Indian Antiquary Vol 39

Author(s): Richard Carnac Temple
Publisher: Swati Publications

Page 32

26
THE INDIAN ANTIQUARY.
[JANUARY, 1910.
A king may deceive or help his equal as follows:
When a king proposes peace to another king of equal power on the condition of receiving the nelp of the latter's army strong enough to oppose an enemy's army, or to guard the front, centre and rear of his territory, or to help his friend, or to protect any other wild tracts of his territory in return for the payment of a share in the profit proportionally equal to the strength of the army supplied, the latter may accept the terms if the proposer is of good intentione ; but otherwise he may declare war.
When a king of equal power, capable of receiving the help of an army from another quarter requests of another king in troubles due to the diminished strength of the elements of sovereignty, and with many enemies, the help of the latter's army in return for the payment of a share in the profit less than the strength of the army supplied deserves, the latter, if powerful, may declare war or accept the terms otherwise,
When a king who is under troubles, who has his works at the mercy of his neighbouring kings, and who has yet to make an army, requests of another king of equal power the help of the latter's army in return for the payment of a share in the profit greater than the strength of the army supplied deserves, the latter may accept the terms if the proposer is of good intentions : but otherwise, war may be declared.
Wben, with the desire of putting down a king in tronbles due to ine diminished strength of the elements of sovereignty, or with the desire of destroying his well-begun work of immense and nnfailing profit, or with the intention of striking him in his own place or on the occasion of marching, one, though frequently getting immense (subsidy) from an assailable enemy of equal inferior, or superior power, sends demands to him again and again, then he may comply with the demands of the former if he is desirous of maintaining his own power by destroying with the army of the former an impregnable fortress of an enemy or a friend of that enemy or by laying waste the wild tracts of that enemy, or if he is desirous of exposing the army of the ally to wear and tear even in good roads and good seasons, or if he is desirous of strengthening his own army with that of his ally and thereby putting down the ally or winning over the army of the ally.
When & king is desirous of keeping under his power another king of superior or inferior power as an assailable enemy and of destroying the latter after routing out another enerny with the help of the latter, or when he is desirous of getting back whatever he has paid (as subsidy), he may send a proposal of peace to another on the condition of paying more than the cost of the army supplied. If the king to whom this proposal is made is powerful enough to retaliate, he may declare war; or if otherwise, he may accept the terms; or he may keep quiet allied with the assailable enemy; or he may supply the proposer of peace with his army full of traitors, enemies and wild tribes.
When a king of superior power falls into troubles owing to the weakness of the elements of his sovereignty, and requests of an inferior king the help of the latter's army in return for the paymert of a share in the profit proportionally equal to the strength of the army supplied, the latter, if powerful enough to retaliate, may declare war and if otherwise, accept the terms.
A king of superior power may request of an inferior the help of the latter's army in return for the payment of a share in the profit less than the cost of the army supplied ; and the latter, if powerful enough to retaliate, may declare war, or accept the terms other wise.