himself refuted this definition by the expression "Kevalanvayinyabhavat? (kevalAnvayinyabhAvAt). Hence this fault should not be considered here. The effort of Mathuranath to remove the fault shown by Raghunatha is to make another definition only, without change in definition Mathuranath also can't remove the fault of avyapti (31241A). Gangesa also has removed that fault by making second definition 'sadhyavadbhinna' (FTE207967) etc. Therefore there is similarity in their efforts. Besides in the opinion of those who present the first definition 'sadhyabhavavadavrtitva' (HTETT 910ldgafela) the absence of conjunction on monkey is different in each locus due to difference in substratum, because two opposite attributes viz. complete occurrence and incomplete occurrence can't exist in one and same place, the absence of conjunction

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29 of monkey, which exists in a tree, and which exists in the quality are different, in this case the undetermined(aniyantrita 37f73fata locus-ness of the absence of conjunction is unestablished. Therefore it is better to remove mentioned fault of 'avyapti' by second definition 'sadhyavadbhinna' etc. 2. Sadhyavadbhinnasadhyabhavavadavrttitvam, (HTZvadbhinnasAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvam). This definition is mentioned to remove the fault of too narrow application 'avyapti' in the inference "this has the conjunction of monkey because of this tree. Here this tree which has absence of sadhya is not different from the locus of sadhya, quality etc. which has the absence of sadhya is different from the locus of sadhya because conjunction which is a quality dose not exist in quality, hence in the quality which is the locus of absence of sadhya, this tree-ness (etadvriksatvaVaegtra) dose not exist, there is no fault of 'avyapti.' Raghunatha Siromani has refuted this definition. According to him the absence of conjunction which exists in quality and action is not different from the absence of conjunction which exists in the tree, there is no proof to prove difference in absence due to difference in it's substrata. According to Mathuranatha in the definition Sadhyavadbhinnasadhyabhavavadavrttitvam (HTE207967HTEZIHidacqua) the word 'sadhyavadbhinna' is useless by the word 'sadhyavadbhinnavrttitvam' early mentioned fault is avoided, this tree-ness (etadvsksatva-Treetra) does not occurred in quality etc. which is different from that which has sadhya. 3. Sadhyavatpratiyogikanyonyabhavasamanyadhikaranyam (Feza ufaf ARIRTACHAPIRET V44) Mathuranath has explained this definition following way 'absence of occurrence indicated by the substratum of the mutual absence which indicates counter-positive-ness exists in

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30 the locus of sadhya.' For example in the inference 'the hill has fire because of smoke. Sadhya is fire. The mutual absence of sadhyavan (FT2016) is the mutual absence of the locus of fire which exists in water etc. there is occurrence of fish etc. and the absence of that occurrence exists in the smoke. In this way the definition is applied. While in the invalid inference such as 'the hill has smoke because it has fire this definition is not applied. The mutual absence of the locus of smoke exists in the hot-iron-ball where fire exists therefore there is no absence of occurrence in the reason fire. Therefore it is invalid reason. Acarya Raghunatha has pointed out the rejection of this definition by showing the fault of too narrow application in all valid reasons because the reason exists in the example which is different from subject (paksa 47). Therefore there is no absence of occurrence in the reason, hence the fourth definition was introduced. If to avoid this fault by the expression 'the mutual absence of the locus of sadhya' the mutual absence counterpositive-ness of which is determined by the locus-ness of sadhya, means the mutual absence of all locus of sadhya, there would be repeatition of fifth definition. 4. Sakala-sadhyabhavavannisthabhava-pratiyogitvam (sakalasAdhyAbhAvavanniSThAbhAvApratiyogitvam) Absence of counter-positive-ness of the absence which exists in all substrata of the absence of sadhya, is the meaning. In the inference 'the hill has fire because it has smoke in all substrata of fire, the absence of smoke exists, therefore the counter-positive-ness of that absence exists in smoke, hence the definition is applied. But there is no absence of fire in all substrata of smoke therefore in invalid inference 'this has smoke because it has fire' the definition is not applied. In the substratum of the absence of smoke viz. hot-iron-ball the fire

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31 exists, therefore the absence of fire is not the absence which exists in all substrata of the absence of smoke. We can take there the absence of water etc., the counter-positive-ness of that absence does not exists in fire, hence the definition is not applied. Here the question arises, in this definition which is qualified by 'All the absence of sadhya or the substratum of absence of sadhya ? According to Raghunatha 'All'is qualifier of both 'absence of sadhya and the substratum of absence of sadhya,' while Mathuranatha says 'Allis qualifier of the substratum of absence of sadhya.' If the expression is not used there would be a fault of over extension, in the inference. This has smoke because of fire,' then there is absence of fire in the substratum of the absence of sadhya viz. water etc. counter-positive-ness of which exists in fire. When 'All is used, there would not be fault of over extension. Because of in all substrata of the absence of sadhya (smoke) the absence of fire dose not exist, in the locus of absence of smoke 'hot-iron-ball, fire exists. If 'All is considered as the qualifier of the absence of sadhya, there would be a fault of impossibility, absence of fire which dose not occurred in that water and the absence of fire which dose not exist in this lake etc. also are included in all absences of sadhya, one substratum of all there absences of sadhya in not established, the absence of non-occupant of that lake exists only in that lake not in all substrata of absence of sadhya. Therefore 'All should be understood as qualifier of substratum of absence of sadhya. According to Raghunatha there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference 'this has that colour because of that test. Here all substrata of sadhya is not established, sadhya that

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32 particular colour is one, therefore 'All can't be qualifier of sadhya. According to Mathuranatha the word 'All in this definition, is used in the sense of inclusion (asesa 37979) not many, therefore there is no early mentioned fault where is only one substratum of absence of sadhya that also will be included, therefore 'Allis qualifier of the substratum of the absence of sadhya. 5. sadhyavadanyavrittitvam (HTEYOPATH) In the inference 'hill has fire because of smoke the fire is sadhya the locus of sadhya is hill other than that is water where is the absence of smoke so there in smoke, is the absence of occurrence (vrttitva qard). In this way definition is applied. In the invalid inference this has smoke because of fire this definition is not applied, in the hot-iron-ball which is different from the locus of sadhya, fire exists there, therefore there is no absence of occurrence in fire. In this definition the absence of occurrence (vrttitva) should be known as the absence of occurrence in general, because there is absence of occurrence indicated (nirupita Fafya) by water in fire, hence there is a fault of over extension in the invalid inference 'hill has smoke because of fire', in the occurrence in general, includes the occurrence indicated by hot-iron-ball, the absence of that occurrence dose not exist in fire, occurs in the hot-iron-ball. The substratum of sadhya should be known by that relation by which sadhya is desired to be established in the subject (paksa 48), otherwise there would be fault of 'avyapti' in the inference 'hill has fire because of smoke' by the relation inherence (samavaya 44911) fire exists in the part of fire other than that is hill where smoke occurs, here desired relation is conjunction, (samyoga ier) by this relation fire exists in the

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33 hill which is not different from that, different from that is lake etc. where fire dose not occur, hence there is no fault of too narrow application, this is the idea. Similarly by which relation reason (hetu all) is desired in subject the occurrence should be known, otherewise there would be fault of avyapti in the infernce 'hill has fire because of smoke.' The smoke exists in it's part which is different from the substratum of sadhya, when the relation which determines the state of being reason is introduced there would not be mentioned fault because by the relation 'samyoga smoke dose not occur in it's part. There is very minute difference between third and fifth definitions. In third definition the mutual absence counterpositive of which is the locus of sadhya only is included, while in fifth definition the mutual absence the counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the locusness of sadhya (sadhyavattva 2017). There is fault of 'avyapti' of third definition in the inference 'hill has fire because of smoke' taking mutual absence of fire through 'calaniya-nyaya.' (almiRIRI All these five definitions are based on the original concept of non-deviation, where is no deviation there is 'vyapti. All these definitions are made taking in to account the agreement (anvaya 37-02) and disagreement (vyatireka aft) 'where-ever reason (hetu) there is sadhya' and 'where-ever absence of sadhya there is absence of reason (hetu).' All these are not applied in the 'pure affirmative (kevlanvayi Jadi-afil) inference such as "it is namable because of knowable' the absence of sadhya is not established, everything is namable, therefore there is no absence of namability anywhere. In this way all these five definitions are faulty with regard pure affirmative inference. In first definition absence of sadhya is not established, and in second, third, and fifth the

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34 mutual absence of locus of sadhya is not established. All things are namable, hence difference from them is not established. In fourth definition also the absence of sadhya is not established so this definition is faulty. According to Gangesa all these five definitions are not applicable with 'kevalanvayi anumana (aradi-af4-377915). According to Mathuranatha four definitions beginning from second are faulty with regard the inference 'it has absence of monkey because of existence' because the absence counterpositive-ness of which is determined by the relation which determines the state of sadhya, is not established, the absence of monkey which has incomplete occurrence exists everywhere in this world. Similarly the difference from the locus of 'vacyatva' (alla) also is not established, whole universe is namable (vacya 0124). Mathuranatha says that to avoid fault of avyapti because in the inference 'this tree has conjunction of monkey because of this treeness' the expression 'sadhyavadbhinna' (97821019621) is used. That fault is not removed even that is used, because the absence of monkey which exists in quality which is different from that which has 'sadhya' exists in this tree also. There is no proof to establish difference in absences due to difference in their substrata. Therefore the fault of avyapti remains infact, if to avoid this fault, the absence of sadhya is mentioned as qualified by occurrence in that which is different from the locus of sadhya, the word 'absence of sadhya' in the definition will be use-less. Jagadisa has followed Raghunatha, the Jagadisi is the commentary on Didhiti of Raghunatha Siromani, he has explained ideas of Raghunatha, his special contribution is found in the interpretation of fifth definition.

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Vyapti-Pancakam vyAptipaJcakam

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vyAptipaJcakam tattvacintAmaNiH (ta. 1) nanvanumitihetuvyAptijJAne kA vyApti: ? na tAvadavyabhicaritattvam / taddhi na sAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvam, (ta.2) sAdhyavadbhinnasAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvam, Five Definitions of Vyapti Tattvacintamani (T.1) Here author follows the collection of five tentative definitions of invariable concomitance ( vyapti) (Now the question is), in the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyapti), which is the cause of inferential knowledge, what is invariable concomitance ( vyapti ) ? Infact, it is not the state of having non-deviation (of the reason from that which is to be established) because invariableconcomitance is neither, the non-existence of the reason in such substratum which possesses the absence of that which is to be established. nor, (T.2) The non-existence (of the reason) in the substratum which possesses the absence of that which is to be established and which is different form that which has the absence of that which is to be establised. nor,

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(ta. 3) sAdhyavatpratiyogikAnyonyAbhAvAsAmAnA dhikaraNyam, vyAptipaJcakam (ta.4) sakalasAdhyAbhAvavanniSThAbhAvapratiyogitvam, (ta. 5 ) sAdhyavadanyAvRttitvam vA, kevalAnvayinya bhAvAt / (T.3) The not co-existence (of the reason) with such a mutual absence which has the substratum of that which is to be established as its counter-positive. nor, (T.4) The counter-positive-ness of the absence which resides in all substrata of the absence of that which is to be established. nor, (T.5) The occurrence (of the reason) in the substratum which is different from that which has that which is to be established. This is because all these definitions are not applicable in the pure affirmative reason.

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zrImathurAnAthakRtaM vyAptipaJcakarahasyam / (1) anumAnaprAmANyaM nirUpya vyAptisvarUpanirUpaNamArabhate-nanu ityAdinA / anumitihetu ityasya anumAnaniSThaprAmANyAnumitihetu rityarthaH1, vyAptijJAna ityatra ca viSayatvaM saptamyarthaH, tathA cAnumAnaniSThaprAmANyAnumitihetuvyAptijJAnaviSayIbhUtA vyAptiH kA ityarthaH / Rahasya Commentary (1) Having discussed the validity of inference author starts the discussion about the nature of vyapti by the expression 'but now the question is etc.' By the expression "cause of inferential knowledge" here it should be understood that cause of inferential knowledge of the validity of inferential knowledge1. And in the expression 'in the knowledge of invariable concomitance' the meaning of locative case is the 'state of being object (visayatva viSayatva), there fore, the meaning of the Gangesa's statement is that What is vyapti, which is the object of the knowledge of vyapti, which (knowledge) is the cause of inferential knowledge of validity in inference ? In the discussion of vyapti after the discussion of validity of inference, the 1. anumAnaniSThaprAmANyAnumiti:-The inferential knowledge of validity in the inference. The form of inferential knowledge is "the inference is the means of valid knowledge, because it has the attribute which determines the state of being extraordinary cause of valid knowledge.

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vyAptipaJcakam anumAnaniSThaprAmANyAnumitihetvityanena vyApteranumAnaprAmANyopapAdakatvakathanAdanumAnaprAmANyanirUpaNAnantaraM vyAptinirUpaNe upodghAta eva saGgatiH sUcitA / upapAdakatvaJca atra jJApakatvam / / ____ (2) kecittu-anumitipadam anumitiniSThetarabhedAnumitiparam,3 tathA cAnumitiniSThetarabhedAnumitau yo hetuH prAguktavyAptiprakAraka relevance in the form of introduction2 is indicated because of the statement the vyapti brings out of the inference of the validity in inference. Here 'brings out' means 'brings out the knowledge(of validity of inference) (2) Some of the logicians say the word "inferential knowledge' denotes the inferential knowledge of the difference from other things, in inferential knowledge", therefore the meaning of the statment is the inferential knowledge of the difference from other things in the inferential knowledge which is a reason4 in the form of the state of being produced by the 2. upodghAta:-cintAM prakRtasiddhyarthAmupodghAtaM vidurbudhAH-Thinking for establishing the thing; the discussion of which is started. 3. itarabhedAnumiti:-The inferential knowledge of the difference from others. The form of inferential knowledge is "the inferential knowledge is different from all other things because it is an instance of knowledge, which is different from recollection and which is produced by definite knowledge of concomitant reason existing in the subject." 4. anumitihetu-The reason in inferential cognition. The reason is "the state of being produced by the knowledge of the concomitant reason existing in the subject, in this reason the concomitance is inclusive

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zrImathurAnAthakRtaM vyAptipaJcakarahasyam pakSadharmatAjJAnajanyajJAnatvarUpaH, tadghaTakaM yadvyAptijJAnaM tadaMze vizeSaNIbhUtA vyAptiH kA ? ityarthaH, ghaTakatvArthakasaptamyA tatpuruSasamAsAt / tathA ca prAguktAnumitilakSaNopodghAta eva saGgatiH anena sUcitA ityAhuH / (3) na tAvaditi / tAvat vAkyAlaGkAre, avyabhicaritatvaM avyabhicaritattvapadapratipAdyam / tatra hetumAha taddhItyAdi / 'hi' yasmAt, tat avyabhicaritatvapadapratipAdyam, neti sarvasminneva lakSaNe sambadhyate / tathA ca vyAptiryataH sAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvAdirUpAvyabhicaritatvazabdapratipAdyarUpA na, ato'vyabhicaritatvazabdapratipAdyarUpA na ityarthaH knowledge of the existence in the subject where early mentioned vyapti is a qualifier, the constituent part of which is the knowledge of vyapti, in that what is the qualifier vyapti ? By the seventh case tatpurusa-compound which means the state of being constituent, Therefore early mentioned introduction relevance, only is indicated by the statement of Gangesa. (3) Na tavat here 'tavat word is used for the decoration of the sentence. The state of not having deviation means, denoted by the word state of having non deviation there author points out the reason by the expression tad-dhi.' 'hi' (means) yasmat (from which) Here 'tat' means that which is denoted by the term not having deviation. The word 'not' is related with all definitions. Therefore, "because vyapti is not in the form of non existence in that which has the absence of that which is to part of reason, seventh case shows the inclusion of concomitance in the said reason of inferenial knowledge.

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vyAptipaJcakam pryvsitH| vizeSA'bhAvakUTasya sAmAnyA'bhAvahetutA ca prasiddhA eveti, ata etannaJ dvayopAdAnaM na nirarthakam / be established," denoted by the expression "the state of not having deviation" therefore it is not denoted by the term "the state of not having deviation," this is a concluding menaning of the text. It is well-known fact that the collection of absence of particular things causes the absences of things in general, therefore the use of two negatives is not purposeless (in the definition). Non-occurrence (of the reason) in that which has 5. vizeSAbhAvakUTasya-The collection of absences of particular things shows absence of things in general. Vyapti can't be the meaning of the word "non-deviation" because it is different from occurrence (of the reason) in the thing which has the absence of 'sadhya' etc. which are denoted by the word "state of having the absence of deviation." The inheritable concomitance (vyapti) is not meaning of the word, "the state of having the absence of deviation (avyabhicarita)" because it is different from collection of 'non occurrence of reason in that thing which has the absence of that thing which is to be established (sadhya) etc.' which is the meaning of the word, "state of being non-deviation." 6. nadvayopAdAnaM na nirarthakam-The use of two negative particles is not purposeless, because the collection of absences of individual thing brings out the absence in general. The negation denotes absence of thing in general. The first negation denotes the difference in general which is the meaning of non-deviation (avyabhicaritatva) and the second negation brings out the collection of absences of particular things which is expressed by the words non-occurrence (of reason) in that thing which has absence of sadhya.

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prathamaM lakSaNam (4) sAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvamiti 'vRttam'" vRttiH / bhAve the absence of that which is to be established (this is the definition). The First definition of vyapti. (4) In this definiton (sadhyabhavavadavrittitvam) vrittam? 7. q4-The state of being existent in that which has the absence of sadhya. In this definition "vrittam" means 'vrittitvam' occurrence. This is because the suffixes "kta" () "nistha" (g) is the word of "bhava" (1) feature. The absence of existence is meant by the word "avrittam" (1974) which means the absence of occurrence. Non-existing of the reason in the thing which has the absence of that which is to be established (sadhya). The absence of the occurrence in that thing which has the absence of sadhya, this means the absence of occurrence (of reason) indicated by the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established, that absence of occurrence where it is found that reason is called valid reason. On the basis of suffixes "in" which is used in the sense of "matup" (4g) existing in that which has the absence of sadhya is substratum. The feature of the reason is the existence in the substratum of the absence of sadhya. Therefore according to old naiyayikas the meaning of the definition is "the state of having the absence of occurrence (of reason) in the locus of the absence of that which is to be established (sadhya.) This interpretation of old naiyayikas is not admissable, because it goes against the theory of grameriaans. According to them after Karmadharaya (4) compound the suffix which denotes "matup" (locus) should not be used while "bahuvrihi" (gif) compound

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vyAptipaJcakam is expressed to derive the meaning of sentence, therefore the word "mahadhana" (HETETA) is not correct, because the "mahadhana" (huge wealth) is a 'karmadharaya' compound and after this compound that suffixes which denotes the locus can't be used if the compound bahuvrihi in the form who has money Mahadhanin (HETERED) as justifies prospect to know the meaning of the sentence. Therefore to convey the said meaning the word, "mahadhana" is used and not 'mahadhani. Though in the sentence "sadhyabhavavadvritti" (FTE2410agafa) there is not "karmadharaya" compound, there is not avyayibhava (37alstuta) compound, hence therefore there is no objection for the use suffixes which means locus, but in the expression of the rule in the word karmadharaya is used in the sense of the compound which is different from bahuvrihi. Therefore avyayibhava compound also is included as different from bahuvrihi. So like karmadharaya compound, after avyayibhava compound, also there would not be use of suffixes which dentoes locus. This is very well clarified in the text 'Guna-Prakasa Rahasyam' (Tuch9RE214) and its commentary 'Didhiti-Rahasyam' (Girardel) While clearing 'Agunavattva'. (37100ta), here it should be noted on the basis of the interpritition 'guNasyAbhAvo'guNaM tad yatrAsti sa 31Juala 41a: 3710TH' The absence of quality is non-quality, that where exists, that is the locus of non-quality, the nature of it is state of having non-quality. The state of having non-quality can't be a common feature of categories beginning from quality, because the absence of quality has incomplete occurrence, it exists in substance also, in the first moment of the origination of substance. Therefore by the word karmadharaya in the order of grammer the compounds, other than bahuvrihi should be understood. The word aguna which is avyayibhava compound, therefore with that compound passive-s uffixes can't be used. Therefore early mentioned multiform of bahuvrihi compound

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prathamaM lakSaNam niSThApratyayAt, vRttasyA'bhAvaH avRttam vRttyabhAva iti yAvat, sAdhyA'bhAvavato'vRttaM sAdhyAbhAvavadavRttam sAdhyAbhAvavavRttyabhAva iti yAvat / tadyatrAsti sa sAdhyAbhAvavadavRttI matvarthIyenpratyayAt, tasya bhAvaH sAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvam / tathA ca sAdhyAbhAvavadvattyabhAvavattvamiti phalitamiti means vritti (existence), because here the suffix of the past passive particle, 'kta' is called in the Sanskrit grammar as 'nistha' which is used in the sense of 'bhava' mentioned. The absence of vritta' in avrittitam 'yrityabhava.' 'sadhyabhavavatah-avrittam' means 'sadhyabhavavadavrittam' which means the absence of existence can't be accepted. Instead of that form of yatra sa guNavAn, na guNavAn aguNavAn, tasya bhAvaH aguNavattvam compound 'where is that which has quality, which has no quality that is the locus of non-quality. This form of bahuvrihi compound should be accepted. The mutual absence has no incomplete occurrence, therefore the agunavattva does not exist in the substance which is produced. All this in mentioned clearly in that work. If this rule is not accepted then other says that with the meaning of word used with avyayibhava compound the semantic connection of the meaning of the word which is not the part of avyayibhava compound is disapproved. Therefore upakumbha (3455+47) and agha-a (37817) being in avyayibhava compound. can't be connected by semantic connection with the word 'bhutal etc, which is not included as a part in that compound. There fore 'the nearness of a jar which is in the groundthis meaning should be understood, but according to the rule it can't be the meaning. According to the rule, "the nearness which is in the ground of a jar and the absence which is in the ground of a jar will be the meaning, means the ground will be connected with nearness and absence by symantic connection, which is not desired to be stated"

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10 vyAptipaJcakam praanycH| tadasat 'na karmadhArayAnmatvarthIyo bahuvrIhizcedarthapratipattikara' ityanuzAsanavirodhAt / tatra karmadhArayapadasya bahuvrIhItarasamAsaparatvAt, tacca aguNavattvamiti sAdharmyavyAkhyAnAvasare guNaprakAzarahasye taddIdhitirahasye ca sphuTam / avyayIbhAvasamAsottarapadArthena samaM tatsamAsAniviSTapadArthAntarAnvayasyAvyutpannatvAt / yathA bhUtalopakumbhaM bhUtale'ghaTamityAdau bhUtalavRttighaTasamIpatadatyantA'bhAvayorapratIteH / of reason in that which has the absence of that which is to be established, that absence where exists that is non-existent in that which has the absence of that which is to be established. This is because of suffix in the sense of matup, 'the nature of it is the nonexistence (of the reason) in that which has the absence of that which is to be established the state of having the absence of the existent, in that which has the absence of that which is to be established, is the resulted meaning, according to old logicians. This is not correct because it contradicts the rule, "if bahurvihi compound expresses the same meaning then the possessive suffix (matvarthiya) is not used after karmadharaya compound." Here the word karmadharaya is used in the sense of all compounds other than bahuvrihi compound. This is clearly mentioned by author in Gunaprakasa-rahasya and in Didhiti-rahasya of it on the occasion of explanation of common properties (when) discussing the term the state of not having quality (agunavatva), because, with the meaning of the word next to avyayibhava compound the connection of the meaning of the word, which is not included (as a part) in that

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prathamaM lakSaNam (5) etena vRtterabhAvo'vRttItyavyayIbhAvAnantaraM sAdhyAbhAvavato'vRttiH yatreti- bahuvrIhirityapi pratyuktaM, vRttau sAdhyAbhAvavato'nanvayApatteH / avyayIbhAvasamAsasyA'vyayatayA tena samaM samAsAntArAsambhavAcca / najupAdhyAdirUpA'vyayavizeSANAmeva samasyasyAmAnatvena compound, is prohibited. Just as in the case 'bhutal upakumbham' 'bhutale gha-am' 'near the pot existing in the ground' and the 'absolute absence of that,' both of them are not apprehended. (5) By this way, vritterabhavo avritti after this avyayibhava compound 'sadhyabhavavato avrittih yatra' this bahuvrihi compound8 also is discarded because of the non applicability of the sementic connection of that which has the absence of that which is to be established with existing (vritti), and because the avyayibhava compound is an avyava therefore there would not be connection of other compound, negative adjuncts which are particular avyaya are counted as to be 8. vRtterabhAvo'vRttiH ityavyayIbhAvAnantaraM sAdhyAbhAvavato'vRttiryatra The absence of occurrence is non-occurance this 'avyayibhava' compound, where non-occurant from that would not be semantic connection of that which has the absence of sadhya with occurrent. Another difficulty also arrises here, that because of the avyayibhava compound is avyaya and with these, there would not be semantic connection of other compound. Here avritti is avyaya, with this there would not be use of tatpurusa (tatpuruSa) compound of sadhyabhava. (sAdhyAbhAva), with avyaya only avyayibhava compound only can be used, not with any other compound. Here 'avritti' absence of occurrence is an 'avyaya.'

