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XVIII. The Buddhist doctrine of Momentariness
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cedents; and there is no single series, and bondage and liberation have one single locus, and do not take place with difference of field. Then to whom belongs this liberation, so that he makes effort for it? For this term 'liberation' is a synonym for 'severance of bonds': and liberation holds good only of the person who was bound, while on the contention of momentary extinction one moment is bound, and the liberation belongs to another moment; so that there results a negation of liberation.
Further, the fault of 'ruin of memory'. As thus: in regard to an object experienced by a prior awareness a memory on the part of later awareness is not possible, because they are other than it; like awareness on the part of another series '). For a thing seen by one is not remembered by another; otherwise a thing seen by one person would be remembered by all. And, if there is no recollection, whence in the world comes the begetting of recognition ? Since that arises from both recollection and (original) experience; for this, with the form
this is that same', arises in a knower in whom a former impression (samskara) 2) has been awakened by beholding an object. Or, if it is said that “This fault might exist if without distinction it is said that what has been seen by one is remembered by another; but, even given the otherness, there is memory simply from the relation of effect and cause; and between the awarenesses of different series there is not a relation of effect and cause. Therefore on the part of other series there is not memory. But it is not the fact that also between awarenesses belonging to a single series there is not a relation of effect and cause, so that in regard to a thing experienced by a previous awareness there should not be recollection on the part of later awareness' - that also is not transparent; because even so the otherness is as before. For it does not depart simply on mention of the relation of effect and cause; because all (awarenesses) are, as momentary, different. Nor have we here as regards memory due to the relation of effect and cause an example recognized by both sides. Or, if it is said, 'according to -
"For into whatever series there has been deposited a suffusion of karma,
There only does the fruit present itself, like redness in a cotton cloth 13) "14) - (157) there is the example of the redness in a cotton cloth'. That is not very good, because there can be no establishing and no refuting. As thus: because of the impossibility of constant association (anvaya), etc., there is no Middle Term; for a constant association to the effect that 'where there is a relation of cause and effect, there there is memory, like the redness in a cotton cloth', is not possible; nor is there a divergence to the effect that, 'where there is not memory, there there is not a relation of cause and effect'. And from there being no suggestion of being unestablished, etc. 15), there is not refutation; for in the Middle Term, being other than that' no fault is demonstrated by 'like the redness in a cotton cloth.
Furthermore, if, despite otherness, an origination of memory through the relation of effect and cause is approved, then also between the awareness of a pupil and teacher, since there a relation of effect and cause is actual, there would be memory, etc. Or, if it is said, "This does not follow, because of the specification given a belonging to one series", that also is illogical, since it is used up by the alternative of difference and non-difference. For, if that (series) is
") Another person. 18) On samskära see note VIII 67).
") Quoted Nya ya-manjari, p.443, also in comm. to Pramāna-naya-tattväloka, VII. 55, in Manibhadra's comm. on Haribhadra's Şad-darsana-samuccaya, and in the Sarva-darsana-samgraha, III (Jain chapter).
13) Due to smearing the cotton seeds with lac: see Col. Jacob's, A second handful of popular Maxims, pp. 20-1.
15) A Middle Term is 'unestablished' if it does not occur in the Minor or does not occur at all. Here the Middle Term is 'case other than where there is a relation of cause and effect'.
