Book Title: Syadvada Manjari
Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

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Page 144
________________ XXIV. The combination of opposites involves no contradiction 143 qua its own-formo) resulting; and so because of being uncitable (niru pākhya), (196) there is universal emptiness. For contradiction would be if the existence and non-existence should be with one (same) condition, and it is not so, since we can say) 'For not with that same part wherewith there is existence is there also non-existence; but the existence has one condition, the non-existence, on the other hand, has another condition: for the existence is with own form, and the non-existence with the form of another.' For even in a single whole variegated cloth but with a different condition, is seen blueness, and with different conditions other colours. For the blueness is conditioned by the colour of indigo, etc., and the other colours are conditioned by such and such colorific substances. Similarly in a Mecaka) jewel also must be recognized a variety conditioned by matter of such and such colours. Nor through such examples does there ensue a difference of place between the existence and non-existence; because of the unity of the variegated cloth, etc., as a whole, since in that case too a difference of place is unestablished. However in regard to the example and the thing exemplified a Minor Term'), one way or another, is not difficult for the Quodammodo disputants to get. . If even so the blessed person is not content, then, since in a single man, through difference of such and such conditions, even mutually contradictory attributes, father-ness, son-ness, maternal-uncle-ness, maternal-nephew-ness, paternal nephew-ness, brother-ness, cousinness, etc., are familiar, what is to be said ? 'The same should be said of unutterability, etc.'. Simply from not having awoke to, simply not having cognized; - the word 'simply' is restriction, - on the stated lines, with difference of conditions, the real absence of contradictions. And this is simply the absence of right cognition on their part, and not, on the contrary, its existence even in a fraction; this is what he hints. Therefore they, afraid of contradietion; contradiction, non-residence-together of attributes, existence and non-existence, etc., or imagined by extravert thought; of that 'afraid', alarmed in mind, and for this very reason, stupid. Even in the absence of a cause for real fear, through timidity like animals in that state, fools, opposing disputants, and slain by that non-equivocal view, certitude in the settlement (197) of attributes approved by them with negation of other attributes, the nonequivocal view of the attributes existence, etc.; thereby 'slain', as it were slain, fall, stumble; and, being fallen, they are incapable of treading the path of reason, and they come to be trodden upon by even all travellers on the road of reason. That is the sense. Or else, 'they fall', drop from the path of logic; for in the world fallen from the right path is styled 'fallen'. Or else, as one killed by the stroke of a thunderbolt, etc., fallen, and come into blank unconsciousness, has his utterance of speech stopped ; similarly, these disputants also, being struck down by their approved "non-equivocal' view, which does not follow the road of logic, as by a thunderbolt, are in the presence of the quodammodo disputants helplessly unable to utter even a word. And here, as implied in contradiction, are to be understood also the faults of difference of locus, regressus ad infinitum, confusion, interchange, doubt, failure of understanding, failure to set out the subject, - suggested by the opponents. As thus: when an entity has been propounded as composed of universality and particularity, the opponents criticise to the effect that there is a contradiction because of the impossibility, in one undivided entity, of universality and particularity, which are attributes contradictory in the form of affirmation and negation. For what is the locus of the affirmation need not be exactly the locus of the nega 3) An A which is not' B would have also to 'be-not' A. ) This shows various colours. 9) Sc. an instance of something being at once A (subject to condition X) and not-A (subject to condi tion Y).

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