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12 vyAptipaJcakam parigaNitatvAt / (6) vastutastu sAdhyAbhAvavato na vRttiH yatra iti tripadavyadhikaraNabahuvrIhyuttaraM tvapratyayaH, sAdhyAbhAvavata ityatra nirUpitatvaM SaSThyarthaH, anvayazcAsya vRttau / tathA ca sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNanirUpitavRttyabhAvavattvam avyabhicaritatvamiti phalitam / na ca vyadhikaraNabahuvrIhiH 9 sarvatra asAdhuriti vAcyam, ayaM hetuH sAdhyAbhAvavadavRttirityAdau compounded. (6) Indeed 'sadhyabhavavato na vrittih yatra iti tripadavyadhikaranabahuvrihyuttaram tvapratyayah', in 'sadhyabhavavatah' the state of being described, is the meaning of relational case, it is semantically connected with vritti (existence). Therefore the resulted meaning is that the state of having the absence of the existence indicated by the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established, is the state of not having deviation. It should not be objected that the usage of bahuvrihi-compound is not correct in all cases because in the sentences, like 'ayam hetuh sadhyabhavavadavritti' etc., the usage of vyadhikarana-bahuvrihi compound is justified here 9. Vyadhikaranbahuvrihi (vyadhikaraNabahuvrIhi: ) - The bahuvrihi compound where words which denote qualification and qualifier can't be expressed with same case. In the sentence sadhyabhavadavrittitvam (sAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvam) there are three words "sadhyabhavavatah" (sAdhyAbhAvavataH) 'na' (na) and 'vrittitvam.' (vRttitvam) They are not expressed with same case. The qualification sadhyabhavavatah has sixth case ending. The word 'na' is avyaya and word 'vritti' has first case ending.

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prathamaM lakSaNam vyadhikaraNabahuvrIhiM vinA gatyantarAbhAvena atrApi vyadhikaraNabahuvrIhe: sAdhutvAt / (7) sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNavRttyabhAvazca10 tAdRzavRttitvasAmAnyA also due to lack of any other way to explain the definition. (7) The absence of existence (of the reason) in the substratum of the absence that which is to be established10 10. sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNavRttyabhAvaH-The absence of occurrence described by the locus of the absence of sadhya should be known as the absence of occurrence in general. It means the absence which has counterpositive-ness which is not determined by the characteristic which is different from the state of being occurrence (vrittitvam) and determined by the state of being occurrence and that occurrence which is described by the locus of the absence of sadhya with the reference to the inference, "the mountain has fire because it has smoke," the absence of occurence which is indicated by water etc. which are substratum of the absence of fire, exists in the reason smoke. If the absence in the general samanyabhava (TART ) is not understood by the word absence of occurrence, there would be fault of over-extension with regards such as inference "this (mountain) has smoke because it has fire," by the words absence of occurrence indicated by the locus water which is the locus of the absence of sadhya smoke, also understood and the absence of that occurrence which is described by water etc. exists in the fire which is used as a reason. Therefore there is fault of over-extension (ativyapti). Similarly, by the word the absence of occurrence indicated by the

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14 vyAptipaJcakam bhAvo bodhyaH / tena dhUmavAn vartarityAdau dhUmAbhAvavajjalahRdAdivRttyabhAvasya dhUmAbhAvavadvRttitvajalatvobhayatvAvacchinnAbhAvasya ca vahnau sattve'pi na should be known as the absence of such existence, in general, therefore there is no fault of too wide application in the inference 'this has smoke because of fire' though the absence of existence of reason in waterlake etc. which have the absence of that which is to be established, and the absence which is determined by the state of being both waster-ness and existence indicated by that which has the absence of smoke that which is to be established, abides in the fire. And existent, indicated by that which has the absence of that which is to be established, should be mentioned by the relation which determines the state locus of the absence of sadhya we understand the absence as both that occurrence and waterhood, that absence of both also exists in the reason fire. Though the occurrence which is indicated by the locus hot-iron-ball is subsist in fire but waterhood does not subsist in fire. Therefore there is absence of both that occurrence and waterhood, hence there is fault of over-extension, with regards to the inference, 'it has smoke because of fire. Therefore the absence of occurrence in general is understood by the words the absence of occurrence, so there would not be over-extension with regards to the inherence "it has smoke because of fire,' by the word absence of occurrence in general. The absence of occurrence indicated by hotiron ball also understood, and that occurrence exists in fire, so there is not the absence of occurrence in the fire, hence there would not be over-extension.

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prathamaM lakSaNam 15 ativyAptiH / sAdhyA'bhAvavadvRttizca hetutAvacchedakasambandhena 11 vivakSaNIyA, tena vahnyabhAvavati dhUmAvayave jalahadAdau ca samavAyena kAlikavizeSaNatAdinA ca dhUmasya vRttAvapi na kSatiH / (8) sAdhyAbhAvazca sAdhyatAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnasAdhyatAvacchedakAvacchinnapratiyogitAko bodhyaH / tena vahnimAn dhUmAdityAdau samavAyAdisambandhena vahnisAmAnyAbhAvavati saMyogasambandhena, tattadvahni of being a reason, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in respect of the inference, 'this has fire because of smoke' though smoke exists in water lake etc. and the part of smoke, which have the absence of fire, by the temporal relation and inherence relation11 respectively. (8) The absence of that which is to be established should be known as having the counter-positive-ness of which is determined by that which determines the state of being that which is to be established, and as well determined by the relation which determines that which is to be established, therefore there is not the fault of too narrow application in the inference, 'this has fire because of smoke', even though smoke exists in that which has the absence of fire in general, by the relation inherence, and in that which has the absence determined by the state of being both water and fire as well by the state of being a particular fire, by the relation conjunction. 11. hetutAvacchedakasambandha:-The relation that determines the state of being reason is stated to be the determinant relation of state of being reason.

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vyAptipaJcakam tvavahnijalobhayatvAdyavacchinnAbhAvavati ca parvatAdau saMyogena dhUmasya vRttAvapi na kSatiH / ___ (9) nanu tathApi guNatvavAn jJAnatvAt, sattAvAn jAterityAdau viSayitvAvyApyatvAdisambandhena'3 tAdRzasAdhyA'bhAvavati jJAnAdau (9) Even though there is a fault of too narrow application in the inferences such as "this has quality-ness because it has the state of being knowledge" and "this has existence because of universal,' because the state of being knowledge, exists in knowledge etc. which is the locus of the absence of qualitiness, and existence exists in the substance by the relations such as subject-ness12, state of being non pervaded13 etc. where "jati' exists. Nor it should be said that the substratum-ness of the absence of that which is to be established is to be mentioned by 12. Visayitva (fagfyra) Because the knowledge has object. That object exists in the knowledge by the relation "visayita" for example="This is a pot' in this knowledge the pot subsists by the relation "visayita". 13. 3724| 4q-athraagfoca: The occurrence in that which has the absence of that particular. The relation in the form of 'non-pervadness' by this relation with regard the inference. 'it has existence because it has generic attribute.' Here the absence of sadhya existence is located in the quality by this relation 'non-pervadness' quality is not pervaded by the absence of existence. Therefore the absence of existence subsists in the quality by this relation and in quality generic attribute exists. Therefore there is fault of too narrow application in the valid reason.

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prathamaM lakSaNam 17 jJAnatvajAtyAdervartamAnatvAd avyAptiH / na ca sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNatvam abhAvIyavizeSaNatAvizeSasambandhena vivakSitamiti vAcyam / tathA sati ghaTatvAtyantAbhAvavAn ghaTAnyonyAbhAvavAn vA paTatvAdityAdau sAdhyAbhAvasya ghaTatvAdevizeSaNatAvizeSasambandhenAdhikaraNasya aprasiddhayA'vyApteriti cet na, atyantAbhAvAnyonyAbhAvayoratyantAbhAvasya saptamapadArthasvarUpatvAt / 14 atyantAbhAvAnyonyAbhAvayoratyantA the relation of particular qualifier-ness belonging to the absence. This is because there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the absoulte absence of pot-ness or mutual absence of a pot because of cloth-ness. This is because the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established which is pot-ness is not established by the relation of particular subject-ness. It is not correct, because the absolute absence of both absolute absence and mutual absence are indicated with qualifireness belonging to the absence is in the form of the seventh category14 (absence) of entities. But if someone holds the opinion that the absolute absence of absolute absence and 14. saptamapadArthasvarUpatvAt-Because it is in the form of seventh category some logicians say "the absence of the absence of a pot is identical with the pot. The negative of negative shows positive." This is the idea behind this concept. But others say-because the absence has been accepted a separate category by Naiyayika. Therefore the absence of absence is also a separate category. It is not identical with positive thing.

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18 vyAptipaJcakam bhAvasya pratiyogyAdisvarUpatvanaye tu sAdhyatAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnasAdhyatAvacchedakAvacchinnapratiyogitAkasAdhyAbhAvavRttisAdhyasAmAnyIyapratiyogitAvacchedakasambandhena sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNatvaM vaktavyam / / __ (10) vRttyantaM pratiyogitAvizeSaNaM, tAdRzasambandhazca vahnimAn dhUmAdityAdibhAvasAdhyakasthale vizeSaNatAvizeSa eva, ghaTatvAbhAvavAn paTatvAdityAdyabhAvasAdhyakasthale tu samavAyAdireva / samavAyaviSayitvAdisambandhena prameyAdisAdhyake jJAnatvAdihetau sAdhyatAvacchedaka mutual absence is form of its counter-positive etc. The state of being substratum of the absence of that which is to be established should be known as determined by the relation which determines the counter positive-ness in general of that which is to be established, existing in the absence of that which is to be established, in general counter positive-ness of which is determined by the attribute and the relation which determines the state of being that which is to be established. ___ (10) The part of the sentence ending with existing' is a qualifier of the counter-positive-ness, such a relation in the case of the inference this has fire because of smoke' where that which is to be established is a positive entity is a particular qualifier-ness alone, and in the inference 'this has the absence of pot-ness because of cloth-ness' where that which is to be established is a negative entity, is inherence etc. The word 'in general, is used to avoid the fault of too narrow application in the inference where knowable etc. is

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prathamaM lakSaNam samavAyAdisambandhAvacchinnaprame yAdyabhAvasya kAlikAdisambandhena yo'bhAvaH so'pi prameyatayA sAdhyAntargatastadIyapratiyogitA'vacchedakakAlikAdisambandhena sAdhyA'bhAvA'dhikaraNe jJAnatvAdervRtteravyAptivAraNAya sAmAnyapadopAdAnam / (11) sAdhyasAmAnyIyatvaJca yAvatsAdhyanirUpitatvaM svAnirUpakasAdhyakabhinnatvamiti yAvat / asyaikoktimAtraparatayA gauravasyAdoSatvAt , (12) anumitikAraNatAvacchedake ca bhAvasAdhyakasthale that which is to be established, by the relation inherence, subject-ness etc. and where knowledge-ness is the reason, because the absence by temporal relation, of the absence of knowable determined by the relation inherence etc. which determines the state of being that which is to be established, that also is in the form of knowable, so it is inculded in to that which is to be established, by the temporal relation which determines the counter-positive-ness of that, knowledge-ness exists in the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established. ___(11) In general means state of being described by all those to be established. The state of being different from that which belongs to that which is to be estalished, which is not indicator of that (counter-positive-ness). This is the concluded meaning. Due to the excellence of being expressed only by one utterance there is no fault of cumbersome-ness. (12) And in the inference where that which is to be established, is a positive entity the state of being the substratum

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20 vyAptipaJcakam abhAvIyavizeSaNatAvizeSeNa sAdhyA'bhAvAdhikaraNatvam abhAvasAdhyakasthale ca yathAyathaM samavAyAdisambandhena sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNatvamupAdeya / sAdhyabhedena kAryakAraNabhAvabhedAt / (13) na ca tathApi ghaTA'nyonyAbhAvavAn paTatvAdityatrA'nyonyAbhAvasAdhyakasthale ghaTatvAdirUpe sAdhyA'bhAve na sAdhyapratiyogitvaM, na vA samavAyAdisambandhastadavacchedakaH tAdAtmyasyaiva of the absence of that which is to be established is by the relation a particular qualifierness, belonging to absence, and in the inference where the negative entity is that which is to be established, there the state of being substratum of the absence of that which is to be established, should be taken by the relation inherence etc. as available, this is because the causeeffect relationship is different due to difference in that which is to be established. (13) Even it should not be mentioned, that-there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference "this has the mutual absence of pot because of clothness" where the mutual absence is that which is to be established, where the absence of that which is to be established, is in the form of pot-ness, has no counterpositiveness of that which is to be established, and nor the inherence relation is determinant of that counter-positive-ness because the identity relation alone is determinant of that (counterpositive-ness). This is because the absence of the absolute absence is identical with counter-positive so the mutual absence of a pot is in the form of the absence which has conuter-positive-ness determined by the state of being absolute absence of mutual

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prathamaM lakSaNam 21 tadavacchedakatvAdityavyAptistadavastheti vAcyam / atyantAbhAvAbhAvasya pratiyogirUpatvena ghaTabhedasya ghaTabhedAtyantAbhAvatvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkAbhAvarUpatayA ghaTabhedAtyantAbhAvarUpasya ghaTabhedapratiyogitAvacchedakIbhUtaghaTatvasyApi samavAyasambandhena ghaTabhedapratiyogitvAt / ____ (14) na cAnyatrAtyantAbhAvAbhAvasya pratiyogirUpatve'pi ghaTAdibhedAtyantAbhAvatvAvacchinnAbhAvo na ghaTAdibhedasvarUpaH, kintu tatpratiyogitAvacchedakIbhUtaghaTatvAtyantAbhAvasvarUpa eveti siddhAnta iti vAcyam / yathA hi ghaTatvAvacchinnaghaTavattAgrahe ghaTAtyantA'bhAvAgrahAt absence, hence pot-ness which is determinant of the counterpositive-ness of the mutual absence of pot which is in the form of absolute absence of mutual absene of pot, also is the counterpositive of the mutual absence of a pot by the relation inherence. (14) It should not be argued that though in other cases the absence of absence is identical with counter-positive but the absence determined by the state of being absolute absence of mutual absence of the pot, is not identical with the mutual absence of the pot, but it is identical with the absolute absence of potness which is the determinant of counter-positive-ness of that, only this is the admitted theory. This is because just as when there is the knowledge of the existence of that which is determined by pot-ness, the knowledge of the absoulte absence of pot does not arise and the usage of the absence of the absolute absence takes place. Therefore the absence of the absolute absence of a pot is identical with a pot, similarly when there is the knowledge of the existence of the mutual absence

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22 vyAptipaJcakam ghaTAtyantAbhAvAbhAvavyavahArAcca ghaTAtyantA'bhAvAbhAvo ghaTasvarUpaH tathA ghaTabhedavattAgrahe ghaTabhedAtyantAbhAvAgrahAt ghaTabhedAtyantAbhAvAbhAvavyavahArAcca, ghaTabheda eva tadatyantAbhAvatvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkAbhAva iti tatsiddhAntaH na yuktisahaH iti / vinigamakAbhAvenApi ghaTatvatvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkAtyantAbhAvavad ghaTabhedasyApi ghaTabhedAtyantAbhAvAbhAvatvasiddherapratyUhatvAcca / (15) ata eva tAdRzasiddhAnto na upAdhyAyasammataH / ata eva ca abhAvavirahAtmatvaM vastunaH pratiyogitetyAcAryAH / 15 - of a pot, the knowledge of the absolute absence of the mutual absence of a pot does not arise and there is such a usage of the absence of absolute absecne of the mutual absence of the pot. Therefore the mutual absence of a pot alone is identical with the absence which has the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of being absolute absence of that, this theory has no proof and due to absence of clinching argument also like the absolute absence which has the counter-positive-ness determined by potness-ness the mutual absence of the pot also has the state of being absence of the absolute absence of the mutual absence of pot, because it is not contradicted. Therefore such a theory is not acceptable for Upadhyaya. (15) Therefore acarya says 'the state of being absence of absence is identical with counter-positive-ness'. Otherwise there would be a fault of too narrow application in the mutual 15. abhAvavirahAtmatvaM vastunaH pratiyogitA - The counter-positive-ness is identical with the absence of the absence of a thing.

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prathamaM lakSaNam 23 anyathA ghaTabhedAtyantAbhAvapratiyogini ghaTabhede tallakSaNAvyAptyApatteH, anyonyAbhAvapratiyogitAvacchedakaghaTatvAtyantAbhAve tallakSaNasyAti vyaaptyaaptteshc| (16) na caivaM ghaTatvatvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkaghaTatvAtyantAbhAvasyApi ghaTabhedasvarUpatvApattiriti vAcyam / tadatyantAbhAvatvAvacchinnapratiyogAkAbhAvasyaiva tatsvarUpatvAbhyupagamAt tadvattAgrahe tAdRzatadatyantAbhAvAbhAvasyaiva vyavahArAt / upAdhyAyairghaTatvatvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkaghaTatvAtyantAbhAvasyApi ghaTabhedasvarUpatvA'bhyupagamAcca / (17) na caivaM sAdhyasAmAnyIyapratiyogitAvacchedakasambandhenaiva absence of a pot which is the counter-positive of the absolute absence the mutual absence of the pot and there would be a fault of too wide application in the absolute absence of pot-ness which is the determinant of the counter-positive-ness of the mutual absence. (16) It should not be argued that in this way the absence of potness which has counter-positive-ness determined by potness-ness also would be identical with the mutual absence of a pot. This is because the absence which has counter-positive-ness determined by the state of being absolute absence of that alone is accepted identical with that, because when the existence of that thing is known there is the usage of the absence of the absolute absence of such thing, and because Upadhyaya has accepted the absoulte absence of potness which has the counter-positive-ness determined by potness-ness, also identical with the mutual absence of the pot. (17) Nor it should be argued that let be said the state of

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24 vyAptipaJcakam sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNatvaM vivakSyatAM kiM sAdhyatAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnasAdhyAbhAvavRttitvasya pratiyogitAvizeSaNatveneti vAcyam / kAlikasambandhAvacchinnAtmakatvaprakAraka pramAvizeSyatvAbhAvasya vizeSaNatA being substratum of the absence of that which is to be established by the relation which determines the counterpositive-ness of that which is to be established in general, why the counter-positiveness should be qualified by the existence in the absence of that which is to be established, which (existence) is determined by the relation which determines the state of being that which is to be established. This is because, otherewise there would be a fault of too narrow application, in the inference and where the absence of the substrata-ness of the valid knowledge which has soulness as a qualifier, determined by the temporal relation, is that which is to be established by the relation of self some-ness and soul-ness16 is 16. AtmatvaprakAraketi - When the occurrence in the absence of sadhya determined by the relation of determinant of the state of being sadhya is applied with the counter-positive-ness. There would not be fault of too narrow application because the sadhya which is in the form of the absence of subjectness of the valid knowledge where soulness is qualifier and the counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the temporal relation. The absence of that sadhya, counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the selfsome relation, is the absence is sadhya counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the relation of the detarminant of the state of being sadhya. The counter-positive-ness which exists in that absence is indicated by sadhya in the form of the absence of objectness of valid knowledge

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prathamaM lakSaNam 25 vizeSeNa sAdhyatve AtmatvAdihetAvavyAptyApatteH / kAlikasambandhAvacchinnasAdhyAbhAvasya vizeSaNatAvizeSasambandhena yo'bhAvastasyApi sAdhyasvarUpatayA kAlikasambandhavadvizeSaNatAvizeSo'pi sAdhyIyapratiyogitAvacchedakasambandhastena sambandhenA''tmatvaprakArakapramAvizeSyatvarUpasAdhyAbhAvavati Atmani hetorAtmatvasya vRtteH / (18) pratiyogitAvacchedakavat pratiyogyapi anyonyAbhAvAbhAvaH, the reason. This is because the absence by self-some-ness, of the absence of that which is to be established, the counter-positiveness of which is determined by the temporal relation, is also identical with that which is to be established, therefore like the temporal relation the selfsome-ness relation also is the determinant relation of the counter-positive-ness belonging to that which is to be established, by this relation, in the soul which is substratum of the absence of that which is to be established, in the form of sustratum-ness of the valid knowledge which has soulness as a qualifier, soul-ness exists. (18) The absence of the mutual absence is in the form of counter-positive also accepted like in the form of the determinant of conter-positive-ness, therefore there is no nonestablishment of the counter-positive-ness of that which is to be where soulness is qualifier. The counter-positive-ness is determined by the temporal relation, by this relation in the locus of the absence of sadhya which is the objectness of valid knowledge, where soulness is qualifier (the locus) is the produced thing where soulness does not occur.

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vyAptipaJcakam tena tAdAtmyasambandhena sAdhyatAyAM17 sAdhyatAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnasAdhyAbhAvavRttisAdhyasAmAnyIyapratiyogitvasya nAprasiddhiH / itthaJca atyantAbhAvatvanirUpitatvenApi sAdhyasAmAnyIyapratiyogitA established, which exists in the absence of that which is to be established and determined by the relation which determines the state of being that which is to be established, when some thing is made as that which is to be established by the relation identity.17 In this way, the counter-positive-ness of that which is to be established in genral should be made qualified by the state of being described by the state of being absoulte absence, otherewise there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference; "this has the mutual absence of pot because of pot-ness-ness' because the relation identity also is the 17. JIGITA HEZR14-Where sadhya is desired by identity relation. The form of inference-knowable has difference from jar by identity relation because it has individuality'. Here the counter-positive-ness which exists in the difference from jar which is sadhya, the absence of sadhya which is identical with the difference from the difference from jar, has no the counter-positive-ness which is indicated by sadhya mainly difference from jar. So how can the difference from jar is identical with the absence of difference from difference from jar ? Therefore other says the absence of difference also identical with counter-positive like the determinant of counter-positve-ness. Therefore there is not nonestablishment of counter-positive-ness in general existing in the absence of sadhya, counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the relation which controls the state of being sadhya.

