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130
F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syadvadamañjarī
And here the expression Jina' is with intent: for it is from being victorious over passion, etc., that he is Jina; and therefore whoso looks down on Your Worship's precept, though your words call for attention, as exempt from the turbidity of defects, how is there not in him madness? - that is the sense. O Lord! O master! And he is Lord through having, as bestower of what has not been obtained, the true insight, etc., and, as giver of instruction for maintenance without transgression of that same when obtained, the faculty of effecting complete wellbeing. To him invocation.
And real entity consists of origination, perishing, and stability. As thus: Every entity, as substance, is not subject to origination or falling away; because we patently see continuity. It should not be said, 'There is exception, because we see continuity in the case of cut nails, etc., which have grown again': because a continuity vetoed by Demonstration") is not patent. Nor is the continuity here in question contradicted by Demonstration; since it is established by true recognition; because of the text -
"In all the particulars regular, or, if there is moment by moment otherness, no difference;
Because, despite increase and decrease, there is a settled shape and genus" 4).
And so of every entity as substance there is stability only, but as states every entity is subject to origination and falling away: because unhalting experience of states is actual. Nor is there exception (169) because of the like experience of yellow, etc., states in a white shell; for that is of a halting form. That (experience) is not of unhalting form, so that there should be inseparability of origination of later aspect maintained without failure of destruction of former aspect. And in regard to an entity, soul, etc., the experience of a succession of states, joy, displeasure, indifference, etc., is not in a halting form, because there is not vetoing circumstance.
If it is said, 'Origination, etc., are mutually distinct, or not. If they are distinct, how is there one entity triple? If they are not distinct, just so, how is the one triple? And to this effect. -
"If origination, etc., are different, how is there one thing triple?
Or, if origination, etc., are not different, how is there one thing triple ?"""")
That is unlogical; because it is as having marks in a way distinct that they are admitted to be in a way distinct. As thus: origination, destruction and stability are quodammodo distinct, because of having distinct marks, like colour, etc. Nor is their having distinct marks unestablished. Of the non-existent a becoming real, of the existent a separation from existence, and recurrence in the form of substance are certainly, as mutually un-commingled marks of origination, etc., attested by all the world.
Nor are these, though of distinct marks, mutually irrespective; because of the consequence of non-existence, as in the case of the sky-flower. As thus: Mere origination does not exist; because that is without stability and departure; like the hair of a tortoise. Likewise, mere destruction does not exist; because it is without stability and origination, like the same. Likewise, mere stability does not exist, because it is void of destruction and origination; like just the same. So an existence in the entity of mutually respective origination, etc., must be conceded. And to this effect it is said - (170)
The non-continuity of the cut nails, etc., is manifestly seen.
Source untraced: quoted in Haribhadra's comm. on Tattvärthadhigama-sutra, V. 29 (Dhruva). Quoted also in the comm. to Pramana-naya-tattvāloka, V. 8.
