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154
F.W. Thomas, Mallişena's Syadvadamañjari
the tise of the word patha ('path) 8) twice, in one case pathin, with the ending of a Compound, and in the other case the unanalysed word 'path' ending with a, is no fault.
Now for some description of the own- form of bad-Method, Method and Demonstration. of these, again, first the own-form of the Methods; because with non-understanding of that the own-form of the bad-Methods can hardly be comprehended. And here the mention by the Teacher of the bad. Methods in the first place has been for the sake of suggesting superior ity in order of succession. Of them Method is the partial (eka-desa) reflection upon the thing taken for proving. From 'leading (na yali), making reach, lifting to the point of consciousness', as distinguished by a single quality chosen by oneself, an entity which is the abode of infinite attributes, it is Method (a 'lead'). The meaning is, a reflection taking place later than the procedure of Demonstration. (211)
And the Methods are infinite, because an entity has infinite attributes; and because a Method-character belongs to the speaker's intents, which are satisfied with one of the attributes. And to this effect the ancients, "As many as are the ways of statement, just so many are the Method-statements"). Nevertheless, the ancients by working out a purport of seven as all-embracing formulated only seven: As follows: Naigama (market place), the comprehensive (samgraha), the conventional (vyavahāra), the straightforward irjusutra), the verbal (sabda), the etymological (samabhirūdha) and the 'just so (evambhūta). If it is said, How are all comprehended in these?', we say that intent works, of course, by way of thing or by way of word, because there is no other course. Of these whatever intents of the knower tend to the describing of the thing are all included in the first tetrad of Methods: but those which are apt for the examination of the expression are in the triad of the verbal, etc., Methods.
or these the Naigama understands a great universal, defined as 'existence'; and intermediate universals, substance-ness, quality-ness, action-ness and so forth; also ultimate differences, defined as having the form of being totally unshared, and intermediate diffe. rences relatively proper for the exclusion of the form of others, and having an own - form absolutely detached from generality. And this, having been thrashed out in the discussion of independent universals and particulars (cf. v. IV), requires no separate effort. And this is understandable from the two examples, familiar in the teaching, of 'staying at home and 'going forth).
But the 'comprehensive', by way of neglecting all particularities, takes the whole under the form of universal. And this has been already detailed in the discussion of the non-equivocal universal (cf. vv. IV-V).
But the conventional states as follows: Let there be entity only as popularly apprehended; what is the use of this trouble (kaşta piştikā) of imagining entities unseen and unrecognized (by ordinary language)? Whatever falls within the way of popular usage, only in favour of that does it accept of Demonstration, not of anything else. (212) For an universal, without beginning and end, single, viewed as comprehensive, is not a field of Demonstration, because of the absence of experience to that effect, and because of the consequence of everyone seeing everything. Nor are the differentiae, defined as atoms, momentarily perishing, accessible to Demonstration; because there is no proceeding on that line. Therefore only this entity-form, pot, etc., for the whole world unvetoed, familiar through Dernonstration, abiding for a certain time, possessing largeness, capable of effecting the practical actions of bringing water, etc., is ultimately real. The further examination of its states, belonging to prior and later time, is,
) Sc. in the verse.
Sammati-tarka, III. v. 47, p. 655. 19) See Anu yoga-dvāra-sútra, 145 (Malayagiri's vyākhya, PR. 223-5 (M. L.).