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prathamaM lakSaNam 27 vizeSaNIyA / anyathA ghaTAnyonyAbhAvavAn ghaTatvatvAdityAdau avyAptyApatteH / tAdAtmyasambandhasyApi sAdhyAbhAvavRttisAdhyIyapratiyogitAvacchedakatvAt8 / determinant of the counter-positive-ness18 of that which is to be established which exists in the absence of that which is to be established. 18. caff-Determinant of counter-positive-ness. The absence of difference from jar is the absence of sadhya which is identical with jar. The counter-positive-ness which exists in the jar is indicated by the difference from jar which (difference) is the sadhya the determinant relation of this counter-positive-ness is identity, by this relation the locus of absence of the difference from jar which is counter-positive-ness is jarness itself, there jarness-ness which is reason exists, therefore there is fault of too narrow application. When the counter-positive-ness is qualified by the state of being indicated by absolute absence, there would not be fault of too narrow application because the identity is determinant relation of the counter-positive-ness of difference and identity relation is not determinant of counterpositive-ness of the absolute absence. The inherence etc. will be determinant relation of counter-positive-ness which is indicated by absolute absence and by this relation the locus of the absence of sadhya which is jarness is jar where jarness-ness does not exist, therefore there is no occurrence, hence there is no fault of too narrow application. Thus when the absence of mutual absence is accepted as indentical with counter-positive, the counter-positive-ness should be qualified with state of being indicated by absolute absence. If it is accepted identical with the determinant of counter-positive-ness, there

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28 vyAptipaJcakam (19) yadvA sAdhyatAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnasAdhyAbhAvavRttisAdhyasAmAnyIyanirUktapratiyogitvatadavacchedakatvAnyatarAvacchedakasambandhenaiva sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNatvaM vivakSaNIyam / vRttyantamanyataravizeSaNam / evaJca ghaTAnyonyAbhAvavAn paTatvAdityAdau sAdhyA'bhAvasya ghaTatvAdeH sAdhyIyapratiyogitvavirahe'pi na kSatiH, tAdRzAnyatarasya sAdhyIyapratiyogitAvacchedakatvasyaiva tatra sattvAt / / (19) Or it should be desired to be mentioned that the state of being substratum of the absence of that which is to be established by the relation which determined either said counter-positive-ness of that which is to be established in general, existing in the absence of that which is to be established, determined by the relation which determines the state of being that which is to be established, or the state of being determinant of that counter-positive-ness. The sentence ending with existing' is the qualifier of 'one of two.' In this way, there is no harm even though in the inference this has the mutual absence of pot because of clothness' The counter-positive-ness of that which is to be established does not exist in pot-ness which is identical the absence of that which is to be established, because one of them the state of being determinant of the counter-positive-ness of would not be a fault of for narrow application, when the absence of difference from jar is identical with jarness, the counter-positive-ness which is indicated by the absence of the absence of jar, the determinant relation of that counter-positive-ness will be inherence relation and not identity relation.

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prathamaM lakSaNam ___ (20) na ca tathApi kapisaMyogI19 etadvakSatvAdityAdyavyApyavRttisAdhyakasaddhetau avyAptiriti vAcyam / niruktasAdhyA'bhAvatvaviziSTanirUpitA yA niruktasambandhasaMsargakaniravacchinnAdhikaraNatA tadAzrayAvRttitvasya vivakSitatvAt / guNakarmAnyatvaviziSTasattvA'bhAvavAn that which is to be established alone exists there. (20) Even though it should not be argued that-there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the conjunction of monkey19 because of this tree-ness' where that which is to be established has partial existence, this is because the non-existence in that which has the substratum-ness which is not determined by any characteristic, having determined by mentioned relation and which is described by that which is qualified by the mentioned state of being the absence of that which is to be established, is desired to be said. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference "this has the absence of existence qualified by the difference from quality and action because of quality-ness," even though the substratum-ness of the absence of that which is to be 19. after it (Kapi-samyogi) Having conjunction of monkey. In that tree which is locus of the absence of conjunction of monkey limited by root, there that tree-ness exists, therefore there is fault of too narrow application. When occurrence in the locus of the substratum-ness which is not determined by any characteristic is maintained, there would not be fault of too narrow application, because in this case the locus of the substratumness which is not determined by anything will be quality etc. where that treeness does not exist.

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30 vyAptipaJcakam guNatvAdityAdau sattvAtmakasAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNatvasya guNAdivRttitve'pi sAdhyAbhAvatvaviziSTanirUpitAdhikaraNatvasya2deg guNAdyavRttitvAnnA'vyAptiH / (21) na caivaM kapisaMyogAbhAvavAn sattvAd ityAdau niravacchinnasAdhyA'bhAvA'dhikaraNatvA'prasiddhyA'vyAptiriti vAcyam, kevalA established which (absence) is in the form of existence, exists in quality because the substratum-ness which is described by that which is qualified by the state of being absence of that which is to be established 20, dose not exist in quality etc. (21) Nor it should be argued that-in this way there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference, 20. sAdhyAbhAvatvaviziSTanirUpitAdhikaraNatvasya-Here sadhya is in the form of state of being existence, which is qualified by the difference from quality and action, but qualified is not different from unqualified. Therefore the existence (satta) which is qualified by the difference from quality and action is not different from the existence which is not qualified by difference from quality and action. So the absence sadhya here is the absence of absence of unqualified existence which is located in quality etc. where qualitiness exists. Therefore there is fault of too narrow application. But when the locusness is maintained as indicated by that which is qualified by state of being absence of sadhya, there would not be fault of too narrow application. This is because in this case of inference, quality has not such substantive-ness which is determined by the state of being absence of sadhya which is in the form of the existance is qualified by the difference from quality and action. This is the experience that there is no "existence" which is qualified by the difference from quality and action in quality.

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prathamaM lakSaNam nvayini abhAvAdityanena granthakRtaivAsya doSasya vakSyamANatvAt / (22) na ca tathApi kapisaMyogibhinnaM21 guNatvAdityAdau niravacchinnasAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNatvA'prasiddhayA'vyAptiH, anyonyAbhAvasya vyApyavRttitvaniyamavAdinaye tasya kevalAnvayyanantargatatvAditi vAcyam / "this has the absence of the conjunction of monkey because of existence'. This is because the substratum-ness of the absence of that which is to be established, which is not determined by any property is not established, because this fault is desired to be mentioned by author himself by the expression there is absence of it, in pure affirmative inference' (22) Nor it should be said-yet there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference 'this is different form that which has the conjunction of monkey21 because of quality-ness' This is because the non-determined substratum-ness of the absence of that which is to be established is not established, because in the opinion of those who accept mutual absence always non-partial-existent22 it is not included into pure affirmative. This is because, though in the opinion of those who believe the mutual absence as non-partial existent the absolute absence of another type of mutual absence is identical with the 21. kapisaMyogibhinnam-Different from that which has the conjunction of monkey. Here the difference from that which has the conjunction of monkey is sadhya. The absence of sadhya is in the form of conjunction which is determinant of counter- positive-ness. 22. 2114ad14-Complete occurrence, means that occurrence which is not determined by any time and place.

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32 vyAptipaJcakam anyonyAbhAvasya vyApyavRttitAniyamavAdinaye anyonyAbhAvAtyantAbhAvasya pratiyogitAvacchedakasvarUpatve'pi avyApyavRttimadanyonyAbhAvAbhAvasya vyApyavRttisvarUpasyA'tiriktasyAbhyupagamAt, tacca agre sphuTIbhaviSyati / (23) nanu tathApi samavAyAdinA gaganAdihetuke idaM vahnimad gaganAdityAdAvativyAptiH vahanyabhAvavati hetutAvacchedakasamavAyAdisambandhena gaganAderavRtteH / na ca tallakSyameva, 23 hetutAvacchedakasambandhena determinant of counter-positive-ness the absence of the mutual absence of that which has that which is partially existent is accepted different in the form on non-partial existent, this view will be made clear latter on. (23) Now here is the objection-yet there is a fault of too wide application, in the inference; 'it has fire because of having ether' where ether is a reason by the relation inherence. This is because ether dose not exists in the substratum of the absences of fire by the relation inherence. It should not be said that-this is a valid reason23 because of the absence of the existence in the subject, there is usage of invalid reason-hood, because there also inferential knowledge is experienced due to error of concomitance, otherwise; "this has smoke because of fire" also 23. na ca tat lakSyameva - Nor the valid inference, having concomitance and occurrence in subject, both are conditions of to be a valid reason and not only one of them. Otherwise fire also exists in the mountain which has smoke, therefore; 'this has smoke because it has fire,' this also would be valid inference.

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prathamaM lakSaNam pakSadharmatvAbhAvAccA'saddhetutvavyavahAra iti vAcyam / tatrApi vyAptibhrameNaivAnumiteranubhavasiddhatvAt / anyathA dhUmavAn vahrarityAderapi lakSyatvasya suvacatvAt / evaM dravyaM guNakarmAnyatvaviziSTasattvAdityAdAvavyAptiH viziSTasattvasya kevalasattvAnatirekitayA dravyatvAbhAvavatyapi guNAdau tasya vRtteH, guNe guNakarmAnyatvaviziSTasatteti pratIteH sarvasiddhatvAt / sattAvAn dravyatvAdityAdAvavyAptizca, sattAbhAvavati sAmAnyAdau hetutAvacchedakasamavAyasambandhena vRtteraprasiddheriti cet na / (24) hetutAvacchedakAvacchinnahetvadhikaraNatA-pratiyogikahetutAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnA''dheyatAnirUpita-vizeSaNatAvizeSa would be a valid reason. In this way there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; "this is a substance because of the existence qualified by difference from quality and action, this is because the qualified existence is not different from pure existence, it exists in quality which has the absence of substance-hood because the notion there is the qualified existence in quality is well known by all. And there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; "this has existence because of substance-ness' because the occupancy in universal which has the absence of the existence is not estalished, by the relation inherence which determined the state of being a reason. __ (24) This is not correct, because the general absence of existence in that which has substratum-ness not determined by any attribute and determined by said relation, which described

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34 vyAptipaJcakam sambandhena niruktasAdhyAbhAvatvaviziSTanirUpita-niruktasambandhasaMsargakaniravacchinnA'dhikaraNatA''zrayavRttitvasAmAnyAbhAvasya vivakSitatvAt / 24 by that which qualified by state of being said absence of that which is to be established by the relation one kind of self-someness described by occupancy (adheyata) determined by the relation which determines the state of being the reason and which (occupancy) is described by the substratumness of the reason determined by that which determines the state of being a reason is desired to be mentioned by the definition of vyapti.24 24. HARITY foafedrala-Because absence in general is desired to say. Here the occurrence which is determined by the relation which determines the state of being reason, and which (occurrence) is indicated by substratumness of reason and which is determined by the determinant feature which determines reasonness and the counter-positive-ness determined by the relation selfsomeness which has that occurrence as its adjunct and which (counter-positive-ness) exists in the occurrence which is indicated by the locus of the locusness which is not determined by any attribute and indicated by indicatorness which is determined by the relation which is determinant of counter-positive-ness belonging to sadhya in general, counter-positive-ness which of exists in the absence of sadhya, and determined by the relation of that which determines the state of being sadhya, and the state of having such a counterpositive-ness is the difference of vyapti just as by relation of conjunction which has jar as it's adjunct, the jar exists on the ground, not clothness, therefore by this relation the absence of clothness is "kevalanvayi" (everywhere). Similarly the occurrence existing in namebility which (occurnce) is determined by selfsome

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prathamaM lakSaNam 35 (25) vRttitvaJca na hetutAvacchedasambandhena vivakSaNIyam / asti ca sattAvAn dravyatvAdityAdau sattAbhAvAdhikaraNatAzrayavRttitvasya hetutAvacchedakasamavAyasambandhAvacchinnAdheyatAnirUpitavizeSaNatAvizeSasambandhena sAmAnyAbhAvo dravyatvAdau, samavAyasambandhAvacchinnAdheyatAnirUpita (25) The occupancy should not be desired to be mentioned by the relation which determines the state of being the reason. And there is general absence of occupancy and indi cated by that which has the substratum-ness of the absence of existence by the relation which is a kind of selfsome-ness relation described by the occupancy determined by inherence relation which determines the state of being the reason, in substance-ness. This is because the absence of existence which (absence) has the counter-positive-ness determined by a kind of self-someness relation, described by the occupancy determined by the relation inherence, is the absence which has counter relation and which is locus of the absence of existence by the selfsome relation, adjunct of which is occurrence which is in subjectness which is determined by the relation of determinant of state of being reason and which (occurrence) is indicated by the locusness, which is indicated by indicatorness, existing in substanceness determined by substanceness-ness. That occurrence does not exists anywhere by the mentioned relation, therefore the absence of that occurrence exists in the substance also, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application with regard the valid reason, "subtanceness, belongs to the inference, it has generic attribute existence because it has substanceness.'

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vyAptipaJcakam vizeSaNatAvizeSasambandhAvacchinnapratiyogitAkasattAbhAvAdhikaraNatvAzrayavRttitvAbhAvasya vyadhikaraNasambandhAvacchinnapratiyogitAkAbhAvatayA saMyogasambandhAvacchinnaguNAbhAvAderiva kevalAnvayitvAt / dravyaM sattvAdityAdau ca dravyatvAbhAvAdhikaraNaguNAdivRttitvasyaiva samavAyasambandhAvacchinnAdheyatAnirUpitavizeSaNatAsambandhena sattAyAM satvAnnAtivyAptiH / dravyaM viziSTasattvAdityAdAvavyAptivAraNAya pratiyogikAntamAdheyatAvizeSaNam25 / positive-ness determined by non-co-existent relation, is pure affirmative status is just as the absence of quality determined by conjunction. And in the inference 'this has substance-ness because of existence, the occupancy described by the quality which is the substratum of the absence of substance-ness, exists in existence by the relation qualifier-ness described by occupancy (adheyata) determined by the relation inherence. Therefore there is no fault of too wide application. To avoid the fault of too narrow application in the inference; "this has substanceness because of qualified existence ending with 'having counterpositive is the qualifier of the occupancy. (adheyata)25 25. pratiyogikAntamAdheyatAvizeSaNam-If the qualification having locusness of reason which is determined by the determinant of the reason- hood, is not used, then there would be fault of too wide application with the invalid reason belonging to; "this has substancencess because it has qualified generic attribute existence." The locusness of the absence of substanceness by the relation selfsomeness, adjunct of

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prathamaM lakSaNam 37 (25) vastutastu etallakSaNakartRmate viziSTasattvaM viziSTanirUpitAdhAratAsambandhenaiva dravyatvavyApyaM, na tu samavAyasambandhena,26 tathA ca (25) In fact, in the opinion of the maker of this definition, the qualified existence is pervaded by substance-ness by the relation the state of being substratum described by qualified thing only and not by inherence relation.26 Therefore which is the occurrence in existence, exists in quality etc. The occurrence which existing in the existence, indicated by quality etc. that occurrence exists in qualified existence also, because qualified thing is not different from unqualified thing. When the expression "having locusness of the reason determined by the determinant of reason-ness adjunct of which is that selfsome relation" is used, there would not be fault of too narrow application in the inference; "it has substanceness because it has qualified existence." This is because the locusness which exists in substance which is indicated by indicatorness which exists in the reason qualified existence indicates occurrence, which is determined by the relation of inherence and which (occurrence) exists in qualified existence by the relation selfsomeness adjunct of which is that(occurrrence), the locusness of the absence of substanceness which exists in quality etc. the substratum of that locusness is quality etc. indicated by it, is the occurrence in the existence. That does not exist any where, therefore absence of that occurrence exists in the qualified existence. This is the idea. 26. 7 I 440RIGHEOL-277-Not by the relation inherence etc. here the determinant relation of hetuta(reason-hood) is the locus-ness indicated by qualified existence. The occurrence by this relation occurrence which exists in qualified existence by its relation the

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38 vyAptipaJcakam pratiyogakAntamAdheyatAvizeSaNamanupAdeyameva / tadupAdAne hetutAvacchedakabhedena kAryakAraNabhAvabhedApatteH / hetutAvacchedakasambandhena sambandhitve sati27 ityanenApi vizeSaNAd vahnimAn gaganAdityAdau nAtivyAptiH / (26) nanu tathApi ubhayatvamubhayatraiva paryAptaM na tu ekatreti siddhAntAdare ghaTatvavAn ghaTatvatadabhAvavadubhayatvAdityAdau paryAptyAkhya the qualifier of occupancy (adheyata) ending with 'having counter-positive' should not be used indeed. If it is used there would be different cause-effect relationships due to different determinants of the state of being reason. The qualification 'state of being relatum by the relation which determines the state of being reason27 also should be used, therefore there is no fault of too wide application in the inference; 'this has fire because of ether'. (26) Even though here the objection is-if this doctrine that 'both-ness occupies both things simultaneously and not one thing' is accepted, there is the fault of too wide application in the inference; 'this has pot-ness because of both-ness of those which have pot-ness and the absence of it' when the reason is taken by the relation paryapti, because the reason dose not locus of the absence of substance-ness is quality etc. and which is determined by the inherence relation does not exists any where therefore the absence of occurrence exists in qualified existence also. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application. 27. sambandhitve satItyanena - Being relative the reason ether, is not related with anything by the relation of inherence which is determinant relation of state of being reason.

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prathamaM lakSaNam sambandhena hetutve'tivyAptiH, ghaTatvAbhAvavati hetutAvacchedakaparyAptyAkhyasambandhena hetoravRtteH, ghaTo na ghaTapaTobhayamitivad ghaTatvAbhAvavAn na ghaTatvatadabhAvavadubhayamityapi pratIteriti cet na, tAdRzasiddhAntAdare hetutAvacchedakasambandhena sAdhyasamAnAdhikaraNatve satItyanenaiva vizeSaNIyatvAditi / ata eva uktaM 'nivizatAM vA vRttimattvaM sAdhyasAmAnAdhikaraNatvaM veti' kevalAnvayigranthe dIdhitikRtaH / tadvizeSaNAt vahnimad gaganAd ityAdau na ativyAptiH / (27) kecittu 28 niruktasAdhyAbhAvatvaviziSTanirUpitA yA exist in that which has the absence of pot-ness by the relation paryapti which determines the state of being reason. This is because there is the notion also that 'which has the absence of pot-ness is not both which have pot-ness and its absence' just as 'pot is not both pot and cloth'. This is not correct because if this doctrine is accepted 'having state of being co-existent with that which is to be established' should be added as qualifier. Therefore the author of Didhiti says 'let include state of having existence in the reason or state of being co-existent with that which is to be established in the 'kevalanvayi grantha.' When this qualification is used there is no fault of too wide application in the inference such as; this has fire because of ether.' (27) Some logicians28 say, the definition of vyapti is 28. kecittu-This definition is made according to the opinion of those who accept absence of mutual absence or absolute absence is different from counter-positive, or determinant of counter-positive-ness.

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40 vyAptipaJcakam vizeSaNatAvizeSasambandhena yathoktasambandhena vA niravacchinnAdhikaraNatA tadAzrayavyaktyavarttamAnaM hetutAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnaddharmAvacchinnAdhikaraNatvasAmAnyaM taddharmavattvaM vivakSitam / dhUmavAn vahnerityAdau parvatAdiniSThavahnyadhikaraNatAvyakterdhUmAbhAvAdhikaraNAvRttittve'pi ayogolakaniSThavahnyadhikaraNatAvyakteratathAtvAnnAtivyAptirityAhuH / (28) anye tu hetutAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnahetutAvacchedakAvacchinnasvAdhikaraNatA zrayavRtti yanniravacchinnAdhikaraNatvaM tadavRttinirukta - desired to be mentioned the state of having the attribute which is substratum-hood in general determined by a particular attribute and determined by the relation which determines the state of being a reason, which (substratum-hood) exists in that individual thing which has the substratum-hood not determined by any feature, described by that which is qualified by early mentioned. The state of being absence of that which is to be established by the realtion attributive-ness or relation as the mentioned. There is no fault of too wide application in the inference; 'it has smoke because of fire' etc. because though the substratumness of fire abinding in the mounrain, does not exist in the substuatum of absence of smote; the substuatum-ness of fire abinding in the hot ironball is not like that (exists in the substuatum of absence of smoke) this is said. (28) Others say that the state of being substratum-hood determined by early mentioned relation and described by that which is qualified by early mentioned state of being absence of

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prathamaM lakSaNam sAdhyAbhAvatvaviziSTanirUpitayathoktasambandhAvacchinnAdhikaraNatAtmakatvamiti vizeSaNavizeSyabhAvavyatyAse tAtparyam29, svapadaM hetuparam / itthaJca that which is to be established and which does not exist in that substratum-hood of that which is not determined by any attribute, and which exists in the locus of substratum-hood of itself which is determined by that which determines the state of being reason and determined by the relation which determines the state of being reason. This is intention29 by the change of qualifier and qualified relationship. The term 'self denotes reason. In this way there is no fault of too narrow application even in the inferences; "this has the absence of the conjunction with monkey because of existence', 'this is different from that 29. arueft-Intention. "The locusness of reason which is determined by determinant of reason-hood, and which is determined by the relation of determinant of reasonhood, existing in the locus of such locusness of the reason, the locus-ness which is not determined by any attribute, non-existing in that locus-ness which exists in the locus which is indicated by the state of being indication, and which is determined by the relation which determines the counter-positiveness of the sadhya in general, and which counter-positive-ness exists in the absence of sadhya and which (counter-positiveness) is determined by the state of being absence of sadhya, counter-positiveness of which is determined by the determinant of state of being of sadhya and which is determined by the relation which determines the state of being sadhya, to be belonging of reason of that locusnessness" is the definition of vyapti according to some authors.

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42 vyAptipaJcakam kapisaMyogAbhAvavAn sattvAt, kapisaMyogibhinnaM guNatvAdityAdAvapi nAvyAptirityAhuriti saGkSepaH / which has conjunction with monkey' because of state of quality. etc. This is the brief discussion.

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dvitIyaM lakSaNam (29) lakSaNAntaramAha sAdhyavadbhinneti / sAdhyavadbhinno yaH sAdhyAbhAvavAn tadavRttitvamityarthaH / kapisaMyogI etadvRkSatvAdityAdyavyApyavRttisAdhyakAvyAptivAraNAya sAdhyavadbhinneti sAdhyAbhAvavato vizeSaNamiti prAJcaH, tadasat, 'sAdhyAbhAvavad' ityasya vyarthatApatteH sAdhyavadbhinnAvRttitvam ityasyaiva samyaktvAt / " The second definition of Vyapti (29) The author states the second definition of vyapti by the expression "that which is different from that which has that which is to be established". The meaning is the non-existence of reason in that which possesses the absence of that which is to be established and which is different from that which has that which is to be established. According to old logicions the expression 'that which is different from that which has that which is to be established' is the qualifier of the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established is used to avoid the too narrow application, in the inference; 'this has the conjunction of a monkey of this treeness because this is the inference' in which that which is to be established has partial existence. This is the opinion of old logicians. It is not correct because in this case the expression 'the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established' will be useless, because the non-existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established only would be the correct definition.

