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156
F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syādvādamañjarī
is to be admitted. Of these, number is unity, etc., time is past, etc., Case-relation is Nominative, etc., Person is first Person, etc.
And the etymological' 15) holds that synonymous terms have an actually distributed denotation. As follows: from being powerful he is Indra; supreme lordliness, to be stated by the word 'Indra' applies essentially to a thing which has that; and by metonymy to what has not that or else there is not anyone who has it (metonymically so): because, as all terms are made out with mutually distributed denotation, an usage with the relation of basis and thing based 16) is unestablished. So from being capable 'Sakra'; from fort-cleaving 'Purandara', etc. in this way it shows a distinction of denotation in all terms. (214) And it formulates a proof: Even synonymous terms have distinct denotations; because they are occasioned by distinct etymologies: in this world whatever (words) are occasioned by distinct etymologies have distinct denotations, like the words 'Indra', 'cattle', 'man'; and synonymous words also are occasioned by distinct etymologies, and hence have distinct denotations.
But the 'just so', again, says thus: With whatever denotation a word is interpreted, only when that denotation, the occasion for its correct use, is in action, does it understand the word as applying, and not with universality. As: only when mounted on the head of a woman, etc., at a time of bringing water, and in a special movement, is the 'pot' so called; not in other cases, because it is without the occasion for the correct use of the term 'pot'; like 'cloth', etc. If it is said that 'embracing the past and future movement 17), it is in fact used with generality', No!, since those two, having perished or not originated, are equivalent to hare's horn, etc. If nevertheless there is in that way application of the terms, it is to be applied to everything, since there is no difference. Moreover, if with reference to movement past or to come, the word 'pot' should be used also of what has not the movement, then its use in regard to potsherd, lump of earth, etc., would be unavoidable, because there is no difference. Therefore only in the moment when the occasion for the etymological use is intact is the particular thing to be stated by the particular word.
Here we have the summarizing verses 18):
"That the universal is one thing undivided, cause of the cognition. And the difference is only other, is the view of the market place. 1.
That which comprehends under the form of existence this whole world with its own own-nature
And not passing beyond the existence-form, is the comprehensive view, 2.
But 'convention', comprehending that same as actually distributed in different things, Because in that way they are seen, sets the living beings to work. 3.
Here the 'straightforward' view would be resting upon pure states
Because of there being only perishable existence with separation from permanence. 4. (215)
Holding in consequence of difference of contrary marks, number, etc., a difference in own-nature of the same thing,
1) Since rudha in ordinary Sanskrit denotes 'conventional', 'current', as opposed to etymological (yaugika), meaning, this Jain term is somewha tsurprising, as signifying the opposite; but the verb-form samabhirohan occurs infra, p. 158, v. 36.
16) Relation of basis and thing based': Sc. Subject and Attribute, etc. The sense seems to be that a term can denote primarily only what its etymology indicates and not anything merely related thereto, all other employment of it being metonymous.
17) Exemplifying the 'lengthwise universal' (i. e. a thing as more than momentary), recognized by Jain Logic (see Pravacana-sara, trans. Faddegon, Introduction, p. xxii, Prameya-kamala-, fol. 143.) Or is it rather the durativeness of motion?
18) By the author, Mallisena?
