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XXIII. The 'seven-nuance-view table even by the word 'unutterable'. So the fourth. The remaining three are easily understood.
Nor should it be said that 'By reason of the consequence of infinite 'nuances', through admission in regard to an entity of infinite attributes affirmed and denied, the 'seven-nuancedoctrine' is inappropriate', - because of the possibility, in consideration of the modes of affirmation and negation, of infinite seven-nuances in regard to a single entity for each state. For, as in respect of existence and non-existence, likewise also in respect of universality and particularity there might be a seven-nuance-system. As thus: quodammodo universal, quodammodo particular, quodammodo both, quodammodo unutterable, quodammodo unutterable and universal, quodammodo unutterable and particular, quodammodo universal, particular and unutterable. Nor should it be said that here there are not the two modes, affirmation and negation, because the universal is of the form of affirmation, and particularity, being of the form of exclusion, consists in negation. Or else, because of being a correlative word, when there is primacy of the universality, then that has the form of affirmation; and particularity has the form of negation; when the particularity is put in front, then that has the form of affirmation, and the other the form of negation. (192) So construe in all cases. Hence it is well said that actually even infinite seven-nuance-groups may arise; since in regard to each state there are actually seven further questionings of the thing to be made out. Of these (questionings) also there are seven, because inquiry as to them is fixed to seven kinds. Thereof also there is sevenfoldness, because of the origination of doubts concerning it in exactly seven ways. And of that also there is determinateness to seven ways, because of the appropriateness of sevenfoldness of the entity-attributes to which it (the doubt) refers. And this seven-nuance-system has in each nuance the own-nature of complete expression (sakalādesa), and the own-nature of incomplete expression (vikalādesa). Of these, complete expression is statement of Demonstration, and its definition is this: a statement making out, with simultaneity, an entity composed of endless attributes adopted for Demonstration, with primacy of occurrence with non-distinction by time, etc., or with implication of (such) non-distinction, is 'complete expression'. Of this the meaning is: with primacy of non-separateness of the attributes and the bearer of attributes occurring without distinction, and stated with the eight, time, etc., by reason thereof, or of superimposition 8) of non-distinction of attributes and subject of attributes, though different by time, etc., a statement referring to them simultaneously is complete expression', and opposed to that is incomplete expression, meaning a statement with Method. This is the sense: By complete expression is made out an entity composed of all its attributes with simultaneity, or with implication of non-distinction by the use of primacy of non-distinction by time, etc., because that is amenable to Demonstration. But incomplete expression through implication of distinction, or through primacy of distinction, states the same with succession; because it is essentially a Method.
Now what is the succession, and what is the simultaneity? When the attributes existence, etc., are meant with distinction by time, etc., then, since a single word is without power to convey plural meanings, there is succession; but, when of those same attributes the own-form is stated as occurring, with non-distinction by time, etc., then, because of the possibility of stating, by means of a single word directed to conveying even a single attribute, an entity which, in the form of having the plurality of the remaining attributes, is taken as having for essence that one, there is simultaneity.
*8) On ūropa see note XV 5).