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44 vyAptipaJcakam (30) navyAstu sAdhyavadbhinne sAdhyAbhAvaH sAdhyavadbhinnasAdhyAbhAvaH tadvadavRttitvamiti saptamItatpuruSottaraM matuppratyayaH / tathA ca sAdhyavadbhinnavRttiryaH sAdhyAbhAvastadvadavRttitvamityarthaH / evaJca sAdhyavadbhinnavRttItyanuktau saMyogI dravyatvAdityAdAvavyAptiH / saMyogAbhAvavati dravye dravyatvasya vRtteH, tadupAdAne ca saMyogavadbhinnavRttiH saMyogAbhAvo guNAdivRttiH saMyogAbhAva eva adhikaraNabhedena abhAvabhedAt tadvadavRttitvAnnAvyAptiH / (30) New logicians say-the absence of that which is to be established in that which is different from that which has that which to be established is meant by the absence of that which is to be established, is in that which is other than that which has sadhya and non existence in that. This is suffix matup after the compound seventh case tatpurusa. Therefore 'the non-existence in that which has the absence of that which is to be established which (absence) exists in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established' is the meaning. In this way if the 'existent in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established', is not said there will be the fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has conjunction because this has substanceness.' This is because substance-ness exists in the substance which has the absence of that which is to be established that is conjunetion when that is said the absence of the conjunction which exists in quality is the absence of conjunction which exists in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, because absence is different due to difference in the substratum and because it does not exists in that, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

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dvitIyaM lakSaNam 45 (31) na ca tathApi sAdhyavadbhinnAvRttitvamityevAstu lakSaNaM kiM sAdhyAbhAvavadityanena iti vAcyam / yathoktalakSaNe tasya apravezena vaiyarthyAbhAvAt tasyApi lakSaNAntaratvAt / na ca tathApi sAdhyavadbhinnavRttiryastadvadavRttitvamevAstu kiM sAdhyAbhAvapadena iti vAcyam / tAdRzadravyatvAdimadvRttitvAt asambhavApatteH / sAdhyAbhAvetyatra sAdhyapadamapyata eva, dravyatvAderapi dravyatvAbhAvAbhAvatvAt bhAvarUpAbhAvasya ca adhikaraNabhedena bhedAbhAvAt / __ (31) Nor it can be said-let there be the non- existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established as the definition, what is the need of the expression 'that which has the absence of that which is to be established ? This is because even there is no useless-ness of that expression due to non-inclusion of it in the said definition because that is also a different definition. Nor it should be said-let be the non-existence in that which has that which exists in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, what is the need of the expression 'absence of that which is to be established? Because there will be a fault of impossibility, because it exists in that which has such substance-ness. In the expression "the absence of sadhya that which is to be established', the word that which is to be established, is for the same reason only sadhya the substance-ness, also is the absence of the absence of substance-ness because the absence which has the positive form is not different due to the difference in the substratum.

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vyAptipaJcakam ___ (32) nanu tathApi ghaTAkAzasaMyogaghaTatvAnyatarAbhAvavAn gaganatvAdityAdau ghaTAnadhikaraNadezAvacchedena ghaTAkAzasaMyogAbhAvasya gagane sattvAt saddhetutayA avyAptiH, sAdhyavadbhinne ghaTe varttamAnasya sAdhyAbhAvasya ghaTAkAzasaMyogarUpasya gagane'pi sattvAt, tatra ca hetorvRtteH / na ca sAdhyavadbhinnavRttitvaviziSTasAdhyAbhAvavattvaM vivakSitamiti30 vAcyam / sAdhyAbhAvapadavaiyarthyAMpatteH / sAdhyavadbhinnavRttitvaviziSTavadavRttitvasyaiva (32) This is the objection that-in the inference; "this thing has the absence of one of them the conjunction of a jar with ether and jar-ness because this has ether-hood" which is a valid reason, there is fault of too narrow application, because the absence of the conjunction of jar and ether exists in ether, by the place where there is no a jar, in the jar which is different from that which has that which is to be established, and which has absence of that which is to be established, in the form of the conjunction of jar and ether, exists in either also and there reason exists. Nor it should be said 30the state of having the absence of that which is to be established qualified by the existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, because the word the absences of that which is to 30. vivakSitam-Desired to be said-just as the locus-ness indicated by the state of being indicator determined by qualified existence-ness, exists only in substance not in quality etc., similarly the absence of sadhya in the form of the conjunction of ether with jar also exists only in jar and not in ether, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

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dvitIyaM lakSaNam 47 samyaktvAditi cet, na / abhAvAbhAvasyAtiriktatvamatenaitallakSaNakaraNAt / tathA ca adhikaraNabhedena abhAvabhedAt sAdhyavadbhinne ghaTe vartamAnasya sAdhyAbhAvasya pratiyogivyadhikaraNasya pratiyogimati gagane'sattvAdavyApterabhAvAt / ___ (33) na caivaM sAdhyAbhAvetyatra sAdhyapadavaiyarthyam abhAvAbhAvasyAtiriktatvena dravyatvAderabhAvatvAbhAvAt sAdhyavadbhinnavRttighaTAbhAvAdestu be established would be useless. If it is said that the absence existence in that which has that qualified by existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established would be correct. This is not admitted because this definition is made by the opinion that the absence of absence is different from positive entity. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application because the absence of that which is to be established exists, in the jar which is different from that which has that which is to be established and which (absence) dose not exist in that where counter-positive of it exists and that absence abides in ether which has counter-positive, due to difference in absence by substratum. __ (33) It should not be argued that-in this way the word 'that which is to be established', will be useless in the expression "the absence of that which is to be established because the absence of absence is different from positive entity hence the substance-ness is not an absence, the absence of a jar which exists in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established does not exist in the substratum of the

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48 vyAptipaJcakam hetumati asattvAt31 adhikaraNabhedena abhAvabhedAditi vAcyam / yatra pratiyogisamAnAdhikaraNatvapratiyogivyadhikaraNatvalakSaNaviruddhadharmAdhyAsa:32 tatraiva adhikaraNabhedena abhAvabhedAbhyupagamo na tu sarvatra, tathA ca sAdhyavadbhinnavRttighaTAbhAvAdehertumatyapi sattvAd asambhavavAraNAya33 reason31 because of the difference in the absence due to difference in the locus of it. This is because where the oppositive attributes as "the state of being co-existent with its counterpositive and state of being non-co-existent with its counterpositive32, abide there only absences are accepted different due the differene in the is substratum, not in all cases. Therefore to avoid the fault of impossibility33 because of the absence of a jar 31. Arthraiffa-Because it does not exist in the locus of the reason. The absence of absences which exists in water, the locus of that absence is the water etc. and not mountain etc. If absence is not different from other absence on basis of the difference of locus then the locus of the absence of fireness which exists in lake etc., like it the mountain also will be its locus, because the absence of fireness exists in the mountain. The smoke exists in the mountain. Therefore there would be fault of too narrow application. When the absence is accepted different from other absence due to difference in there locuses then the absence of jarness existing in lake etc., the substratum of it is the absence of smoke. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application. 32. folhas Th12/14-Knowledge of opposite attributes. The absence of the conjunction of monkey which has incomplete occurrence is accepted different on the basis of the different locus of absences. 33. 374E4OAR -To avoid the fault of imposibility, if leaving the word

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dvitIyaM lakSaNam 49 sAdhyapadopAdAnAt / (34) yadvA ghaTAkAzasaMyoga-ghaTatvAnyatarAbhAvAbhAvo'tirikta eva, ghaTAkAzasaMyogAdInAmananugatatayA tathAtvasya vaktumazakyatvAt / ghaTatvadravyatvAdyabhAvAbhAvastu nAtiriktaH, ghaTatvadravyatvAdInAmapyanu etc. which exist in that which is different from that which has 'that which is to be established abides in the substratum of the reason, the term 'that which is to be established' is included. (34) Or the absence of an absence of one of the jar-ness and the conjunction of ether and jar is different from positive entity because the conjunction of jar and ether etc. has no consecutive attributives as positive entity. Therefore this can not be said, the absence of absence of jar-ness and substanceness etc. are consecutive attributives. Therefore to 'sadhya' only the word absence is used, there would be the fault of too narrow application, because the absence which exists in lake etc., which is locus of the absence of sadhya fire is the absence of absence of substance-ness which has identity with substanceness, the locus of this absence is mountain where smoke exists, therefore there is not the absence is of that occurrence, there is the fault of too narrow application, when the word 'sadhya' is being used in the definition, there would not be the possibility of the fault of impossibility. The absence of sadhya which exists in water, is the absence of fire, the locus of it is water etc., the occurrence which indicated by water does not exists in smoke therefore there is no chance of fault of impossibility.

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vyAptipaJcakam gatatvAt / tathA ca dravyatvAdikamAdAyAsambhavavAraNAyaiva sAdhyapadamiti prAhurityAstAM vistaraH / avoid fault of impossibility by taking substance-ness etc. the expression 'that which is to be established is used it is said by some logicians. Let finish details.

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tRtIyaM lakSaNam (35) sAdhyavatpratiyogikAnyonyAbhAveti / hetau sAdhyavatpratiyogikAnyonyAbhAvAdhikaraNavRttitvAbhAva ityarthaH / anyonyAbhAvazca pratiyogyavRttitvena vizeSaNIyaH, tena sAdhyavato vyAsajyavRttidharmAvacchinnapratiyogitAkAnyonyAbhAvavati hetorvRttAvapi na asambhavaH / ___ (36) nanu evamapi nAnAdhikaraNakasAdhyake vahnimAn dhUmAdityAdau sAdhyAdhikaraNIbhUtatattadvyaktitvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkAnyonyA The Third definition of Vyapti (35) Non-coexistence of the mutual absence which has its counter-positive that which has that which is to be established in the reason. The absence of existence described by the substratum of the mutual absence of that which has that which is to be established, is its counter-positive, this is the meaning. The mutual absence should be qualified by nonexisting in the counter-positive. Therefore, there is no fault of impossibility even though the reason exists in the substratum of mutual absence of that which has that which is to be established determined by the characteristic which exists simultaneously more then one thing. (36) There is an objection in this way also. There is a fault of too narrow application in the inference, 'this has fire because this has smoke' where that which is to be established belongs to many substrata. This is because in the substratum of the mutual absence which has counter-positive-ness

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52 vyAptipaJcakam bhAvavati hetorvRtteravyAptirdurvArA iti / pratiyogyavRttitvamapahAya sAdhyavattvAcchinnapratiyogitAkAnyonyAbhAvavivakSaNe tu paJcamena saha paunaruktyamiti cet, na, vakSyamANakevalAnvayyavyAptivadasya api atra doSatvAt / (37) na ca tathApi sAdhyavatpratiyogikAnyonyAbhAvamAtrasyaiva etallakSaNaghaTakatve vakSyamANakevalAnvayyavyAptiH atrAsaGgatA, kevalAnvayisAdhyake'pi sAdhyAdhikaraNIbhUtatattadvyaktitvAvacchinnapratiyogitA determined by the state of being particular individual which is a substratum of that which is to be established, there the reason exists. If to avoid that fault instead of non-existence in the counter-positive, the mutual absence which has the counterpositive-ness determined by the state of having that which is to be established is used, there will be repeatation in the respect of fifth definition. This is not correct, because like too narrow application in the pure positive inference which will be said later on, here this fault also happens. (37) Nor yet it can be argued that-if the mutual absence which has that a which has that which is to be established, this is only a part of the definition, the fault of too narrow application in the pure positive inference which is to be shown later on would be in-consistent in this case, because the mutual absence which has the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of being particular individual substratum of that which is to be established, is established, in the inference where that which is to be established is pure affirmative. This is because

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tRtIya lakSaNam kAnyonyAbhAvasya prasiddhatvAditi vAcyam / tatrApi tAdRzAnyonyAbhAvasya prasiddhatve'pi tadvati hetorvRttereva avyApterdurvAratvAt / 53 (38) yadvA sAdhyavatpratiyogikAnyonyAbhAvapadena sAdhyavattvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkAnyonyAbhAva eva vivakSitaH / na caivaM paJcamAbhedaH, tatra sAdhyavattvAvacchinnapratiyogikAnyonyAbhAvavattvena pravezaH, atra tu tAdRzAnyonyAbhAvAdhikaraNatvena ityadhikaraNatvapravezApravezAbhyAmeva bhedaat| akhaNDAbhAvaghaTakatayA 34 ca nAdhikaraNatvAMzasya vaiyarthyamiti na there also, even though such mutual absence is established, there the fault of too narrow application is not avoidable, because the reason exists in the substratum of that. (38) Or that by the expression 'mutual absence which has the counter-positive-ness which abides in that which has that which is to be established,' the mutual absence that which has the counter- positive-ness determined by the state of having that which is to be established, is to be said. In this way there is no identity with fifth (definition) since a mutual absence which has the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of having that which is to be established is not included there, here (it is included) as a being a substratum of a such mutual absence. In this way there is difference from fifth definition, due to inclusion and non inclusion of state of being substratum, there is no uselessness of the part of substratum-ness, because it is a constituent part of one individual (akhand) absence 34, therefore there is no fault. 34. akhaNDAbhAva--There are so many definitions of vyapti, one of them is

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54 vyAptipaJcakam ko'pi doSa iti dik / This is a direction. inclusive of locusness. This is the idea, here in the definition nonoccurrence in that which is different from that which is the locus of the absence of sadhya, the state of being determinant existing in the mutual absence, is indicated by the state of being determinant existing in the locus. But in this third definition that state of being determinant existing in mutual absence, is indicated by the state of being determinant, existing in occurrence. This is difference between them.

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caturthaM lakSaNam (39) sakaleti / sAkalyaM sAdhyAbhAvavato vizeSaNaM, tathA ca yAvanti sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNAni tanniSThAbhAvapratiyogitvaM hetoH vyAptirityarthaH / dhUmAdyabhAvavajjalahRdAdiniSThAbhAvapratiyogitvAdvayAdAvativyAptiriti yAvaditi sAdhyAbhAvavato vizeSaNam, sAdhyAbhAvavizeSaNatve tattadhadAvRttitvAdirUpeNa yo vaDhyAdyabhAvastasyApi sakalasAdhyAbhAvatvena pravezAt tAvadadhikaraNAprasiddhyA asambhavApatteH / The fourth definition of Vyapti: (39) All, (the expression all), is a qualification of the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established, the counter-positive-ness of the absence which exists in that which are substrata of the absence of that which is to be established, in the reason is the vyapti. This is the meaning. Because there is fault of too narrow application in the fire which is a conuterpositive of the absence which abides in waterlake etc. which is the substratum of the absence of smoke etc. all is stated to be a qualification of that which has that which is to be established. If it would be a qualification of the absence of that which is to be established there will be a fault of impossibility. This is because the absence of fire qualifies by non-existence in lake etc. that (absence) also is included in all absences of that which is to be established, therefore one substratum of them are not established.

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56 vyAptipaJcakam (40) na ca dravyaM sattvAdityAdau dravyatvAbhAvavati guNAdau sattvAderviziSTAbhAvAdisattvAdativyAptiriti vAcyam / tAdRzAbhAvapratiyogitAvacchedakahetutAvacchedakavattvasyeha vivakSitatvAt / ( 41 ) pratiyogitA ca hetutAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnA grAhyA, tena dravyatvAbhAvavati guNAdau sattAdeH saMyogAdisambandhAvacchinnAbhAvasattve'pi (40) Nor it should be argued that-there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference 'it is a substance because it has existence, because of there is absence of qualified existence35 in the quality etc. which has the absence of substance-ness, because here, 'state of having the determinant of the state of being reason the determinant of the counterpositive-ness of such an absence, is to be said. (41) The counter-positive-ness should be taken as determined by the relation of the determinant of the state of 35. sattvAderviziSTAbhAvAt - The quality which is locus of absence of the substanceness is the locus of existence, being non-substratum of qualified existence. If the counter-positive-ness of the absence of qualified existence exists in that counter-positive-ness exists in existence also, therefore there is fault of too narrow application when to avoide this fault state of having determinant of state of being reason is maintioned as determinant of counter-positive-ness of such absence. The state of being qualified existence though it is determinant of the counter-positive-ness of that absence the state of being unqualified existence which is determinant of state of being reason is not determinant of the counter-positive-ness of such absence, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

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caturthaM lakSaNam 57 nAtivyAptiH / (42) sAdhyAbhAvazca sAdhyatAvacchedakAvacchinna-sAdhyatAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinna-pratiyogitAko grAhyaH, anyathA parvatAdAvapi vaDhyAdeviziSTAbhAvAdisattvena samavAyAdisambandhAvacchinnavalyAdisAmAnyAbhAvasattvena ca yAvadantargatatayA tanniSThAbhAvapratiyogitvAbhAvAt dhUmasya asambhavaH syAt / (43) na ca kapisaMyogI etadvakSatvAt ityAdau etadvRkSasyApi tAdRzasAdhyAbhAvavattvena yAvadantargatatayA tanniSThAbhAvapratiyogitvAbhAvAdeta being the reason. Therefore there is no the fault of too wide application, even the absence of existence, which has a counter-positive-ness determined by the relation conjunction, exists in quality etc. where the absence of substance-ness exists. (42) And the absence of that which is to be established, should be understood as having a counter-positive-ness determined by the realation of the determinant of the state of that which is to be established, and determined by the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established, otherwise there would be a fault of impossibility, because smoke has not the counter-positive-ness of the absence which exists in the mountain etc., which is included in all where the absence of a qualified fire and the absence of fire in general determined by the relation of inherence exist. (43) Nor, it should be said that-there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; "this has the conjunction of monkey because of 'this tree-ness' this tree-ness also exists in

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vyAptipaJcakam dRkSatvasyAvyAptiriti vAcyam / kiJcidanavacchinnAyAH sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNatAyA iha vivakSitatvAt / itthaJca kiJcidanavacchinnAyAH kapisaMyogAbhAvAdhikaraNatAyA guNAdAveva36 sattvAttatra ca hetorapyabhAva that which has such absence of that which is to be established, which (tree) is included in all, because the absence of counterpositive-ness of the absence which exists in that, because the substratum-hood of the absence of that which is to be established, is desired to be said, as not determined by any thing. In this way the substratumhood of the absence of the conjunction of monkey which is not determined by any thing, exists in quality36 etc., and where is the absence of the reason 36. Tugida-In quality etc. only. Those who do not accept difference between absences due to differences in substratum, in the opinion of them, the absence of conjunction of monkey which exists in the tree and the absences of conjunction of monkey which exists in quality, both are same. If the absence of the conjunction of monkey in the tree is determined by root, the absence of monkey in quality also would be determined by something. If it is not determined by anything in quality, it is not determined by anything in the tree also, because both are same. Here complete occurrence and non-complete occurrence both should be accepted as non-complete occurrence and which has non-complete occurrence can't be co-existent. Just as the conjunction and absence of conjunction both are co-existent in the tree in different parts, similarly the absence of conjunction which exists in quality has complete occurrence when the absence of conjunction in the tree has incomplete occurrence. Therefore in the opinion of those who accept identity in absences, the locusness of the

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caturthaM lakSaNam sattvAnnAvyAptiH / ___ (44) na ca kapisaMyogAbhAvavAn sattvAdityAdau sAdhyAbhAvasya kapisaMyogAdeniravacchinnAdhikaraNatvAprasiddhyA avyAptiriti vAcyam / kevalAnvayini abhAvAdityanena granthakRtaiva etaddoSasya vakSyamANatvAt / (45) na ca pRthivI kapisaMyogAdityAdau pRthivItvAbhAvavati jalAdau yAvatyeva kapisaMyogAbhAvasattvAdativyAptiriti vAcyam / tanniSThapadena tatra niravacchinnavRttimattvasya vivakSitatvAt / itthaJca also. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application. (44) It should not be said that-there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; "this has the absence of the conjunction of monkey because this has existence" due to non establishment of the state of being a substratum of the conjunction of monkey as not determined by anything. This is because this fault would be mentioned by author himself by the expression, "Absence in the pure affirmative inference." (45) Nor it should be said that-there is a fault of too wide application in the inference; "it is earth because it has the conjunction of monkey." This is because the absence of the conjunction of monkey exists in all water etc., which are substrata of the absence of earth-hood, because of by the expression "existing in that" the existence which is not determined by any thing is to be said. In this way, the absence of the conjunction of monkey is not the absence which has existence not determined by anything in the absence of the conjunction which exists in quality has incomplete occurrence.

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vyAptipaJcakam pRthivItvAbhAvAdhikaraNe jalAdau yAvadantargate niravacchinnavRttimAnabhAvo na kapisaMyogAbhAvaH kintu ghaTatvAdyabhAva eva tatpratiyogitvasya hetAvasattvAnnAtivyAptiH / (46) na caivamanyonyAbhAvasya vyApyavRttitAniyamanaye dravyatvAbhAvavAn saMyogavadbhinnatvAdityAderapi sadhetutatayA tatrAvyAptiH saMyogavadbhinnatvAbhAvasya saMyogarUpasya niravacchinnavRtteraprasiddheriti vAcyam / anyonyAbhAvasya vyApyavRttitAniyamanaye'nyonyAbhAvasya abhAvo na pratiyogitAvacchedakasvarUpaH, kintvatirikto vyApyavRttiH / anyathA38 water etc., which is included in all, the substratum of the absence of earth-ness, but the absence of jar etc. only is as such, and the counter-positive-ness of that absence does not abide in the reason.37 Therefore there is no fault of too wide application. (46) It also should not be said that-in this way there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference, "this has the absence of substance-ness because this is different from that which has the conjunction". This is also a valid reason according to them who believe that mutual absence is non-partial existent, because the absence of the difference from that which has the conjunction which (absence) is identical with conjunction has no non-determined existence. This is because in the opinion of the scholars who accept mutual absence has non partial existence, the absence of mutual absence is not identical with the determinant of counter-positive-ness but it is a different category, and non-partial existent. Other wise38 there would 37. hetAvasattvAta-Because it does not exists in the reason 38. (anyathA) Otherwise-The absence of mutual absence. Logicians who

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caturthaM lakSaNam mUlAvacchedena kapisaMyogibhedAbhAvabhAnAnupapatteriti saMyogavadbhinnatvAbhAvasya niravacchinnavRttimattvAt / (47) vastutastu sakalapadamatrAzeSaparaM,39 na tu anekaparam, not be the knowledge of the absence of the difference of that which has the conjunction of monkey by determinaction by the root, because the absence of the difference of that which has conjunction has non-determined existence. (47) Indeed the word "All" means 'not-remaining else 39 and not 'many, otherwise there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference where one individual is a counter accept mutual absence as having complete occurrence, accept the absence of mutual absence as different from the determinant of counter-positive-ness of the absence. For example, the difference from that which has the conjunction of monkey, has complete occurrence, the absence of that also is different from the determinant of counter-positive-ness, when that absence is admitted as different from the determinant of counter-positive-ness of absence. Just as the notion, "there is no difference from that which has conjunction of monkey in the branch of tree" is valid. The notion "in the root of tree" there is nondifference from that which has conjunction of monkey also is valid. If the absence of difference from that which has conjunction of monkey is accepted identical with the conjunction of the monkey, then because it is not determined by root therefore the notion. "There is no difference from that which has conjunction of monkey" would be invalid. 39. 37979424-Pervaderness is the meaning of word 'all.

