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XXVIII. THE JAIN DOCTRINE OF THE NAYAS (METHODS)
Now, by way of describing the wrong-Methods, the Methods and Demonstration, in consequence of the saying that "getting at is by Demonstration and Methods"), he, lauding the superiority in statement, not shared by others, and refulative of the path of wrong-Method, at variance with the Quodammodo doctrine, on ihe part of the Lord, the propounder of Demonstration and Methods, which are conditions of the attainment of truth in regard to soul, non-soul, etc., - says - XXVIII). Simply existent, existent, quodammodo existent - thus in three ways.
the thing should be measured by wrong-procedure, Methods and Demonstration. But Thou alone, beholder as the thing is, didst by the path of method and demonstration
get rid of the path of had procedure. Thing (artha): (what) 'is dealt with' (arth yale), 'is outlined', is word-content; in three ways, by three procedures; should be measured, should be outlined: Seventh form (Optative) used in an injunction. By what three procedures ? On this he says: wrong-procedure, Methods, Demonstration. 'Procedures' (niti) are that whereby is led, outlined, a thing particularised in one part; Nayas (Methods); 'bad procedures', 'faulty procedures', 'wrong Methods' is the meaning, 'Methods, the Naigama, etc. Demonstration' (pramāna), because by it is judged (pramiyate), outlined, a thing, with equivocal' particularization, - defined as direct and indirect perception) consisting in the Quodammodo doctrine. Wrong-procedures, and Methods, and the two Demonstrants are 'wrong procedure, Metbods, Demonstration'; by them. With what olining should be measured ? On this he says. Simply existent, existent,
4) Tattvārthadhigama-sútra, 1. 6 (M. L.!.
2) In developed Indian Logic pramana, here translated Demonstration', Demonstrant', etc., is the fundamental, and usually (e.g. in Nyāya-sutra, I. 1, and the commentaries, and the Buddhist Nyaya-bindu, etc., the Jain Sammati-tarka, etc.) the opening, topic. The word, derived from pra-ma-right knowing', final truth', denotes (1) the process of proving, (2) objectively, 'proof' or 'evidence', or the evidential thing, e. g. perception; and correspondingly prāmānya, pramāka-ness', means validity of (1) a proving, (2) of an evidential thing, e.g. perception. Pramiti is the act of judging, and pramātr the judging person or faculty: prameya is 'subject envisaged in pramana'. There are many special treatises, Hindu, Jain and Buddhist, devoted to pramanas in general, their numbers, etc., or to particular pramānas and their prämänya, validily; and many definitions of these may be seen in the N yāya-kosa under these headings. On this matter see Dr. Randle's Indian Logic in the early Schools, Index, s. vv.
The Jains restricted the term pramāna to ultimate proof or truth in accordance with their main docErine of many-sided (anekanta, here rendered 'equivocal") existents. From this they distinguished the nayas, 'leads, lines of approach' (here rendered Methods'), under which they classified, as 'one-sided' (ckanta) or erroneous, the several other systems.
In the Sammati-tarka the nayas fill an enormous space (pp. 271-456): they are also fully expounded in The Pramüna-naya-tattväloka of Devasūri and its commentary, and incidentally in works on pramana, among which may be mentioned, beside Hemacandra's Pramana-mimāmsā, a Pramana-paribhäsā, by the late sainted Sri-Vijayadharmasüri and his disciple Sri-Nyayavijaya.
19 On pratyakşa and paroksa in Jainism see Outlines of Jainism, p. 113: original texts Tattvarthädhigama-sütra, 1. 11-12, Sammati-tarka, pp. 573-595, Prameya-kamala-martanda, foll. 45-96.
