Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

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F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syadvādamañjari
'on account of their own nature only possess conformity and difference. Conformity' is uniform presentation, and it is expressed by the term 'one' (eka); 'difference', divergence. (13) complete discrimination from things of the same and other classes. Both these combined they possess', hold on to; they possess conformity and difference', they have the nature of both generality and particularity. That is the meaning.
He states a default') of this very thing: not of a form to be deduced from other existences. Not has the effect of denial; from other existences, from the two other categories (padārtha), approved by the opponent as other than substance, quality, action and inherence, i. e. gener ality and particularity as distinct from existence; to be deduced from, conveyed as an object of presentation, form, - those things which have a form of their own, marked by conformity and difference in order, are as stated. It is the very own-nature of all positive existences that of themselves they beget the ideas of conformity and difference. For instance, a pot, to begin with, having the forın of a broad bottom and belly, and so on, becoming the object of a presentation, and bringing about the presentation of other objects of the same form, as pols, and as being denotable by the same word 'pot', receives the designation 'universal. And the same also, separating itself, in respect of substance, place, time, and being, from things of the same and other classes, enjoyed the designation particular”. And so to suppose that universality and particularity are things apart is not logical, since they are presented only as attributes of things. And attributes are not absolutely differentiated from the bearer of the attributes; because, if they were altogether distinct, the relation of attributes and subject would be unaccountable, and because it would follow that a young elephant and a donkey could be designated attribute and subject (respectively). And, if it were supposed that attributes also are things apart, an infinite number of things even in one single entity would be the conse quence, since an entity has an infinite number of attributes.
Not discerning correctly this proper truth of universality and particularity, the unskilful, the followers of other beliefs who have their views obsessed by unreality, trip up, fall from the path of logical reasoning; the meaning is, they become unable to reply: and here by tripping' a ridiculousness in the eyes of competent persons is suggested. By doing what? By asserting a duality, i. e. of presentations defined as conformity and difference. (14) For what reason asserting that duality of presentation ? He states: on ground of a distinct selfreality 5): the distinct self-reality, own-form, of universality and particularity, different, because of distinction from the things, and also mutually independent, of these 'the selfreality', own-nature, defined as conformity and difference; on that ground: relying on that is the meaning. The Ablative (in parālmatattval) in virtue of (the sūtra which says), "After gami, aia, etc., the Ablative of the base of action"). - 'Because of having in what way a distinct self-reality ? he states: on ground of a self-reality which is not so'). This qualification is in order to deny the opponent's distinct self-reality being true. 'Not so', as invented by the opponent with the aspect defined as complete distinction. What with a particular aspect has its own self-reality, its own nature, is 'so': because of that, because in the things universality and particularity occur as inseparable and by them those two are supposed to be different
9 Se a case which fails to accord with the truth which he has just announced. Besides this sense of something wanting', yatireka has frequently in Indian logie the sense of going beyond, as when a Middle Terni includes instances not covered by the Major or an effect occurs in the absence of its supposed cause (see Nya yu-kośa, s. v.).
*) The universal, 'man', etc., heing essentially different from the particular man, etc. *) The grammatical rule (Hemacandra, II ii 24 (M. L.) merely states that, where no verb of motion rurs, The Ablative denotes (not a starting-point but) a base (here a logical ground). ) A mistaken sell-reality.