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vyAptipaJcakam etadghaTatvAbhAvavAn paTatvAdityAdyekavyaktivipakSake40 sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNasya yAvattvAprasiddhyA avyAptyApatteH / tathA ca kiJcidanavacchinnAyA niruktasAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNatAyA vyApakIbhUto yo'bhAvaH hetutAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnaH tatpratiyogitAvacchedakahetutAvacchedakavattvaM lakSaNArthaH / (48) na ca sattvAdisAmAnyAbhAvasyApi prameyatvAdinA nirukta subject 40 as in the case; 'this has the absence of this jar-ness because this is a cloth". This is because the many-ness of the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established is not established. Therefore the meaning of the definition is that 'the state of having the determinant of the state of being a reason which (determinant) is the determinant of that counterpositive-ness determined by the relation, determinant of the state of being a reason, of the absence which is the pervasive of the state of being a substratum of the absence of that which is to be established which is mentioned as not determined by any thing. (48) Nor it should be said that there is a fault of too wide application in the inference; "it is a substance because it has existence." This is because the absence of existence also is the pervasive of the state of being substratum of the absence of 40. ekavyaktivipakSake-Where one individual is contradictory example. In this inference the absence of sadhya is the absence of absence of the fire-ness which is identical with that particular fireness, the locus of this form of absence of sadhya, is one individual fire alone. Therefore many locuses of that absence are not established.

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caturthaM lakSaNam 63 sAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNatAyA vyApakatvAd41 dravyaM sttvaadityaadaavtivyaaptiH| tadvanniSThAnyonyAbhAvapratiyogitAnavacchedakatvaM vyApakatvamityuktau tu nighUmatvavAn nirvahnitvAdityAdAvavyAptiH nirvahnitvAbhAvAnAM that which is to be established. 41 By the state as-the state of being pervader a non-determinant of the counter-positive-ness of the mutual absence which exists in that which has that, there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the absence of smoke because of the absence of fire.' This is because all absences of absence of fire in the form of fire, are determinant of the mutual counter-positive-ness of the absence existing in that which is the substratum of substratumness or the absence of the absence of smoke by the way of a 41. f16 THE2T4191fETOA UTAPAT 24140calc-The absence of existence is pervader of the locusness of the absence of sadhya. This is because the absence which exists in the substratum of substanceness quality etc., is not the absence of knowable but the absence of jar etc., the determinant of the counter-positive-ness of the absence is not knowability. That knowability exists in the absence of existence, hence the absence of existence is the pervader of locusness of the absence of sadhya. The counter-positive-ness of which is indicated by such and absence which is determined by the relation of inherence exists in the generic attribute existence. The determinant of the counter-positive-ness is the state of being existence which is the determinant of the state of being valid reason. That determinant exists in the existence, therefore there is a fault of over-extension, this is the meaning.

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64 vyAptipaJcakam vahnivyaktInAM sarvAsAmeva cAlanIyanyAyena 42 nirdhUmatvAbhAvAdhikaraNatAvanniSThAnyonyAbhAvapratiyogitAvacchedakatvAditi vAcyam / tAdRzAdhikaraNatAyA vyApakatAvacchedakaM hetutAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnayaddharmAvacchinnAbhAvatvaM taddharmavattvasya vivakSitatvAt 43 / filter action42 because the state of having that attribute which is the state of being absence which is determined by a particular attribute and determined by the relation which is a determinant of the state of being a reason, and which is a determinant of the state of being a pervasive, of such a substratum-ness, is to be mentioned.43 42. cAlanIyanyAyena - The mutual absence which exists in the mountain which is the substratum of smoke, is the mutual absence of that which has the absence of fire of kitchen, the counter-positive-ness of the absence exists in the hill the determinant of that counterpositive-ness is fire of kitchen. The pervader is not the absence of the absence of fire. Therefore there is fault of too narrow application. 43. faaf-The determinant of pervaderness of the locus-ness of smoke which exists in the mountain, is the state of being absence determined by which particular attribute is the state of being absence of the absence of fire, counter-positive-ness of which exists in the absence of fire and which is determined by the selfsome relation, that attribute exists in the absence of fire which is reason. The absence of which, exists in the mountain is the absence of jar and not the absence of the absence of fire. The determinant of that counter-positive-ness is fire-ness non-determinant is the state of being absence of the absence of fire that is determinant of pervaderness.

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caturthaM lakSaNam (49) vyApakatAcchedakatvantu tadvanniSThAtyantAbhAvapratiyogitAnavacchedakatvam / na tu tadvanniSThapratiyogivyadhikaraNAbhAvapratiyogitAnavacchedakatvam, tadvati niravacchinnavRttimAn yo'bhAvastatpratiyogitAnavacchedakatvaM vA, prakRte vyApakatAyAM pratiyogivaiyadhikaraNyasya niravacchinnavRttitvasya vA praveze prayojanavirahAt / tena44 pRthivI kapisaMyogAdityAdau nAtivyAptiH kapisaMyogAbhAvatvasya niruktavyApaka 65 (49) The state of being a determinant, of pervasive-ness, is the state of being non-determinant of the counter-positiveness of the absolute absence even not non-determinant of counter-positiveness of absence which is non-existent with its counter-positive which exists in that which exists which has that thing or not the state of non-determinant of counterpositive-ness of that absence which has existence, not determined by any thing in the sustratum of that. In the present definition there is no need of the inclusion of the expression of "not being present with counter-positive of it, or existence of not determined by any attribute, in the definition of pervasiveness." Therefore44 there is no fault of too wide application in the inference; 'this is earth because this has the conjunction of monky'. This is because the state of absence of the conjunction of monkey has not the state of being the determinant of above 44. teneti - Therefore. When the determinant of pervaderness in accepted in the early mentioned form.

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vyAptipaJcakam tAvacchedakatvavirahAdityeva45 paramArthaH / * * * said pervasive-ness,45 this is only the real meaning. 45. niruktavyApakatAvacchedakatvavirahAt-Because of it is not the determinant of pervader-ness which is stated early. The absolute absence which exists in the water which is substratum of absence of that which has the conjuction of monkey which exists in the part of tree, therefore the determinant of the counter-positive-ness of the absence is the state of being absence of the conjuction of monkey. In this way the state of being absence of the conjuction of monkey is not determinant of pervaderness of the locusness of the absence of sadhya.

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paJcamaM lakSaNam (50) sAdhyavadanyeti / atrApi prathamalakSaNoktarItyA hetau sAdhyavadanyavRttitvAbhAva ityarthaH / tAdRzavRttitvAbhAvazca tAdRzavRttitvasAmAnyAbhAvo bodhyaH / tena dhUmavAnvahnerityAdau dhUmavadanyajalahRdAdivRttitvAbhAvasya dhUmavadanyavRttitvajalatvobhayAbhAvasya ca hetau sattve'pi nAtivyAptiH / (51) sAdhyavadanyatvaJca-anyonyAbhAvatvanirUpita-sAdhyavattvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkAbhAvavattvaM tena vahnimAn dhUmAdityAdau tattadvahnima The fifth definition of Vyapti. (50) "That which is different from that which has that which is to be established". Here also, like the first definition in the reason, the absence of existence described by that which is different from that which has that which is to be established. This is the meaning. The absence of such existence should be understood as absence in general of such existence. Therefore there is no fault of too wide application in the inference; 'this has smoke because of fire,' eventhough the absence of existence described by the water lake etc. which is different from that which has smoke and the absence of both water ness and existence in that which is different from that which has smoke, exist in the reason. (51) The state of being different from that which has that which is to be established means the state of having that absence which is described by counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the state of having that which is to be established

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68 vyAptipaJcakam danyasmin dhUmAdervRttAvapi nAvyApti: 46, na vA vahnimattvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkAtyantAbhAvasya svAvacchinnabhinnabhedarUpasya 47 adhikaraNe and which conuter- positive-ness which is described by state of mutual absence. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application46 in the inference; "this has fire because of smoke', eventhough smoke exists in that thing which is different from that which has that which is to be established (that particular fire), not even there is fault of too narrow application, though in the mountain nor even though in the mountain etc. smoke exists which is the substratum of the absence which has the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of having fire which (absence) is in the form of difference from that which is different from that which is determined by that itself,47 there is 46. :-No fault of too narrow application. All locuses of fire are included into them which have sadhya. State of having the absence of counter-positive-ness which is determined by the state of having sadhya and which (counter-positive-ness) is determined by the relation of identity, does not exists there, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application. 47. svAvacchinnabhinnabhedarUpasya - The difference from that which has difference from that which is determined by that just as the difference from that which has difference from that which has jar is not difference from jar. Similarly the difference from that which has difference from that which has the absolute absence of that which has fire is not different from the absolute absence of that which has fire. Thus that absence also has the counter-positive-ness which is determined by the state of having sadhya. Hence the locus of that absence is mountain etc.,

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paJcamaM lakSaNam parvatAdau dhUmasya vRttAvapyavyAptiH / tasya sAdhyavattvAvacchinnapratiyogitAyA atyantAbhAvatvanirUpitatvena anyonyAbhAvatvanirUpitatvavirahAt / anyonyAbhAvatvanirUpitatvaJca tAdAtmyasambandhAvacchinnatvameva / ___ (52) sAdhyavattvaJca sAdhyatAvacchedakasambandhena bodhyam, tena vahnimAn dhUmAdityAdau vahnimattvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkasya samavAyena vahnimato'nyonyAbhAvasya adhikaraNe parvatAdau dhUmAdervRttAvapi nAvyAptiH / fault of too narrow application because the counter-positiveness of that (absence) which is determined by state of having that which is to be established is described by the state of being absolute absence and not by the state of being mutual absence. The state of being described by the state of being mutual absence means to be determined by the relation identity alone. (52) And the state of having that which is to be established, should be known by the relation which delimits the state of that which is to be established, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference, 'this has fire because of smoke'eventhough the smoke exists on a mountain which is the substratum of the mutual absence of that which has fire by the relation inherence and which (absence) has the occurrence which indicated by that exists in smoke. Therefore there is fault of too narrow application. When the counter-positive-ness is stated to be indicated by state of being mutual absence there is no fault of too narrow application because there is absence of being determined by the relation of identity in the counter-positive-ness of the absoulute absence. There that absence can't be taken as the absence of that which has sadhya, this is the idea.

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70 vyAptipaJcakam sarvamanyat prathamalakSaNoktadizA avaseyam / yathA cAsya na tRtIyalakSaNAbhedastathoktaM tatraiveti48 samAsaH / sarvANyeva lakSaNAni kevalAnvayyavyAptyA dUSayati- kevalAnvayini abhAvAditi / paJcAnAmeva lakSaNAnAm idaM vAcyaM jJeyatvAdityAdivyApyavRttikevalAnvayisAdhyake, dvitIyAdilakSaNacatuSTayasya tu kapisaMyogAbhAvavAn sattvAdityAdyavyApyavRttikevalAnvayisAdhyake'pi cAbhAvAdityarthaH / (53) sAdhyatAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnasAdhyatAvacchedakAvacchinna counter-positive-ness determined by the state of having fire. All other things should be known according to the description in the first definition. How there is no non-difference with third definition that is already discussed in that place only.48 Author rejects all five definition by too narrow application in the pure affirmative inference by the expression 'absence in pure affirmative inference. There is absence of all five definitions in the inference; 'it is namable because it is knowable' in which that which is to be established is a pure affirmative and non partial eristent all four definitions begining from the second one have fault of too narrow application in the inference; "this has the absence of the conjunction of monkey because of existence' where that which is to be established is pure affirmative and partial existent, this is the meaning. __ (53) This is because the mutual absence, which has 48. tatraivoktam-Maintioned there only by in locus of locussness, there is difference between them. These two definitions third and fifth.

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paJcamaM lakSaNam 71 pratiyogitAkasAdhyAbhAvasya sAdhyatAvacchedakasambandhena sAdhyavattvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkA'nyo'nyAbhAvasya cAprasiddhatvAt, kapisaMyogAbhAvavAn sattvAdityAdau niravacchinnasAdhyAbhAvAdhikaraNatvasya aprasiddhatvAcca iti bhAvaH / tRtIyalakSaNasya kevalAnvayisAdhyakAsattvaJca tadvyAkhyAnAvasare eva prapaJcitam / (54) etaccopalakSaNaM dvitIye kapisaMyogI etadvRkSatvAdityAdAvapyavyAptiH, adhikaraNabhedena abhAvabhede mAnAbhAvena kapisaMyogavadbhinnavRttikapisaMyogAbhAvavati vRkSe etadvakSatvasya vRttitvAt / counter-positive-ness determined by the state of having that which is to be established and determined by the relation which determines the state of being that which is to be established and the absence of that which is to be established which has the counter-positive-ness is determined by the determinant of the state of that which is to be established and determined by the relation which determines the state of that which is to be established, are not established, and the inference; this has the absence of the conjunction of monkey because of existence', the substratum-ness of the absence of that which is to be established, non-determined by anything is not established, this is the idea. The third definition is not applicable in pure affirmative inference is stated when this definition was discussed. (54) This is indicative. There is a fault of too narrow application of second definition in the inference; "this has the conjunction of monkey because of this treeness." This is

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72 vyAptipaJcakam (55) na ca sAdhyavadbhinnavRttitvaviziSTasAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvaM vaktavyam, evaJca vRkSasya viziSTAdhikaraNatvAbhAvAt na avyAptiriti because this tree-ness exists in the tree which has the absence of the conjunction of monkey which absence exists in that which is different from that which has the conjunction of monkey because there is absence of proof for the theory that absence is different due to difference in substratum. (55) It should not be said that-there is not fault of too narrow application when it is stated-'The absence of existence in that which has the absence of that which is to be established qualified by the existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established because in this way the tree is not a qualified substratum. This is because in that case the expression the absence of that which is to be established will be purpose-less. Hence, existence in that which is qualified by the existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established is the correct form of definition, because there is no fault of impossibility in a valid reason due to the absence of the qualified substratum-hood in the locus of the reason. And there is a fault of too narrow application by taking mutual absence through the method of the filter action in the inference; "this mountain has fire because of smoke' where that which is to be established has many substrata while the all mutual absences which have the counter-positive-ness which exists in that which has that which is to be established are included in the third definition, this also should be noted.

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paJcamaM lakSaNam 73 vaacym| sAdhyAbhAvapadavaiyApatteH / sAdhyavadbhinnavRttitvaviziSTavadavRttitvasyaiva samyaktvAt / saddhetau hetvadhikaraNe viziSTAdhikaraNatvAbhAvAdeva asambhavAbhAvAt / tRtIye sAdhyavatpratiyogitAkAnyonyAbhAvamAtrasya ghaTakatve cAlanIyanyAyena anyonyAbhAvamAdAya nAnAdhikaraNakasAdhyake vahnimAn dhUmAdityAdAvavyAptizca ityapi bodhyam / iti zrImathurAnAthatarkavAgIzakRtaM vyAptipaJcakarahasyaM samAptam / Thus the chapter on VYAPTI-PANCAKAM in VYAPTIVADA RAHASYA by Sri Mathuranatha Tarkavaghisa ends.

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prathamaM lakSaNam (ta.1) nanu anumitihetuvyAptijJAne kA vyAptiH ? na tAvadavyabhicaritatvam / taddhi na sAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvam / (dI.1) samArabdhAnumAnaprAmANyaparIkSAkAraNIbhUtavyAptigrahopAyapratipAdananidAnaM vyAptisvarUpanirUpaNam Arabhate-nanu ityAdinA / (jA.1) samArabdheti / samArabdhaM yadanumAnaprAmANyaparIkSaNaM The First definition of vyapti. (T.1) Here author follows the collection of five tentative definitions of invariable-concomitance (vyapti) Now the question is, in the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyapti), which is the cause of inferential knowledge, what is invariable concomitance (vyapti) ? Infact, it is not the state of having non-deviation of the reason from that which is to be established) because invariable-conocomitance is neither. The non-existence of the reason in such substratum which possesses the absence of that which is to be established (D.1) By the expression 'Nanu' author Gangesa starts the discussion of the nature of vyapti which is the cause of the discussion of the method of the graspping vyapti, which is the reason of examination of validity of inference which is started by author in previous chapter. (J.1) 'Started'. Started the examination of the validity of inherence, which is the cause of establishing of validity of

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prathamaM lakSaNam 75 prAmANyasAdhanaM tatkAraNIbhUtaM yadvyAprAptigrahopAyapratipAdanaM tannidAnaM vyAptisvarUpanirUpaNamityarthaH / vyAptijJAnaM vinA 'ayaM vyAptagrahopAya' iti jJAtumazakyatvAd, vyAptestatra vizeSaNatvAditi49 bhAvaH / pervasion. The cause of which is the discussion of the method of grasping vyapti, which is dependent upon discussion of the nature of vyapti. Without the knowledge of vyapti there would not be the knowledge of the method of grasping vyapti. This is because vyapti is qualifirer49 there (in the method of grasping vyapti) 49. fastqucaia-Because of qualifiereness. In the method of knowledge of unveriable concomitance the knowledge of concomitance is qualifier in vyapti (concomitance) without is qualifier of the knowledge of vyapti. Therefore without the knowledge of vyapti there would not be the knowledge of the method of the knowledge of vyapti, because the knowledge of qualifier is the cause of the knowledge of qualified thing.

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dvitIyaM lakSaNam (ta.2) sAdhyavadbhinnasAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvam / (dI.2) sAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvasyAvyApyavRttisAdhyakasaddhetAvavyAptimAzaGkayAha-sAdhyavadbhinneti / sAdhyavadbhinne yaH sAdhyAbhAvastadvadavRttitvamarthaH / (jA.2) avyApyavRttIti / kapisaMyogI etadvakSatvAt ityAdAvityarthaH / idaJca yena rUpeNa yena sambandhena ca sAdhyatvaM tadavacchinnasya The Second definition of vyapti. __ (T.2) (Nor,) The non-existence (of the reason) in the substratum which possesses the absence of that which is to be established and which is different form that which has that which is to be established. (D.2) Non-occurence (of the reason) in that which has the absence of sadhya, which is different from that which has sadhya of the definition. There is fault of too narrow application in the valid reason, sadhya of which has incomplete occurence. So author says "Different from that which has sadhya" nonoccurence (of the reason) in that which has the absence of sadhya. [Non co-existence (of reason) with the mutual absence counter positive of which is that which has sadhya.. This is the meaning :] (J.2) 'Non-partial existence' means in the inference; "this has the conjunction of monkey because of this tree-ness" etc.' This is due to inclusion of the absence of that which is to be established delimited by the state of being that which is to be

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dvitIyaM lakSaNam 77 sAdhyAbhAvasya pravezamAdRtya, anyathA tu vyApyavRttisAdhyake'pi50 viziSTAbhAvAdikamAdAya51 doSo bodhyaH / avyApyavRttisAdhyake'pi AkAzAdihetAvavyAptyabhAvAdAha 2 saddhetAviti / vRttimaddhatAviti tadarthaH / avyApyavRttisAdhyaM yatra tatra san vartamAno yo hetustatretyarthaH, tena established by which from attribute and by which relation. Otherwise even in the inference, where the that which is to be established, is non-partially existent50, there is a fault taking in to account the absence of a qualified thing51 this should be known here. Author says "in the valid reason." This is because there is no fault of too narrow application52 even in the inference where that which is to be established is a partialy existent and where ether etc. are reasons. In that reason, which abides something, this is the meaning of that expression. The partial existent that which is to be established is where, which reason exists there, in that reason, this is the meaning. Therefore even though there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; "this has the absence of conjunction because this 50. vyApyavRttisAdhyake-In the inference where sadhya has complete occurence such as "this has substanece-ness because of earthness." 51. fafretira-Qualified absence etc. absence of substanceness qualified by water-ness, absence of absence of substance-ness and absence of substance-ness by temporal relation. 52. 372|1614101G-Because of the fault of too narrow application. There is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; "this has the conjuction of monkey because of ether" because ether does not exist anywhere, which is locus of the absence of the conjuction of monky which is the absence of sadhya.

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78 vyAptipaJcakam saMyogAbhAvavAn guNatvAdityAdAvavyAptyabhAve'pi na kSatirityapi vadanti / ___ (jA.3) nanu sAdhyavadbhinno yaH sAdhyAbhAvavAn ityarthe sAdhyAbhAvavatpadavaiyarthyaM sAdhyavadbhinnAvRttitvasyaiva samyaktvAt, na cAvRttitvena samaM sAdhyavadbhinnasyAnvayAvivakSaNAt, sAdhyAbhAvavatA samameva tAdAtmyenaivAnvayavivakSaNAnna vaiyarthyamiti vAcyam / tathA sati sAdhyavadbhinnAtmako yo matubarthaH sambandhI tadavRttitvasya samyaktve sAdhyAbhAvapadavaiyarthyadhrauvyAt / ataH saptamIsamAsasAmarthya vyAcaSTesAdhyavadbhinne iti / is a quality," there is no harm, this is said by author. (J.3) This is the objection if the meaning is that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, possesses the absence of that which is to be established, the expression "that which has the absence of that which is to be established," will be purposeless because, then the nonexistence in that which has that which is to be established only will be correct definition. Nor it should be said that-there is not useless-ness because the cementic relation of that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, is not with non-existence, but it is stated to be desired with that which has the absence of that which is to be established by the relation identity, eventhough non existence in that relatum which is the meaning of matup in the form of that which is different from that which has that which is to be established is correct. Then the expression 'absence of that which is to be established is indeed useless. Therefore author supporting seventh compound says "in that which is different from that

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dvitIyaM lakSaNam 9 on tathA ca sAdhyavadbhinnasya vRttAvananvayAt yathA sanniveze na vaiyarthyam / sAdhyAbhAve53 sAdhyavadbhinnavRttitvavizeSaNaM tu avyApyavRttisAdhyakasaGgrahArtham eva ityAzayaH / (jA.4) sAdhyavadbhinnavRttidravyatvAdimati parvatAdau dhUmAdeH which has that which is to be established. Therefore there is no fault of useless-ness when it is included as it is, because that which is different from that which has that which is to be established is not semantically related with existence, The existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be esablished is the qualifier of the absence of that which is to be established. 53 This qualification for the inclusion of the inference where that which is to be established is partially existent, this is the idea. (J.4) There would be a fault of too narrow application or the fault of impossibility, because smoke exists in mountain etc., which is the substratum of substanceness, which exists in 53. HZ410-Absence of occurence (of reason) which is indicated by the locus of the absence of sadhya and which (locus) is different from that which has sadhya. This is second definition. When this definition is accepted, there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the conjunction of monkey because of this tree-ness.' Though this tree is locus of absence of the conjunction of monkey in the root but this is not different from that which is locus of sadhya, because the conjunction of monkey also exists there such a locus of absence of sadhya is quality also where this tree-ness does not occurs. This is the idea.

