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XXVI. NEITHER ETERNALITY NOR NON-ETERNALITY CAN BE MAINTAINED
Now, whereas the two parties of eternal and non-eternal, at strife through being girt up for bringing to light of mutual refutation, incur ruin through the onslaught of weapons of various reasonings uplifted on one side or the other, he states the universal superiority of the Holy One's impartiality in teaching, which without effort attains the defeat of its opponents - XXVI. Whatsoever faults truly are in the eternality doctrine.
the like in the perishableness doctrine also there are, the very same. While the thorns drive out each other mutually,
victorious unassailably, O Victor! is Thy teaching. Truly, is used in certainty; whatsoever in the eternality doctrine, in the ‘non-equivocall eternality doctrine; faults, deduced by the disputants for the 'non-equivocal non-eternality doctrine, the inappropriateness of practical efficacy in the two ways of succession and simultaneity, etc.: the very same, in the perishableness doctrine also, in the doctrine of 'non-equivocal' momentariness also; the like, equal, (201) deduced by the disputants for “non-equivocal' eternality, without deficiency or excess. As thus: “The disputant for eternality states a proof, 'everything is eternal because of existence; in the momentary by reason of the contradiction of practical efficacy at the two times of its being existent and non-existent existence as so defined") does not find an abiding-place (avasthā), so that, turning back from that, it makes its abode (avatişthate) in eternality, because there is no other refuge. As thus: a momentary thing would produce its effect either as existent or as non-existent, because there is no other course. Now not the first alternative, because of the illogicality of operation upon what belongs to the same time, and because of over-extension through the result of mutual relation of effect and cause on the part of all positive existents. Nor again does the second alternative bear discussion; because the non-existent is without power to produce an effect; otherwise the hare's horn, etc., also would have energy for producing effects, because of the absence of difference'.
The disputant for non-eternality, again, urges against the disputant for eternality an argument as follows: 'everything is momentary because of existence; by reason of the contradiction of practical efficacy in the non-momentary, whether in succession or all at once, and because, as being effective of practical efficacy is the mark of a positive thing, practical efficacy on withdrawal therefrom (from the non-momentary) would withdraw the existence which it embosoms; so that there is establishment of the momentary: For an eternal thing has no energy for setting on foot, in succession, a practical efficacy; because it is with impairing of its own-nature, which was the effecting of its former practical efficacy, that it engages, in succession, in later practical efficacy. For otherwise there would be the consequence of its non-cessation from its former efficacy; and with its falling from that own-nature its eternality departs; since non-identity of state is the mark of non-eternality. Or, if it is said, "Even an eternal might for a time abide awaiting a successively occurring co-operant, and afterwards,
) Sc. as practical efficacy'. 10.
