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F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syādvādamañjarī
And that (Demonstration) is twofold, direct and indirect. Of these the direct is twofold, the conventional, and the ultimately real. The conventional is twofold, because of the distinction of the senses and quasi-sense 28) as the occasions. "This pair, through the distinction of attention (avagraha), interest (iha), inspection (avaya), and retention (dharana) has four alternatives for each" 29). The own-form of attention, etc., being very familiar, is not enlarged upon. "But the ultimately real (perception), on the other hand, has in its origination regard only to the self" 30). This is twofold: due to waning and cessation (kṣayo pasama) 31), and due to waning. The first is twofold, through the distinction of knowledge of what is remote (avadki-jñāna), and of knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others (manah-paryayajñāna); but that due to waning is absolute cognition.
And the indirect, through the distinction of memory (smrti), recognition (pratyabhijñāna), reasoning (ha), inference (anumana) and scripture (agama), is of five kinds. "Of) these at knowing in the form of 'that', relating to a thing experienced, and arising from the awakening of a trace (samskara), is memory (3). It is as 'that image of a Tirthankara' (4). A cognition consisting of a putting together, having for field a crosswise or lengthwise generality 33), etc., and caused by experience and memory is recognition (5). As: 'this cow-body belongs to that species, what is like a cow is a gayal'; 'this is that same Jinadatta', etc.' (6). A consciousness in the form 'this takes place only when that is', etc., and relating to a connection of Middle Term and Major Term, taken as of the three times, and arisen from observation and (230) non-. observation, is reasoning, otherwise named deduction (7). As, 'as far as there is any smoke, it all occurs only when fire exists'; or, if that does not exist, this does not occur' (8). Inference is of two kinds, for self and for other (9). Of these, definite cognition of a Major Term, having for cause the apprehension of a Middle Term, solely defined as 'unaccountability otherwise134), and recollection of the connection, is (inference) for self (10). That which consists in statement of a Minor Term and a Middle Term for the sake of another is metonymously inference (23). Consciousness of a thing elicited through the statement of an authority is scripture (-knowledge) (1). By metonymy also the statement of the authority (2)". And the special own-form of memory, etc., can be known, along with the clearing of objections, from the Syadvada-ratnakara").
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The other means of proof, again, practical consequence (arthapatti), analogy (upamāna), possibility (sambhava), ideas (pratibha), report (aitihya), etc., are included in these. But contact (sannikarsa), etc., as being non-intelligent (jada), simply are not means of proof. So by such provision of Methods and proofs the road of wrong-Methods was by you laid waste. This is the meaning of the verse.
28) Anindriya seems to be the no-indriya of note XVII 22), corresponding more or less to the mind-organ (manas) of Hindu philosophy: cf. Sammati-tarka, p. 619.
2) Pramana-naya-tattvaloka, II. 6 (M. L.).
30) Ibid., II. 18 (M. L.).
31) On these terms see Outlines of Jainism, Index.
3) The lo ng quotation is from the Pramana-naya-tattväloka, III. 3-10, 23, IV. 1-2 (M. L.) (who notes in 10 the absence of 'solely... otherwise' 11 of the edition.
33) See note XXVIII 17).
34) On an yatha-anupapatti, see p. 132.
35) By Vadi-Devasüri, XIIth to XIIIth century.