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80 vyAptipaJcakam sattvAdavyAptirasambhavo vA syAd, ataH - sAdhyAbhAveti / na ca kapisaMyogI etadvRkSatvAdityAdeH saGgrahArtham adhikaraNabhedena abhAvabhedamAdRtya eva lakSaNamidaM kAryaM, tathA ca sAdhyavadbhinne yo'bhAvastadvadavRttitvasyaiva samyaktve sAdhyapadavaiyarthyamiti vAcyam / pratiyogitA- saMsargeNa sAdhyIyatvenaiva sAdhyAbhAvasya pravezo, na tu abhAvatvenApIti tadvaiyarthyazaGkAnavakAzAt54 / that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, therefore the expression "absence of that which is to be established" is used. It should not be stated that-for the inclusion of the inference, "this has the conjunction of monkey because of this tree-ness" taking in to account the theory the absence is different due to difference in substratum only, this definition should be made, therefore the non-existence in that which has the absence which exists in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, is only correct definition. Hence the term 'the absence of that which is to be established' is useless. This is because there is inclusion of the absence of that which is to be established, as being connected with that which is to be established by the relation counter-positive-ness and not by the state of being absence, therefore there is no chance of the doubt of useless-ness.5 54 54. tadvaiyarthyazaGkAnavakAzAt --There is no possibility of doubt of perposeless-ness of word "absence of sadhya' absence of occurence indicated by the locus of that which is qualified by sadhya by the relation of counterpositive-ness and which exists in that which is different from that which has sadhya, this is the meaning. Therefore here in form of

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dvitIyaM lakSaNam 81 (jA.5) vastutaH svapratiyogitAvacchedakasambandhena sAdhyavadbhinne varttate yaH, sAdhyatAvacchedakasambandhena sAdhyIyo'bhAvaH tadvadavRttitvamarthaH / tathA ca sAdhyatAvacchedakasambandhena sAdhyIyatvArthakasya sAdhyapadasya anuktau svapratiyogitAvacchedakIbhUtasamavAyAdisambandhena vayAdimato'nyasmin parvatAdau yaH samavAyAdyavacchinnavalyAdyabhAvastadvati dhUmAdeH sattvAdavyAptiH syAt, ataH tadupAttamiti navyAH / (J.5) Infact the meaning is that, the non-existence in that which has that absence, of that which is connected with that which is to be established, by the relation which is determinant of the state of being that which is to be established, that (absence) which exists in that which has that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, by the relation which is determinant of the counter-positive-ness of absence of that which is to be established. Therefore when the expression that which is to be established', which means the state of being connected with that which is to be established by the relation which is determinant of the state of being that which is to be established, is not used there will be a fault of too narrow application, because of the smoke exists in that which has the absence of fire determined by relation inherence mountain etc., which (absence) exists which is different from that which has fire by the relation inherence which is determinant of the conuter-positive-ness of that itself, therefore that expression is used. This is stated by new logicians. absence, the absence of sadhya is not included but it is included as a qualified by sadhya by relation of counter-positive-ness, therefore the word 'sadhya' is not meaningless.

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82 vyAptipaJcakam (jA. 6) kecittu vyApyavRttitvAvyApyavRttitvAdiviruddhadharmAdhyAsAt55 saMyogAdyabhAvasyaiva dravyaguNAdyadhikaraNabhedena bhedaH, na tu gaganAdyabhAvasya, mAnAbhAvAt / tathA ca sAdhyavadbhinnavRttigaganAdyabhAvavati parvatAdau dhUmAdeH sattvAdavyAptiH, ataH sAdhyapadamityAhuH, tanmandaM, guNe gaganAdyabhAve guNatvAdisAmAnAdhikaraNyaM, na tu dravye gaganAdyabhAve tathAtvam ityAdi pratItyA gaganAdyabhAvasyApi guNatvAdisAmAnAdhi - (J.6) Some logicians say that the absence of conjunction etc. only is different due to difference in substrat substance and quality etc., because of the imposition of two opposite attributes such as the state of being partial existence and state of being non-partial existence55, and not the absence of ether etc. because there is no proof. Therefore there is a fault of too narrow application. That's because smoke etc. occurs in mountain etc. which has the absence of ether etc. which (absence) exists in that which is different form that which has that which is to be established. Therefore the word "that which is to be established" is used, this is not correct, because there is a possibility of two opposite attributes such as the co-existence with quality-ness etc., and its absence, in the absence of ether etc., on the basis of the notion the absence of ether etc. "in 55. vyApyavRttittvAvyApyavRttitvaviruddhadharmAdhyAsAt - Because of the apprehention of opposite attribtes, complete occurence and incomplete occurence, = non-occurence in that which is locus of it counter-positive is complete occurence, in that which is locus of it's ocunter-positive is incomplete occurence. Therefore absence of conjuction is different in the locuses as substance and quality, the absence of eather is not different in quality and substance because it has complete occurence.

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dvitIyaM lakSaNam 83 karaNyatadabhAvayoH viruddhayoH dharmayoH sambhavAditi dik / (jA.7) na ca ghaTatvaghaTAkAzasaMyogAnyataratvAdyavacchinnAbhAvavAn gaganatvAdityatrAvyAptiH, sAdhyavadbhinne ghaTe varttamAnasya gaganaghaTasaMyogAtmakasAdhyAbhAvasyApi adhikaraNe gaganAdau gaganatvAdihetoH sattvAditi vAcyam / abhAvAbhAvasyAtiriktatAmate evaitallakSaNakaraNAditi bhAvaH quality co-existence with quality-ness, in the absence of ether and not in substance co-existence with quality-ness in the absence of ether. This is the direction. (J.7) Nor it should be stated, that there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; this has the absence of that which is determined by the state of being one of them jarness and the conjunction of ether-ness because the reason' in the etherness etc. exits ether which also is the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established in the form of conjunction with ether and jar which absence exists in the jar which is different from that which has that which is to be established. This is because this definition is made taking in to account only the opinion of those who accept the absence of absence as separate category. This is the idea.

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tRtIyaM lakSaNam (ta.3) sAdhyavatpratiyogikAnyonyAbhAvAsAmAnAdhikaraNyam / (dI.3) karmAdau saMyogAdyabhAvasya bhinnatve maanaabhaavaadaahsaadhyvditi| (jA.8) bhinnatve iti / dravyaniSThasaMyogAbhAvato bhinnatve ityarthaH / mAnAbhAvAditi / tathA cAtrAvyApyavRttisAdhyakasaddhetAvavyAptiriti bhaavH| The Third definition of vyapti. (T.3) (Nor,) The not co-existence (of the reason) with such a mutual absence which has the substratum of that which is to be established as its counter-positive. (D.3) There is no proof to accept the absence of sadhya which exists in movement is different, therefore author says - "Sadhyavaditi." (J.8) "In the state of being different," In the state of being different from that which has the absence of the conjuntion existing in the substance is the meaning. ___Because of the absence of proof. Therefore there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference where that which is to be established is partially existent.56 This is the idea. 56. 372414?fa-Fault of too narrow application in the inference; "this has conjunction of monkey because of this tree-ness." Here the absence of conjunction which exists in quality which is different from that

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caturthaM lakSaNam (ta.4) sakalasAdhyAbhAvavanniSThAbhAvapratiyogitvam / (dI.5) hetoH sAdhyavatpakSabhinnadRSTAntavRttitvena avyApterAha sakaleti / (jA.9) hetoriti / na ca sAdhyavatpratiyogikAnyonyAbhAvasya kevalAnvayitvAdasambhava57 eva vaktumucito nAvyAptiriti vAcyam / The Fourth definition of vyapti. (T.4) (Nor,) The counter-positive-ness of the absence which besides in all substrata of the absence of that which is to be established. (D.4) Because the reason exists in example which is different from subject which has sadhya, hence there is fault of too narrow application therefore author says-sakal (all). (J.9) 'Of the reason.' It should not be said that-there is a fault of impossiblilty only and not too narrow application. Because the mutual absence of that which has that which is to be established is pure affirmative.57 This is because in the which has the absence of sadhya, is different from that absence of sadhya which exists in this tree, therefore the locus-ness of the absence of conjunction of monkey exists in this tree, also, there this tree-ness which is reason exists, so there is a fault of too narrow application. 57. goddi-afecaia-Because of omni-present. In the inference such as 'this has fire because of smoke' here also the mutual absence of both pot and fire, which also has that which has sadhya as counter-positive, exists everywhere, therefore there is a fault of impossibility.

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86 vyAptipaJcakam vahnimAn gaganAdityatrAvRttigaganAdau lakSaNasambhavena tasyApi saddhetutAyAH svayaM vakSyamANatvAditi bhAvaH / sAdhyapadasya siddhikarmatattadvyaktiparatayA58 tattadvyaktyavacchinnAnyonyAbhAvAsAmAnAdhikaraNyarUpasya paryavasitArthasya dravyaM pRthivItvAdityAdAveva sambhavAd gandhavatI pRthivItvAdityAdAvavyAptikathanamityapi vadanti / ( dI. 6) sAkalyaM sAdhyAbhAvavati sAdhye ca bodhyam, sAdhyAbhAvo vA sAdhyatAvacchedakAvacchinnapratiyogitAko grAhyastena inference; 'this has fire because of ether,' there in ether which is non-existent, there is a possibility of application of the definition this is also a valid reason which will be mentioned later on. This is the idea. The term 'sadhya' means the particular individual object of the certain knowledge of that which is to be established'58 therefore the concluding meaning in the form non-'co-existence of the mutual absence of that which is determined by the state of that particular individual, is applicable only in the inference like; 'this is a substance because of earth-ness', therefore the fault of too narrow application is mentioned in the inference; 'it has smell because of eather-ness' author says this also. (D.5) All-ness should be known as the qualification of that which has absence of sadhya and sadhya or the absence of sadhya should be known as having counter-positive-ness which is determined by that which is determinant of the state of being 58. siddhikarmatadvyakti-- Siddhi- the certainty of sadhya. Karm-the object of certainity of sadhya.

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caturthaM lakSaNam 87 vipakSaikadezaniSThAbhAvapratiyogini vyabhicAriNi nAtivyAptiH, na vA nAnAvyaktisAdhyakasaddhetAvavyAptiH / (jA. 10) nanu sakalasya sAdhyapratiyogikAbhAvasyAdhikaraNAprasiddhyA vyabhicAriNi ativyAptivAraNAya yadi sAdhyAbhAvasya vizeSaNaM sAkalyaM tadA vahnimAn dhUmAdityAdisaddhetAvavyAptiH, tatrApi tattatsapakSAvRttitvAvacchinnAbhAvarUpasya 5 9 tattadvipakSAvRttitvAvacchinnAbhAvarUpasya ca sadhya. Therefore there is not a fault of too wide application in invalid reason which is counter-positive of the absence which exists in the part of contradictory subject. Nor there is fault of too narrow application in the reason which has many individuals as sadhya. (J.10) Here is the objection if 'all' is admitted qualifier of the absence of that which is to be established, to avoid the fault of too wide application in a devious reason due to non-establishment of the substratum of all absences of that which is to be established, there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has fire because of smoke,' there also is a fault of nonestablished (sabstratum) the collection of the absence of that which is to be established in the form of the absence of that which is determined by non-existence in that individual counter-subject and in the form of the absences of that which is determined by non-existence in the particular individual definite subject.59 60. tadtadvipakSAvRttittvAvacchinnatvAbhAvaH - The absence of that which is determined by occurence of reason in that particular subject as water etc. tadtatsapakSAvRttitvAvacchinnatvAbhAva The absence of that which is determined by occurence in that particular subject as mountain etc.

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88 vyAptipaJcakam sAdhyapratiyogikAbhAvastomasya adhikaraNAprasiddharata Aha-sAdhyAbhAvavatIti / tathA ca sAkalyaM na sAdhyAbhAvavizeSaNam, ato nAprasiddhiriti60 bhAvaH / ___(jA.11) kecittu nanu dhUmavAn vahnaH ityAdi vyabhicAriNi ativyAptiH, sAdhyAbhAvavadyatkiJcinniSThAbhAvapratiyogitvAdityata AhasAkalyaM sAdhyAbhAvavatIti / nanu evamapi sAdhyAbhAvavannikhilAntargate mahAnasAdau vartamAnasya abhAvasya pratiyogitvaM dhUmAdau nAstIti Therefore author says 'in that which has the absence of that which is to be established', hence 'all' is not the qualifier of the absence of that which is to be established, therefore there is no fault of non-established60 (substratum). ___ (J.11) Some of logicians say, that there is a fault of too wide application in the devious reason as; "it has smoke because of fire." This is because it (fire) is the counter-positive of the absence which exists in something which has the absence of that which is to be established. Therefore 'all' is connected with that which has the absence of that which is to be established. Here is an objection-in this way also there the fault of too narrow application will remain intact, because the counter-positive-ness of the absence which exists in kitchen etc., which is included in 61. Fiftros:-No fault of non-establishment. If the "all" is a qualification of the absence of sadhya then only is the fault of non-establishment of locus of all absences of sadhya, if "all" would be qualifier of locus of the absence of sadhya, then there would not be fault of nonestablishment this the idea.

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caturthaM lakSaNam avyAptitAdavasthyamata uktaM sAdhye ceti / tathA ca sapakSo mahAnasAdirna sakalasAdhyAbhAvavAn iti adoSaH / - 89 (jA. 12) prAJcastu vyabhicAriNi ativyAptivAraNArthaM sAdhyAbhAvavati yAvattvavizeSaNe datta eva sAdhye yAvattvavizeSaNamavyAptivArakatayA sArthakaM bhavati, ataH sAdhyAbhAvavatyeva sAkalyaM prAk prayojayati sAkalyamityAdinA ityevamavadhArayanti tanmandaM, sAdhyAbhAvavati sAkalyAnuktAvativyAptivArakatayA eva sAdhye sAkalyavizeSaNasya prathamataH sArthakatvasambhavAt / anyathA gaganAvRttidharmavAn that which has the absence of that which is to be established, does not exist the reason smoke etc. therefore it is said "that which is to be established," thus the definite subject kitchen etc. is not that which has the absence of all that which is to be estalished, therefore there is no fault. (J.12) Old logicians hold that-when to avoid the fault of too wide application in devious reason the qualifier 'all' is connected with that which has the absence of that which is to be established, only then the qualifier 'all' in that which is to be established is fruitfull as a remover of the fault of too narrow application. Therefore 'all' is connected with that which has the absence of that which is to be established in first by the expression 'all.' This is not correct, because there is a possibility of fruitfullness of the qualifier 'all' with that which is to be established, in first, by removing the fault of too wide application. Otherwise there will be fault of too wide application in the inference; 'this has the thing which dose not abide in ether, because of substance

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vyAptipaJcakam dravyatvAdityAdau paTatvAdilakSaNatattatsAdhyavyaktyabhAvavad guNAdiniSThAbhAvapratiyogini dravyatvAdau atiprasaGgAditi61 dhyeyam / * (jA.13) nanu sAdhyavati api dvitvAdyavacchinnapratiyogitAkasya sakalasAdhyapratiyogikAbhAvasya sattvAdasambhavaH,62 kiJca sakala ness' because of the over extention61 in substance-ness' which is the counter-positive of the absence which exists in quality etc. which has the absence of individual particular that which is to be established, in the form of cloth-ness etc. (J.13) There is fault of impossibility62 because the 61. atiprasaGgAt-Because of fault to over-extension. Even fall", is not used as qualifier of that which has the absence of sadhya, if it is not accepted as qualifier of sadhua in the inference; 'it has the quality which does not occur in the ether because it has substance-ness', etc. also, that attribute which does not exist in ether therefore absence of sadhya would be the absence of potness also which exists in one locus as such quality etc., there the absence of substance-ness exists counter-positive of the absence is substance-ness. Therefore there is fault of over-extension of fourth definition. In this way when 'all is accepted as qualifier of sadhya, there would not be over-extention because qualitiness also is included in to sadhya. The absence of qualitiness does not exists in quality. The absence of qualitiness exists in eather etc. where reason substance-ness occures. Therefore there is not fault too wide application. Editor's Note 'itthaJca prathamataH sAdhye sAkalyavizeSaNopAdAne guNatvAderapi saGgrahAt tadabhAvanAnna guNAdiH kintu gaganamAtraM tatra hetorvRttitvAnnAtivyApti This text is available in Printed book of 24|1843 which is explained by Vamacaran bhattacarya, but not translated by translator. 62. 374749:-Fault of impossiblity. In the inference such as "this has fire because of smoke." The absence of both fire and pot also, is such

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caturthaM lakSaNam 91 padottaranAmnA sakalasAdhyapratiyogitAkAbhAvavato'nupasthApanAt tena samaM sakalapadasya karmadhArayo'pi anupapanna ityata Aha- sAdhyAbhAva iti / tathA ca sAdhyAbhAvavatyeva sAkalyaM deyaM na tu sAdhye'pIti bhAvaH / (jA.14) sAdhyAbhAvavati sAkalyadAnasya prayojanamAha-teneti / vipakSaikadezaH kazcidvipakSa: sAdhyaniSThasAkalyasya sAdhyasAmAnyAbhAvasya absence of all those which are to be established having the counter-positive-ness determined by two-ness, exists in that, also which has that which is to be established. More over by the name followed by the word 'All', that which has the absence of all those which are to be established, 'is not denoted therefore 'karmadharaya' compound of the word 'all' with it, is not applicable. Hence author says 'absence of that which is to be established.' Therefore word 'all' should be connected with that only which has the absence of that which is to be established and not with that which is to be established also. This is the idea. (J.14) Author says the reason of the use of 'all' connected with that which has that which is to be established by the word 'therefore.' The part of counter-subject (means) someone of counter-subjects. Author says the purpose of the inclusion of 'allness' in that which is to be established, or inclusion of absence of that which is to be established in general by the expression 'or absence, counter-positive of which is sadhya in the locus as such absence naturally mountain etc., there is no absence of smoke but the absence of pot etc., the counter-positive-ness as this absence does not exist in smoke. Therefore there is fault of impossiblity. Absence of both things can be taken as the absence of sadhya in all valid inferences. Therefore there is fault of impossibility and not a fault of too narrow application.

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92 vyAptipaJcakam vA nivezasya phalamAha-na veti / ekavyaktisAdhake sakalasAdhyoktau api avyAptiH agre sthAsyatItyAzayena nAnA ityuktam / * (jA.15) avyApyavRttIti / kapisaMyogI etattvAdityAdau ityrthH| yadyapyagre hetvabhAvasyApi pratiyogivaiyadhikaraNyAvacchinnasyaiva niveza: karaNIyaH iti avyApyavRttihetAvavyAptiH sambhavati tathApi yathAzrutamUlasya na tatra avyAptirityAvedayituM vyApyavRttihetUktiH / (dI.7) avyApyavRttisAdhyakavyApyavRttisaddhetAvavyAptervyabhicAriNi cAvyApyavRttAvativyAptervAraNAya abhAvadvaye pratiyogi not. There would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference where that which is to be established is only one individual when all that which is to be established is mentioned taking in to account this 'many is stated by author. (J.15) "Partial existent means in the inference; 'this has the conjunction of monkey, because of this tree-ness.' Though in later the absence of reason' also, is to be included as delimited by non-existence with its counter-positive. Therefore the fault of too narrow application in the partial existent reason also possible, yet to inform that there is no fault of too narrow application according to original text 'non partial existent reason' is stated. (D.7) Both absences should be known as non-existent with counter-positive, to avoid over-extantion in invalid reason, Editor's Note : na caikavyaktisAdhyakasthale'pi dvitvAdyavacchinnAbhAvamAdAyA'sambhavaH, na tvavyAptiriti vAcyam / vyAsajyavRttidharmAnavacchinnatvavizeSaNenaiva tadvAraNasambhavAt / This text is available in printed book of '2114 with Jagdisi which is explained by Vamacaranbhattacarya, but not translated by translater.

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caturthaM lakSaNam 93 vyadhikaraNatvaM bodhyam / ___(jA.16) vyabhicAriNIti / etadvakSatvavAn kapisaMyogAd ityAdAvityarthaH / abhAvadvaye iti / sAdhyAbhAve hetvabhAve cetyarthaH / atra ca sAdhyAbhAve pratiyogivaiyadhikaraNyaM sAdhyatAghaTakasambandhena pratiyogino yadadhikaraNaM tadavRttitvaM, tena dhUmAdyabhAvavato'pi ayaHpiNDAdeH kAlikasambandhena dhUmAdimattve'pi nAtivyApti:63 / hetvabhAve pratiyogi which has incomplete occurence, and fault of too narrow application in the valid reason which has complete occurence but sadhya of which has incomplete occurence. (J.16) In the devious reason means-in the inference; 'this has tree-ness because of conjunction of monkey'. In both absences means in the absence of that which is to be established, and in the absence of reason. Here the nonexistence with counter-positive of it means non-existence in that which is to be the substratum of counter-positive by the relation which is determined by the state of being that which is to be established, therefore there is no fault of too wide application63 even though smoke exists in the hot-iron-ball by 63. Fifchifa:-No fault of too wide application. In the expression "occurence in that which is not locus of counter-positive" the locusness of counter-positive if it is taken by only relation in general, there would be fault of over-extention in the inference such as "it has smoke because of fire." When the locusness of counter-positive is mentioned by the relation of the determinant of 'sadhyata' there would not be fault of too wide application, counter-positive of the absence of smoke does not exist in hot-iron-ball by the relation

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94 vyAptipaJcakam vaiyadhikaraNyaM tu pratiyogitAvacchedakasambandhena pratiyogyanadhikaraNatvaghaTitaM bodhyam / tena ayamAtmA jJAnAdityAdau sAdhyAbhAvavato ghaTAdeviSayatayA hetvAbhAvapratiyogimattve'pi nAvyApti:64 / (dI.8)hetvabhAvo'pi pratiyogitAvacchedakAvacchinnapratiyogivyadhikaraNaH / tatpratiyogitvaJca hetutAvacchedakarUpeNa bodhyaM, the temporal relation. Non existence with its counter-positive in the absence of the reason should be known by the relation, which determined the counter-positive-ness, therefore 64there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this is soul because of knowledge', though jarness etc. which are substrata of the absence of that which is to be established, has the counter-positive-ness of the absence of reason by relation subject-ness. ___ (D.8) The absence of reason also should be known as non-co-exsisting with counter-positive, determined by the determinant of counter-positive-ness and that counter-positiveness also determined by the determinant of the state of being reason. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; where substernece-ness etc. is sadhya and conjunction, there is not absence of fire, therefore there is no fault of too wide application. 64. nAvyApti:-No fault of too narrow application, when the locusness of counter-positive of the absence of reason is mentioned by relation in general. There would be fault of too narrow application in the inference; "it is soul because of knowledge."

