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XIX. THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF SUFFUSION
Now the followers of the Tathāgata, after hearing proved by others the unaccountability of all practical life on the alternative of momentary destruction, (158) demonstrate, as follows, that even with momentariness of all things*) the faults of loss of deeds, etc., are entirely without opening, because through the certitude of unity which derives its origin from the force of suffusion"), the practical life of this world and the other can go on. Desiring to cut away their idea, and proving the inappropriateness of the suffusion supposed by them on all the three alternatives, defined as difference from the succession of moments, non-difference, and non-both, he, in order to make them even against their will adopt the quodammodo doctrine of difference and non-difference as accepted by him, says - XIX. That suffusion and that seriality of moments,
do not fit with non-difference, difference, or non-both. Therefore, on the principle of the birdling not seeing the shore,
let the opponents take refuge in Thy pronouncements. That, supposed by the Sākya suffusion; which, begetting a presentation running through from one to another of the moments, mutually isolated, like a broken necklace, takes the place of a single thread, and is otherwise termed series (santāna). 'Suffusion' they call a potency in a later cognition generated by a previous cognition; and that, in their view well-established, seriality of moments; series of moments, like the series of ever renewed flame of a lamp; these two also do not fit with non-difference, difference, and non-both. Not, first of all, 'with non-difference', with identity, do these 'fit'; for, if the two were non-different, there would be either suffusion, or succession of moments, not both; for what is non-different from anything is not observed apart therefrom; as from pot the own-form of a pot. If only in suffusion is a continuant adopted, then, as there is nothing to be infected, what is to be infected by it? So that even of it the own-form does not stand fast. If only the succession of moments is accepted, there are simply the previous faults. (159)
Nor as different are the two logical. For as different that suffusion would be either momentary, or non-momentary. If momentary, then the supposition of it apart from the moment is purposeless. If non-momentary, then through the admission of a continuous thing there is vetoing of their Tradition; and so the exertion of supposing a momentariness of other things is mere waste.
Also on the alternative of 'not both the two do not fit. For he might on some occasion say as follows: 'I do not adopt a non-distinction of the suffusion from the line of moments, nor again distinction, but a negation of both'. That also is improper; for between difference and non-difference, which are in the form of affirmation and negation, there is adoption of one or the other alternative, because upon denial of either one there is a necessity of affirming one or the other, and in this matter the fault has already been actually stated. Or else, if there is
*) sarva-padārthānam ka Das; AMP omits sarva-. ) This specially is the topic of v. XIX.