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caturthaM lakSaNam tena dravyatvAdau sAdhye viziSTasattAdau nA'vyAptiH, na vA viziSTasattAtvAdinA tAdRzAbhAvapratiyogini sattAdau atiprasaGgaH65 / (jA.17) hetvabhAvo'pi iti / apinA sAdhyAbhAvasaGgrahaH / tena viziSTasattAvAn jAterityAdau nAtivyApti:66 / yadyapi sAdhyA qualified existence etc. is reason. Nor there is fault of overextention65 in counter-positive of such absence determined by state of being qualified existence. (J.17) The absence of reason also here by the expression 'also' the absence of that which is to be established is included, therefore there is no fault of too wide application 66 in the 65. 3fa445:-Fault of over-extension. When the counter-positive-ness of the absence of reason is stated to be determined by the determinant of the state of being reason, there would not be a fault of over-extension in the inference; "this is substance because of existence" which is not co-existent of its counter-positive and which exists in quality etc. which is the locus of the absence of substenceness and which is nonlocus of qualified existence determined by qualified existence-ness. The counter-positive-ness of the absence of qualified, exists in the existence. Therefore there is the fault of over-extension when the counter-positive-ness of the absence as the reason is mentioned as determined by the determinant feature there would not be overextention because the counter-positive-ness of the absence of qualified existence is not determined by the state of being existence which is the determinant of the state of being reason. This is the idea. 66. Fifcufa:-No fault of over-extension when the counter-positive-ness of the absence of reason is not mentioned as determined by the

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vyAptipaJcakam bhAvo'pItyevaM krameNa vaktumucitam apizabdAdeva hetvabhAvasya lAbhasambhavAt tathApi tatpratiyogitvaJca ityagrimatmapadenAnirdiSTahetvabhAvasya parAmarzAsambhavAt hetvabhAvapratiyogitvaJca ityabhidhAne ca granthagauravAdityamabhidhAnam / (jA.18) pratiyogitAvacchedakAvacchinnapratiyogIti / prati inference; "this has qualified existence because of generic attribute. Though it should be mentioned by such order that the absence of that which is to be established also mentioned, because by the word 'also''the absence of reason can be understood yet by the expression that conuter-positive-ness' the absence of reason which was not early mentioned, that could not be taken. And if the counter-positive-ness of the absence of reason is to be stated there is cumber-some-ness of the text. (J.18) In the expression 'counter-positive determined by that which determines the counterpositive-ness', the term relation which determines the state of being the reason, there would be a fault of over-extention in the inference; "this is different from soul because of substence-ness." The absence of substence-ness also exists in the substratum of the absence of sadhya by the temporal relation, the counter-positive-ness of the absence occures in substance, therefore there is a fault of over-extention. When the counter-positive-ness is taken by the relation of the determinant of state of being reason there would not be fault of over-extention, because the counter-postive-ness which is determined by temporal relation is not determined by the relation inherence which determined state of being reason.

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caturthaM lakSaNam 97 yogipadaM pratiyogitAvacchedakatAghaTakasambandhenAvacchedakasya vaiziSTyalAbhAya, tena hRdAdau kAlikAdisambandhena dhUmAtvAdyavacchinnasya kASThAdeH saMyogasambandhena sattve'pi nAvyAptiH / tatpratiyogitvaM hetvabhAvapratiyogitvaM / hetutAvacchedakarUpeNeti / hetutAvacchedakasambandhena ityapi bodhyam, tenAtmabhinnaM dravyatvAdityAdau sAdhyAbhAvavati Atmani vartamAnasya pratiyogitAvacchedakasambandhena pratiyogivyadhikaraNasya kAlikAdisambandhena pratiyogitve'pi dravyatvasya nAtivyAptiH / 'counter-positive' is used to get qualified-ness of determinant by the relation which determines the state of being determinant of counter-positive-ness. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; "it has fire because of smoke even though the wood etc. which has smoke etc., by the temporal relation, exists in lake etc. by the relation conjunction. That counter-positive-ness means the counter-positive-ness of the absence of the reason. Determined by the determinant of the state of being reason. By the relation which determines the state of being a reason also should be known. Therefore there is no fault of too wide application in the inference; "this is different from soul because of substance-ness' though substance-ness is the counter-positive of the absence of substance-ness by temporal relation which absence dose not exists with its counterpositive by the relation which determines the counter-positiveness that absence exists in soul, which is the substratum of absence of that which is to be established.

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1 vyAptipaJcakam (jA.19) na ca hetutAvacchedakasambandhena pratiyogivaiyadhikaraNyoktau eva ativyAptivAraNasambhavAt, hetutAvacchedakasambandhena pratiyogitvavivakSA vyartheti vAcyaM, tathA sati nirdhUmatvavyApyavAn nirvahnitvAdityAdau nirvahnitvabhedamAdAyaiva lakSaNasambhave nirdhUmatvavyApyetyAdhuttaragranthavakSyamANAvyAptyalagnatApatteriti dhyeyam / ___ vastutaH nirvahnitvasya vyApyavRttitayA taddhetusthale hetvabhAve pratiyogivyadhikaraNatvaM na deyaM vyarthatvAt, parantu hetutAvacchedakasambandhAvacchinnatvaM vAcyam, ata: nAgrimagranthAsaGgatiriti dhyeyam / (J.19) It should not be said that-there is a possibility of removal of the fault of too wide application only if it is mentioned different substratum-ness of counter-positive non-existance by the relation which determines the state of being a reason. Therefore desire to say counter-positive-ness as delimited by the relation which determines the state of being reason is use-less. This is because in that case there is possibility of the application of definition by taking in to account the mutual absence of the difference from fire in the inference; "this has that which is pervaded by the absence of smoke because of absence of fire". So the too narrow application which is to be mentioned in the later text would be irrelevant, this should be noted. Indeed, the absence of fire is a non-partial existent, hence where this is a reason there non-existence with its counter-positive should not be mentioned with regard to the absence of reason, cause it will be useless, but the state of being determined by the relation which determines the state of

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caturthaM lakSaNam 99 (jA.20) hetvabhAve pratiyogitAvacchedakAvacchinnavaiyadhikaraNyavivakSAyAH phalamAha-tena dravyatvAdAviti / anyathA sAdhyAbhAvavati guNAdau viziSTasattAbhAvasya sattArUpapratiyogisamAnAdhikaraNatvAdavyAptireva syAditi bhAvaH / ____ (jA.21) atra tu dravyatvasAdhyatAyAM sAkalyAprasiddhyA avyApteruktavivakSayApi apratIkArAt-Adipadam / tena guNavattvAdisAdhyasyopagraha: dravyetarAsamavetamAtraM vA prakRte dravyatvamiti dhyeyam / being a reason should be added, therefore there is no irrelevance of later text, This should be understood. ___ (J.20) Author says the fruit of desire to be mentioning non-existence with that which is determined by the determinant of counter-positive-ness in the respect of the absence of reason by the expression 'there-fore in substanceness' etc. Otherwise there would be a fault of too narrow application because of the absence of qualified existence is coexistent with its counter-positive in quality etc. in the form of existence and so on, which have the absence of that which is to be established. This is the idea. ___ (J.21) Here where substance-ness is that which is to be established 'all is not established, there is a fault of too narrow application which is not avoided, eventhough there is desire to apply that qualifier. Therefore the word and etc. is used, by this the state of having quality etc. as that which is to be established, is included or only non-inherence in that which is different from substance is the meaning of substance-ness, in present case this should be noted. Author says the result of desire to

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hetutAvacchedakarUpAvacchinnapratiyogitvavivakSAyA phalamAha-na veti / sattvAdAviti / dravyatvAdau sAdhye iti anuSajyate / paJcamaM lakSaNam (ta.5) sAdhyavadanyAvRttitvaM vA, kevalAnvayini abhAvAt / (dI.9) yatra ekavyaktikaM sAdhyaM vipakSo vA tatra nirdhUmatvAdivyApye tattvena sAdhye nirvahnitvAdau cAvyAptistatra hetvabhAvasya valyAdeH pratyekaM yAvadvipakSAvRttitvAdata Aha-sAdhyavaditi / (jA.22) yatra ekavyaktikamiti / tathA ca dravyaM pRthivItvAd mention the counter-positive-ness determined by the attribute which determines the state of being reason by the expression or not.' 'In the existence etc.' should be followed by when substance-ness is that which is to be established. The Fifth definition of vyapti. (T.5) (Nor,) The non-occurrence (of the reason) in the substratum which is different from that which has that which is to be established, this is because all these definitions are not applicable in the pure affirmative reason. (D.9) Where sadhya is one individual thing, or contradictory subject, there which is pervaded by the absence of smoke as its own capacity is sadhya and the absence of fire is reason, there is a fault of too narrow application, because the absence of reason fire etc. everyone does not exists is all controdictiory subjects therefore author says sadhyavaditi. (J.22) 'Where one individual is that which is to be

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paJcamaM lakSaNam 101 ityAdAvavyAptiH sakalasAdhyAprasiddherityarthaH / nanu ito'pyasvarasAt sAdhyasAmAnyAbhAvasyaiva niviSTatvAt sAdhye sAkalyaM na deyameva ityata Aha - vipakSo veti / vipakSa: sAdhyAbhAvavAn, taddhaTayavRttidharmavAn tadghaTAnyatvAdityAdAvavyAptiH sAdhyabhAvavattadghaTasya sAkalyAprasiddheriti * bhAvaH / (jA.23) sAdhyAbhAvanniSThAnyonyAbhAvapratiyogitAnavacchedakIbhUtAbhAvapratiyogitvaM vaktavyamataH doSAntaramAha - nirdhUmeti kazcit / established.' Therefore there is fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this is substance because of earth-ness'. Because all those which are to be established, are not established, this is the meaning. 'All', should not be connected with that which is to be established because even more due to incongruity, only the absence of that which is to be established in general is included, therefore author says 'or counter-subject.' Countersubject means that which has the absence of that which is to be established. There is fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the attribute which dose not abide in that pot because it is different from that pot etc.," because 'all-ness' of that pot which is abode by the absence of that which is to be established is not established. This is the idea. (23) The counter-positive-ness of the absence which is not determinant of the conuter-positive-ness of the mutual absence, which exists in that, which has the absence of that Editor's Note : 'ekavyAvartaka ityanuSajyate / tathA ca yatraikavyAktireva sAdhyAbhAvavatI tatra' This text is available in printed book of 'vyAptipaJcaka' with Jagdisi which is explained by Vamacaranbhattacarya but not translated by translator.

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102 vyAptipaJcakam (jA.24) nanu sAdhyAdibhedena vyApterbhedAt yatraikavyaktireva vipakSastatra lakSaNe sAdhyAbhAvavati sAkalyavizeSaNaM na deyamiti doSAntaramAha-nirdhUmatvAdivyApya iti / nirdhUmatvasya sAdhyatve yatraikavyaktikamityanenaiva gatArthatA syAdato vyApyaparyantaM, ni--matvavyApyasyApi snehAdeH snehatvAdinA sAdhyatve which is to be estalished should be stated. Therefore author points out another fault by the expression 'absence of smoke'. This is stated by some one. (J.24) Where only one individual is the counter-subject there in the definition 'all should not be applied with that which has the absence of that which is to be established. This is because vyapti is different due to difference in that which is to be established. Therefore author says another fault by the expression that which is pervaded by the absence of smoke. When the absence of smoke is that which is to be established, then by the expression only 'where one individual, the purpose may be achieved, therefore author goes till that which is pervaded, oily-ness which is pervaded by the absence of smoke also is that which is to be established by the state of being oily-ness there is no fault of non-inclusion because of deviation of the absence of fire. Therefore author said 'when that which is to be established by the state of being that. When that which is to be established is in the form of that which is pervaded by the absence of smoke, this is the meaning. Every individual, there is fault of two narrow oplication, because Absence of reason in the form of the fire in the kitchen, etc. is non-existent in mountain which is included in all those

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paJcamaM lakSaNam 103 vahnnyabhAvasya vyabhicAritvAdasaGgraho na doSa ityata uktaM tattvena sAdhye iti / nirdhUmatvavyApyatvena sAdhye ityarthaH / pratyekamiti / hetvabhAvasya mahAnasIyAdivahneH sAdhyAbhAvavat sakalAntargataparvatAdyavRttitvAdavyAptiriti 67 bhAvaH / niruktapratiyogivaiyadhikaraNyAvacchinnasAdhyAbhAvavyApakatAvacchedakaM niruktapratiyogivaiyadhikaraNyAvacchinnayadrUpAvacchinnAbhAvavattvaM tadrUpavattvaM vyAptirityuktau tu na doSa iti dhyeyam / (dI. 10) atra anyonyAbhAvasya sAdhyavatvAvacchinnaprati -- which has the absence of that which is to be estalished, this is the idea. Therefore there is a fault of too narrow application67. The state of having that attribute which is the state of being absence determined by that particular attribute and which is determined by said non-existence with its conuter-positive and which is determinant of the state of being pervaded and of the absence of that which is to be and established, which is determined by said non co-existent with its counter-positive is vyapti, when it is stated there is no any fault, it should be understood. (D.10) Here state of having counter-positive-ness of mutual absence is determined by state of having sadhya is 68. avyAptiriti--There is a fault of too narrow application. The kitchen fire which is absence of fire can't be accepted in the mountain which has similies absence of that which is to be established in that kitchen the similar fire of mountain does not exist, so by the word the similar absence which occures in the locus of similar absence of that which is to be established, the absence of reason that is absence of absence of fire can't be accepted therefore there is fault of too rarrow application

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104 vyAptipaJcakam yogitAkatvaM vyutpattibalalabhyam / na hi bhavati nIlo ghaTo ghaTAdanya68 iti / iti vyAptipaJcakasya raghunAthaziromaNikRtA dIdhitivyAkhyA samAptA // (jA.25) nanu sAdhyavatpratiyogikAnyatvasya dhUmAdimati sattvAdavyAptirata Aha-atreti / tathA ca sAdhyavatapadena nirUDhalakSaNayA upasthApitasya sAdhyatAvacchedakaviziSTasAdhyavatvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkasya anyapadArthaikadeze anyatve tAdAtmyena anvayAt sAdhyavati ca sAdhyavattvAvacchinnabhedAsattvAt na avyApti:69 / gurudharmasya avacchedaka apprehended through denotative function, because bluepot is not diffferent from a pot.68 Thus the commentary on Vyapti-Pancaka by Raghunatha siromani is over. __ (J.25) The difference from that which has that which is to be established, exists in that which has smoke. Therefore there is a fault of too narrow application, hence author says 'here.' In this way, there is no fault of too narrow application69 because in that which has that which is to be established, the 68. na hIti-"Not just" This is different from the jar. Here jar is connected with the meaning of difference by relation state of being counterpositive-ness determined by potness different from that which has sadhya which is here also the thing that which has sadhya is connected with difference by the relation of state of being counter positive-ness determined by state of being sadhya. 69. nAvyAptiriti-No fault of too narrow application. Because of meaning of

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paJcamaM lakSaNam 204 tvopagamAcca dravyaM pRthivItvAdityAdau dravyatvatvaviziSTadravyatvavatvAvacchinnabhedAprasiddhyA nAvyAptiriti bhAvaH ' 70 I mutual absence determined by the state of having that which is to be established, does not exist because of that, which has the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of having that which is to be established qualified by determinant of the state of that which is to be established which is presented by word 'that which is to be estalished', is related, by identity relation with 'difference' which is the part of the meaning of different, when the cumbersome attribute is accepted as determinant, there is no fault of too narrow application70 in the inference; fifth definition is the absence of occurence (of reason) in the locus of mutual absence, counter-positive-ness of which is indicated by state of being determinant which is determined by the determinant of the state of being sadhya. Therefore the mutual absence of that which has fire and jar and the mutual absence of kitchen which has fire, cannot be taken and the mutual absence of that which has fire only can be taken according to early mentioned mutual absence of locus, that absence exists in water etc., where smoke does not exist. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference, "this has fire because of smoke." This is the idea. 70. :-No fault of too narrow application. Just counterpositive-ness does not happen determined by heavy property is not proved and the attribute which is qualified by heavy property cumbersome also is not proved. Therefore, taking in to account the mutual absence of that which has substanceness qualified by subsance-ness the fault of too narrow application in the inference "this is substance because of earthness." This is the idea.

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106 vyAptipaJcakam (jA.26) yaddharmaviziSTabodhakapadasamabhivyAhRtena anyAdipadena upasthApite anyatvAdau taddharmAvacchinnapratiyogitAkatvaprakAreNaiva tAdAtmyena anvayo, na tu taddhAzrayapratiyogitAkatvena ityatra vyutpattau prAcAM saMvAdamAha na hiiti| tathA ca tAdRzavyutpattyasvIkAre nIlaghaTe ghaTapratiyogikabhedasattvAt nIlaghaTo ghaTAnya ityapi vyavahAraH syAditi bhAvaH / (jA.27) atra ca dravyaM ghaTAnyadityAdyaprayogAt yadviziSTaprati 'this is substance because of earth-ness' due to nonestablishement of the mutual absence of that which is determined by the state of having substance-ness qualified by substance-ness-ness. This is the idea. (J.26) The difference which is expressed by the word different which is semantically connected with the word which conveys that qualified by which particular attribute, is related by identity as having as qualifier the state of having counterpositive-ness determined by that particular attribute, and not having as qualifier the state of having the counter-positive-ness which exists in that which is the substratum of that particular attribute. In this theory author points out agreement of old logicians by the expression 'not because. Therefore if such theory is not accepted there would be such a usage that 'the blue-pot is different from a pot. This is because there is mutual absence which has a pot as its counter-positive. This is the idea. (J.27) And here the mutual absence as having counterpositive-ness qualified by which particular attribute should be known by the term difference etc. because there is no usage as

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paJcamaM lakSaNam 107 yogikatvena bhedaH anyAdizabdena bodhyaH, tadavRttidharmasyaiva anuyogitAvacchedakatvAt tatra ghaTo ghaTAnya ityasya vAraNAsambhavAt nIlaghaTatvasya dharmitAvacchedakatvAnudhAvanamiti mantavyam / (jA.28) nIlo ghaTo ghaTAnya ityeva samyak pAThaH tathaiva prakRtopayogitvasaGgateghaTAdanya iti pAThastu sAdhyavadanya ityatra paJcamIsamAse luptavibhaktismAritapratiyogitve prakRtyarthatAvacchedakAvacchinnatvasya saMsargamaryAdayA bhAnamAdRtya kathaJcit saGgamanIyaH / / (jA.29) ghaTa: paTo na ityAdau paTapadaM mukhyArthaparameva, na tu prakRta substance is different from a pot, because the attribute which is not there is determinition of substanceness. There is possibility of avoiding the usage 'the pot is different from pot, therefore author had to mention the blue-jar-ness, as the determinant of the state of being substratum, this should be noted. ___(J.28) "The blue pot is different from a pot' this is a correct version, by this only there is consistency with present use, the text 'different from a pot should be supported any how taking in to account the apprehension through the limitation of relation, of state of being determined by the determinant of the state of being present meaning, in the counter-positive-ness which is reminded by hidden case in the fifth compound in the expression different from that which is different from that which has that which is to be established.' ___(J.29) In the expression the pot is not a cloth the word 'cloth' reveals main meaning and not that which has the counter-positive-ness determined by pot-ness just as in present

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108 vyAptipaJcakam iva paTatvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkaparaM nipAtAtiriktasthala eva nAmArthayodhaMdAnvayasya avyutpannatayA napadopasthApyabhede paTatvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkatvasaMsargeNaiva paTasyAnvayasambhavAt / paTatvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkatvantu paTatvamavacchinnatvaM pratiyogitvaJceti tritayameva, vizeSyavizeSaNabhAvApannasaMsargaH, na tu vastugatyA paTatvAvacchinnaM yat pratiyogitvaM tanmAtraM, paTo na ityatra pratiyogitAyAM paTatvAvacchinnatvamAnasya anubhavasiddhatvAt, anyathA pratiyogitAvyaktibhireva tattadviziSTabuddhyupapattau paTatvAdestadavacchedakatvameva na syAt, mAnAbhAvAt / ata eva case. This is because the difference relation of two meanings of two names is not apprehended in the case, other then nipat only. Therefore there is possibility of the connection of cloth with difference which is presented by negative term by the relation state of having counter-positive-ness determined by cloth-ness. (And the state of having counter-positive-ness determined by cloth-ness,) Here cloth-ness, the state of being determined by cloth-ness and counter-positive-ness all the three are relations, which are apprehended by qualifier and qualified relation-ship and not indeed the counter-positive-ness determined by cloth-ness alone, because in the expression this is not a cloth' it is proved by experience. Otherwise there would be the knowledge of thing qualified by that particular attribute, through individual counter-positive-ness only, cloth-ness would not be determinant of that because there is no proof. Therefore in kevalanvayi-chapter author him-self has said, that in the notion 'there is absence of fire' fire-ness, state of being

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paJcamaM lakSaNam 109 kevalAnvayigranthe vahnirnAstItyatra vahnitvamavacchinnatvaM pratiyogitvaJca saMsargamaryAdayA bhAsate iti svayamapyuktam / (jA.30) itthameva ca prameyaM nAsti kambugrIvAdimAn nAstItyAdizAbdabodhAnAM saMsargakoTAveva pratiyogitAyAM prameyatvAdyavacchinnatvAvagAhitayA bhramatvaM, saMsargaprakArasAdhAraNavizeSyavizeSaNabhAvasyaiva bhramatvaghaTakatvAt, anyathA svarUpasambandhena prameyatvAvacchinnapratiyogitvasya alIkatayA akhaNDatAdRzasambandhena prameyasya abhAvadharmiNi anvayAsambhavena bhramatvAnupapatteH, saduparAgeNApyasataH saMsargamaryAdayA bhAnasya determined, and counter-positive-ness all these three are apprehended through the limitation of relation (samsargamaryada). (J.30) In this way, verbal apprehensions such as there is the absence of object of valid knowledge, there is absence of that which has conch like neck, are error like in the side of relation, when in the counter-positive-ness is determined by state of being knowable (prameyatva) etc. because the qualifier-qualified relationship which is common to relation and qualifier is only included in the state of being error, otherwise the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of being knowable (prameyatva) by the relation self-some-ness (svarupa) is non-existent, therefore there is no possibility of relation of knowable with locus of absence by part-less such a relation, hence that would not be an error. This is because the apprehension on non-existent by imposition of existent through the limitation of relation is not accepted by the author of 'mani'

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110 vyAptipaJcakam maNikRtA anaGgIkArAt / klRptena paTatvAdyavacchinnapratiyogitvasambandhena ca abhAve prameyasya sattvena tAdRzasambandhena bhramatvasya vaktumazakyatvAt , paTatvAderanvayitAnavacchedakatayA tadavacchinnApratiyogitvasambandhena prameyatvAdiviziSTasyAnvaye nirAkAGkSatvAcca, anyathA ghaTavati api ghaTo nAstItyAdeH pramAtvApatteH, tattadghaTatvAvacchinnapratiyogitvasambandhena ghaTaviziSTasya ghaTavizeSAbhAvasya tatra sattvAt / (jA.31) etena sattAsamavAyini api guNAdau viziSTasattAtvAvacchinnasya samavAyena asattvavat ghaTatvAdyavacchinnapratiyogitvasambandhena ghaTatvAvacchinnavato'pi ghaTAdyabhAvasya na tAdRzasambandhena prameyatvAdya and by known relation in the form of counter-positive-ness determined by cloth-ness the knowable exists in absence, therefore by this relation, it cannot be treated as error and because clothness is not determinant of state of having relation by the relation of counter-positive-ness determined by that, clothness there is no expectancy for the connection of that which is qualified by state of being knowable. Otherwise the notion that there would be no pot valid in the locus of a pot because there is absence of a particular pot which (absence) is qualified by the pot by the relation of counter-positive-ness determined by pot-ness. (J.31) By this way, in quality etc. which is inherent of existence also, there that which is determined by the state of being qualified-existence dose not exist. In the same way the absence of a pot has that which is determined by pot-ness by the relation of counter-positive-ness determined by pot-ness, it

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paJcamaM lakSaNam 111 vacchinnatvam / ataH prameyaM nAstItyAdau ghaTatvAvacchinnapratiyogAtvasambandhenaiva prameyatvAvacchinnatvasyaiva abhAvAMze bhramatvamityapi pratyuktaM, ghaTatvAderanvayitAnavacchedakatayA tadavacchinnapratiyogitvasambandhena prameyatvaviziSTasya anvaye nirAkAGkSatayA tathA zAbdasya asambhavAd iti dhyeyam / ___ (jA.32) nIlo ghaTo nAstItyAdau nIlaghaTatvasya anvayitAvacchedakatve tAdRzadharmAvacchinnapratiyogitvameva saMsargo, na tu nIlatvAdipratyekadharmAvacchinnapratiyogitvam, nIlapaTasya pItaghaTasya ca adhikaraNe tAdRzaprayogApalApApatteH nIlatvopalakSitasya ghaTatvamAtrasya has no the state of being substratum of that which is determined by the state of being knowable, by that relation. Therefore in the notion that 'there is no knowable there is the state of being error of the state of being determined by state of being knowable, in the absence by the relation of counterpositive-ness determined by potness. This also is refuted, because there is no expectancy for the connection of that which is qualified by state of being knowable, by the relation of counter-positive-ness by that (pot-ness) because pot-ness is not the determinant of the state of being related, therefore there is no possibility of verbal cognition, this should be understood. (J.32) "There is not blue pot," here when the state of being blue pot is a determinant of state of being related, the counterpositive-ness determined by that attribute alone is a relation and not the counter-positive-ness determined by every individual like blue potness etc. this is because there would be the fault of refuting of the usage of that in the substratum of blue and yellow pot. Where only potness indicated by blue-ness by the relation

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112 vyAptipaJcakam anvayitAvacchedakatvasthale tu nopalakSitaghaTatvAvacchinnapratiyogitvameva, tathA nIlo saMyogena ghaTo nAstItyAdau tRtIyAvibhakternAvacchinnatvamarthaH saMsargIbhUtapratiyogitAyAM tadanvayAsambhavAt,* kintu avacchinnapratiyogitAkatvaM pratiyogitAmAtraM vA avacchinnatvasaMsargeNa saMyogAdestatrAnvayAdeva viziSTalAbhAt / (jA.33) na ca evaM saMyogena ghaTAbhAvasyaiva samavAyena ghaTaviziSTadravyatvAbhAvatayA samavAyena kapAle ghaTo nAstIti vyavahArApattiH, tRtIyAntasamabhivyAhArasthale tadupasthApyapratiyogitvasyaiva saMsargatayA conjunction there counter-positive-ness determined by indicated pot-ness, is a relation. In the notion, 'there is not a pot by the relation of conjunction' semantic the meaning of third case is not the state of being determined, because in that case there would not be the connection of that with the counter-positive-ness, which is a form of relation, but state of having a counter-positive-ness determined by (somathing) or only counter-positive-ness is the relation, due to the connection of conjunction with it by the relation of state of being determined by (something), there is apprehension of a qualified thing. (J.33) And it should not be stated that-in this way, there should be usage that 'there is not a pot in the half of the pot by the relation of inherence," this is because the absence of pot by Editor's Note : 'padArthApadArthayoranvayasya nirAkAGkSatvAt, padArthaH padArthenAnvIyate iti niyamAcca' This text is available in printed book of 'vyAptipaJcaka' with Jagdisi which is explained by Vamacaranbhattacarya but not translated by translator.

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paJcamaM lakSaNam 113 bhAnasya vyutpannatvAt samavAyAvacchinnaghaTatvAvacchinnapratiyogitAkAbhAvasya ca kapAle virahAt / (jA.34) astu vA ghaTatvAvacchinnatvasyeva saMyogAdisambandhAvacchinnatvasyApi pratiyogitvAMze saMsargamaryAdayaiva bhAnaM tRtIyAntasamabhivyAhArasya niyAmakatvAcca nAtiprasaGgaH / 'ghaTAnadhikaraNaM; bhUtalam' ityAdau tu lakSaNayA adhikaraNapadameva ghaTAdhikaraNArthakaM ghaTapadaM tu tAtparyagrAhakam, anyathA anadhikaraNapadena adhikaraNasAmAnyabhinnatvoktau ca bhUtale tasya bAdha: syAt / na ca ghaTAnvitasyaiva adhikaraNasya bhedastatra naJA bodhanIyaH samAsAntargatanatra uttarapadArthamAtrAnvayitvavyutpatteH / relation conjunction is identical with the absence of substanceness qualified by pot by the relation inherence, because when there is proximity of word ending with third case, the counter-positive-ness which is expressed by that, is apprehended as a relation and the absence having the counterpositive-ness determined by pot-ness and the relation of inherence, does not exist in the part of the pot. ___(J.34) Or let it be a cognition of the state of being determined by the relation of conjunction limitation in the counter-positive-ness by the expectancy (samsargamaryada) just like the state of being determined by pot-ness and because of the proximity of word ending with third case is a limiter. Therefore there is not fault of too wide application. In the notion "the ground is non substratum of pot' the word substratum denotes the substratum of pot by implication and the word pot is conveyer of the intention of speaker, otherwise

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vyAptipaJcakam anyathA nIlA nIlaghaTo ghaTo ghaTa ityAdau nIlaghaTAnyasya ghaTatvaM nIlAprameyaH paTa ityAdau ca nIlaprameyAnyasya paTatvaM pratIyate / vastutaH sambandhikapadasthale vyutpattivaicitryAt pratiyogitAnavacchedakaM ghaTAnadhikaraNamityAdau ghaTadyanvitasyaivAdhikaraNAderbhedo bhAsate* iti paramArthaH / (jA.35) pItaH zaGkho nAstItyAdi zAbdabodhastu zaGkhatvAvacchinnatayA na pratiyogitvamavagAhate tanmAtrasyAnvayitAnavacchedakatvAt, zaGkhavattayA nizcite dharmiNyapi tAdRzaprayogAt, parantu pItazaGkhatvA if by the word; "non-substratum" the difference from all substrata is stated, there would be contradiction, in the ground, and the mutual absence of subtratum related with a pot should not be conveyed by negation, because the negation in the compound should be connected with only the meaning of next word' this is the rule other-wise in the usage blue-non-pot is a pot,' pot-ness of other than blue pot' and in blue non-knowable would be a cloth' cloth-ness is of other than blue knowable, is cognized. Infact in the case the word which denotes relative due to difference in notions in the case of the usage 'nondeterminant of the counter-positive-ness,' that 'non substratum of pot, etc. the difference of substratum etc. related with pot is apprehended, this is the reality. (J.35) 'There is not yellow conch,' in this verblal Editor's Note : anyatra tripadatatpuruSAnupagame'pi ghaTasya nAdhikaraNaM, pratiyogitAyA nAvacchedakam - ityAdirItyA tripadatatpuruSeNa viziSTalAbhasambhavAditi / This text is available in printed book of 'vyAptipaJcaka' with Jagdisi which is explained by Vamacaranbhattacarya, but not translated by translator.

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paJcamaM lakSaNam 115 vacchinnapratiyogitAtvena saMsargamaryAdayA pratiyogitvamavagAhate / natrAdipadAnAM yaddharmaviziSTavaiziSTyAvagAhitvopasthApyAbhAvadharmikAnvayabodhajanakatvaM taddharmAvacchinnapratiyogitvena pratiyogitAsaMsargadhIjanakatvavyutpatteH / iyAn tu vizeSaH-yat ghaTo nAsti ityAdizAbdabodhe sAMsargikapratiyogitvAvagAhitaprasiddhana ghaTatvAdyavacchinnapratiyogitAtvenaiva nirUpitA, pItaH zaGkho nAstItyAdau tu pItazaGkhatvAvacchinnapratiyogitAtvena cognition the counter-positive-ness is not apprehended as being determined by conch-ness because that only is not determinant of the state of being related (anvayita), because which is definite locus of conch there also is found such usage, but the counter-positive-ness is cognized as having the state of being counter-positive-ness determined by yellow-conch-ness through the limitation of relation (samsarga-maryada). "Negative words bring out verbal apprehension which has the absence as substratum presented by that (knowledge) which has the relation of that which is qualified by which particular attribute, as being determinant by that particular attribute, it brings out the knowledge of counter-positive-ness relation,' this is the rule. This is the peculiarity here. In verbal cognition as 'there is absence of a pot' there, objectiveness of the counter-positiveness as being a relation is not established there the counterpositive-ness is mentioned as being counter-positive-ness determined by pot-ness only is mentioned and in the verbal apprehension there is absence of yellow conch' the counterpositive-ness determined by yellow cronch-ness is not

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vyAptipaJcakam aprasiddhenaiva ityAdikaM bahutaram UhanIyam / iti jagadIzatarkAlaGkArakRtA vivRttinAmnI dIdhitivyAkhyA samAptA established and so on. Many things are should be thinkable here. Thus the Vivritti commentary on Didhiti by Jagadica Tarkalankara ends.

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Appendix-1 A Terminology (San.-Eng.) ativyApti atyanta atyantabhAva adhikaraNa adhikaraNa, AdhAra, Azraya adhikaraNatva anavasthA anumAna anumatI anuyogI anyonyAbhAvaH bhedaH Fault of too wide application, fault of over extension Absolute, constant Absolute-absence, constant absence Substratum Substratum, locus State of being substratum, state of being locus, locusness Regress, infinitude Inference Inferential knowledge Relatum Mutual basence, difference Semantic relation, connection, grammatical connection, agreement Non-established Unsublated Absence Absenceness Name-ability Theory of meaning Identity, non-difference Exaltation anvaya aprasiddha abAdhita abhAva abhAvatva abhidheyatva abhihitAnvayavAda Indefinable abheda, tAdAtmya abhyudaya alakSya avacchinna avacchinnatva avacchedaka Determined State of being determined Determinant, limiter

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vyAptipaJcakam avacchedakatA State of being determinate, limitary, controller Non-occurrent avRtti avyabhicaritatvam, vyAptiH, avinAbhAva avyApti avyApyavRtti avyApyavRttitva Absence of deviation Fault of too narrow application, too narrow definition, under-extenuation Incomplete occurent, partial occurent, partial existent Incomplete occurent, partial existences, partial occurrence Perrvederness Fault of impossibility Incongruity Ether azeSatvam asambhava asvarasa: Substratum, locus Superstratum Occurrence AkAza, gagana AdhAra, Azraya, adhikaraNa Adheya AdheyatA Azraya, adhikaraNa, AdhAra upamitI uparAga upAdhi upAya kAlika sambandha / kAlika vizeSaNatA kevalAnvayi gagana, AkAza Locus, substratum Anology Imposition Adjunct Method Temporal relation Pure-affirmative Ether Graspping Filter-action Generic attribute graha cAlanIya nyAya jAti:

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pariziSTa - 1 a jJAna tAtparya tAdAtmya, abheda dRSTAnta dharma dhvaMsa, pradhvaMsAbhAva pakSa pRthakatva pratiyogin pratIti pramANa prameya prasiddha prAgabhAva prAmANya bodha bheda, anyonyAbhAva mUrta lakSaNA lakSya vipakSa vibhAga viziSTAbhAva viSayatA vRttitvam vyatireka vyabhicArI vyabhicArI hetu vyApaka Apprehension Intention of speaker Inntity, non-difference Example Attribute Posterior(absence), destruction Subject Separateness Counter positive Notion Testimony Object of Valid Knowledge Established Prior (absence) Validity Cognition Mutual absence, difference Material, Substance Implication, secondary meaning Definable 119 Contradictory subject, counter subject Disjunction Qualified absence Subjectness Occurrence, Existernce, State of being existent Disagreement Deviation Devious reason Pervasive

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120 vyAptipaJcakam vyApakatvam Pervasiveness vyAptiH, avinAbhAva Conductance, invariable relation, operation vyApti Inveriable concomitance vyApti, avyabhicaritvam,avinAbhAva Invariable relation, conductance, operation, pervasion, invarible, concomitance vyApya Pervaded vyApyavRtti Non-partial existent vyApyavRttitva Non-partial existence vyutpatti Denotative function zAbdabodha Verbal Cogition saMyoga Conjunction,connection,contact saGkhyA Number sattva Existence (one of generic attributes) sapakSa Definite subject samabhivyAhAra Proximity samavAya Inherence samavAyikAraNa Inherence-cause sAdhya Probondum, that which is to be established sAmarthyAbhAva Absence of capacity svarUpasambandha Self-linking connectors, relation self-someness Reason (which brings out the knowledge to hidden thing.)

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dharma Appendix-1 B Terminology (Eng.-San.) Absence abhAva Absence of capacity sAmarthyabhAva Absence of deviation avyabhicaritatvam, vyApti: avinAbhAva Absenceness abhAvatva Absolute, constant atyanya Absolute-absence,constant absence atyantAbhAva Adjunct upAdhi Anology upamitI Apprehention jJAna Attribute Congition bodha Conductance, invariable relation, vyAptiH, avinAbhAva operation Conjuction, connection, contact saMyoga Constant absence, absolute-absence atyantAbhAva Constant, absolute atyanta Contradictory subject, counter subject vipakSa Counter positive pratiyogin Definable lakSya Definite subject sapakSa Denotative function vyutpatti Determinant, limitor avacchedaka Determined avacchinna Deviation vyabhicArI Devious reason vyabhicArI hetu Disagreement vyatireka Disjunction vibhAga Established prasiddha Ether AkAza, gagana Exalitation abhyudaya

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122 Example Existence (one of generic attraibutes) Fault of impossibility Fault of too narrow application, too narrow defination, under-extention Fault of too wide application, fault of over extention Filter-action Generic attribute Grammatical connection Graspping Identity, non-difference Incongruity Indefenable Inference Inferential knowledge Infinitude, regress Inherence Inherence-cause Intention of speaker Invariable relation, conductance, dRSTAnta sattva operation, pervasion, invarible, concomitance asambhava avyApti Inveriable concomittence Locus, substratum Locusness, substratumness ativyApti Implication, secondary meaning Imposition Incomplete occurent, partial existentnce, avyApyavRttitatva cAlanIya nyAya jAti: anvaya partial occurrence Imcomplete occurent, partial occurent, avyApyavRtti partial existent graha abheda, lakSaNA uparAga tAdAtmya vyAptipaJcakam asvarasaH alakSya anumAna anumitI anavasthA samavAya samavAyikAraNa tAtparya vyApti, avyabhicaritattvam, avinAbhAva vyApti Azraya, adhikaraNa, AdhAra adhikaraNatva

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pariziSTa-1 ba 123 mata upAya anyonyAbhAvaH bhedaH abhidheyatva tAdAtmya, abheda aprasiddha avRtti vyApyavRtti vyApyavRttitva pratIti saGkhyA prameya AdheyatA vRttitvam vyAptiH, avinAbhAva, avyabhicaritatvam Material, substance Method Mutual absence, difference Name-ability Non-difference, identity Non-established Non-occurrent Non-partial existence Non-partial existent Notion Number Object of Valid Knowledge Occurrence Occurrence, existence, state of being existent Operation, invariable relation, conductance, pervasion Pervaded Pervasion, invariable-concomitance, conductance, operation Pervasive Pervasiveness Pervertedness Posterior(absence), destruction Prior (absence) Probondum, that which is to be established Proximity Pure-affirmative Qualified absence Reason (which brings out the knowledge to hidden thing.) vyApya vyAptiH, avinAbhAva vyApaka vyApakatvam azeSatvam dhvaMsa, pradhvaMsAbhAva prAgabhAva sAdhya samabhivyAhAra kevalAnvayi viziSTAbhAva

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124 Regress, infinitude Relation self-some-ness Relatum Self-linking connectors, relation self-some-ness Semantic relation, connection, Separateness State of being determinate, limitor, controler State of being determined State of being substratum, state of being locus, locusness grammatical connection, agreement Subject Subjectness Substance, material Substratum Substratum, locus Superstratum Temporal relation Testimony Theory of meaning Unsublated anavasthA svarUpasambandha anuyogI svarUpasambandha Validity Verbal Cognition anvaya pRthakatva avacchedakatA avacchinnatva adhikaraNatva pakSa viSayatA mUrta vyAptipaJcakam adhikaraNa adhikaraNa, AdhAra, Azraya Adheya kAlika sambandha / kAlika vizeSaNatA pramANa abhihitAnvayavAda abAdhita prAmANya zAbdabodha

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That Which is to be - Absence established Fire -- Appendix-2 A Figures (Eng.) Fig.-1 Substratum Absence Fig.-1A Lake Occurrence - Absence Occurrence Water - Reason Abdence Smoke

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126 vyAptipaJcakam Fig.-2 (1) That Which is to be established (15) (16) Counter Positivesness (14) Occurrence - Absence (2) / (5) V (17) (6) Absence of that to be established (11) 7 Reason (18) / (4) Locus of that which is to be established (3) Mutual absence (7) (8) (10) Different (9) Fig.-2 A ce of fire |(15) (19) (1) (17) (18) Fire Counter Occurrence -- Absence Positivesness Absence of fire (2) / (5) (11) I (4) (6) |(12) Water Smoke (16) Kitchen (7) Mutual absence (20) (3) (8) (13) Lake (10) (9)

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pariziSTa - 2 A That which to be is established (1) Fire (1) (2) l Locus of that which to be is established (3) Mountain (3) (4) (4) (7) Occurrence (6) Mutual absence (9) (5) Substratumness (12) (6) (5) Mutual absence (7) Occurrence (10) Fig.-3 (10) Substratumness (9) Substratum (11) Fig.-3 A (8) (8) (12) Lake (11) (13) Water (14) (16) (18), (19) Occurrence - Absence (20) Substratumness (14) (13) (15) (15) (19) (20) Occurrence - Absence (16) 127 Reason (17) (18) (17) Substratumness (21) Smoke (22)

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128 vyAptipaJcakam Fig.-4 That Which is to be is established -- Absence (3) (1) (2) (9) (8) Counter Positiveness |(10) Reason (11) Absen (7) (6) Sbstratum (5) Fig.-4 A Fire -- (1) (2) Absence (3) Counter Positiveness (9) (10) (4) (8) Absence of smoke (7) Reason (11) (6) Lake etc. (5)

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pariziSTa - 2 A That Which is to be is established (1) (2) Locus of that which to be is established (3) That Which is to be is established (1) (2) Mountain (3) (4) (4) Fig.-5 Mutual Absence (5) Fig.-5 A Mutual Absence (5) (6) Lake (7) (6) (8) (10), (11) Occurrence - Absence (9) (8) Sbstratum (7) | (10) 129 (9) (12) (13) Occurrence -Absence Water (11) |(12) Reason (13) | (14) Smoke (15)

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Appendix-2-B vyAptipaJcakam / 1. sAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvam / Fig.-1 sAdhyam - abhAvaH vRttitvam - abhAvaH hetuH adhikaraNam Fig.-1A vRttitvam - abhAvaH vahniH - abhAvaH jAtam dhUmaH

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pariziSTa-2 B 2. sAdhyavadbhinnasAdhyAbhAvavadavRttitvam / Fig.-2 (1) sAdhyam (14) vRttitvam 5 abhAvaH 15) (16) (17) pratiyogitA sAdhyAbhAva (11) /(13 (2) hetuH (12) (18) (4) (7) bhedaH (3)sAdhyavAn - bhinnam (9) (10) Fig.-2 A (1) vahniH (14) vRttitvama (17) (18) abhAvaH pratiyogitA (15) vayabhAva (11) (2) jAtama dhUmaH (16) (20) (4) (12) / (7) bhedaH | /(13) (3)mahAnasaH (10) (9)

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132 3. sAdhyavatpratiyogikAnyonyAbhAvAsAmAnAdhikaraNyam / Fig.-3) AdheyatA AdheyatA sAdhyam (1) (2) sAdhyavAn (3) vahniH (1) (2) parvataH (3) (8) (8) anyonyAbhAvaH , (5) adhikaraNatA (9) |(12) (5) (6) (6) 10 ) (10) anyonyAbhAvaH (10) Fig.-3/A (7) Adheya adhikaraNa (9) (8) (8) (12) hRdaH adhikaraNam ( 11 ) ( 11 ) (16) (18) (19) ( 17 ) (15) 1/(24) ( 13 ) (16) (14) | (13) jalam vyAptipaJcakam adhikaraNatA (14) (15) AdheyatA -- (18) abhAvaH (19) ( 20 ) abhAvaH | (21) adhikaraNatA (17) |(20) hetu:( 21 ) dhUmaH (22)

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pariziSTa-2 B 4. sakalasAdhyAbhAvavanniSThAbhAvapratiyogitvam / Fig.-4 sAdhya (sakalam) - abhAvaH (3) , pratiyogitA (2) / (1) abhAvaH (7) hetuH (6) (11) (sakalakam) adhikaraNam Fig.-4/A vahniH (sakalam) - abhAvaH (3) (9) pratiyogitA (10) (2) (1) 8) ( 5) dhUmAbhAvaH (7) (11) adhikaraNam (6) (sakalakam)

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134 vyAptipaJcakam 5. sAdhyavadanyAvRttitvam / Fig.-5 vRttitvam (10) abhAva: sAdhyam (1) (12) hetuH (2) bhedaH (5) (8) (13) (4) (6) adhikaraNam sAdhyavAn (3) (7) vahniH (1) Fig.-5/A (9) (12) (13) vRttitvam - abhAvaH | (14) (8) | jalam (11) dhUmaH (15) bhedaH (5) (10) (2) parvata (4) hRdaH (7) (3)

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Appendix-3 Brief Introduction of Prof. Dr. Baliram Shukla (Elder son of Pandit Hariram Shastri Shukla (Famous #41400)) Education - Honoured as Acharya in First class at Sanskrit University, Varanasi. Completed M.A. in Philosophy at Kashi Hindu University, Varanasi. Ph.D. from Delhi University, Delhi. Important Works - Anuman Pramana (347414 441) (Published) Nyayasidhantamanjari-commentary (PRF461-1432-2||CH) (Published) A basic Course of Indian Logic. (Published) Aatmatva Jativicar (31hra Hifafaar) (Edited) (Published) Aatmadarsanam (3416464f-4) (Edited) (Published) Navyanyaya ke Paribhasik Padarth (navyanyAya ke pAribhASika padArtha) (1st part) Other Works -- Nearly 50 Research papers published in different Magazines. Presented Research papers and successfully Participated in Seminars. Rewards -- Honoured as 'Nyayabhusana' (P2490) by the Chief of Shri Raghavendra Swami Ma-h Mantralaya, Andhrapradesh. Rewarded by Shri Moraya Goswami Temple Chinchawad, Pune for the great contribution in Philosophy and Sanskrit.

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136 vyAptipaJcakam Honoured by Various Acaryas and Institutes. Delivered Lectures at -- Shri Ramanuj Darsan college, Varanasi. Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Central Sanskrit University, New Delhi. Worked as Head of the Philosophy Department at University of Pune. Helped with the Guidelines to Research scholars for Ph.D. Written and published Articles in Hindi-Marathi-Sanskrit and English. Invited for Delivering lectures by the various Universities. Invited for Assembly regarding the Debate by different Sanskrit Institutes.

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Appendix-4 Bibliography (1) navya nyAya ke pAribhASika padArtha - DaoN. balirAma zukla, puNe yunivarsiTI. (2) nyAyakoza-pro. bhImAcArya jhaLakIkara bhAMDArakara prAcya vidyA saMzodhana mandira, puNe (1996) (3) vyAptipaJcakam-saM. vAmAcaraNa bhaTTAcArya, prakA. bhA. khelADIlAla saMkaTAprasAda saMskRta pustakAlaya kacauDI galI, vArANasI-1 (saM. 2045) (4) Dictionary of Paninian Grammatical Terminology - J. A. F. Roodbergen-Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Pune (2008) (5) Webster's Dictionary - Random House, New York, (1996).