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XX. Criticism of the Lokayatas
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even is not apposite, even to utter a word is not proper; hence only to remain silent is preferable for him; to say nothing of entering into a company of authorities on logic and debating on propounding a means of proof.
For speaking is proffered (pratipidyate) for the convincing of another. And in proffering a matter where there is no chance of agreement by another, his statements are not be regarded by worthy people; like a madman's. 'Surely, (164) however is simply being silent preferable for him, inasmuch as, having by a kind of movement, etc., inferred the intent of the thing to be proffered, it is easy for him to utter speech ?', - in view of this doubt he says: What of a movement? What of a mere look? What of' (kva) is used in the case of a wide difference; 'a movement', a gesture, a sign of a thing to be inferred in the form of the opponent's intent. Seeing is 'look'; kta in the sense of a Noun 5); 'a mere look even a look; mere perception, because that proceeds without dependence upon a mark. For this very reason wide is the difference between the two: for not by perception can the imperceptible movements of another's thought be known; because that belongs to the sense-organs. But through the actions of repose of countenance, etc., as mark this even to one who does not approve of inference as a means of proof does in regard to ascertainment of the opponent's intent, perforce occur. As thus: This person has the intent of hearing my statement; because ofherwise his movements, such as such composure of countenance, etc. are unaccountable. And hence Alas! error! - Alas!' is used in regret. Ho! his error, his mistakenness; that by his acceptance of perception alone he denies inference while actually experiencing it. The root vid, preceded by sam-) has Middle Voice only when there is no Accusative: but here there is an Accusative; so why is there here the termination anas?)? As to this we say: here we must take 'conscious' as 'one who is able to be conscious of'; because of the rule for sāna- in the sense of 'potency' "after sayaḥ sakti and sila"). And so the meaning is this: incompetent to know correctly without inference the intent of another'. And so, because of the impossibility otherwise of knowing the mind of another, perforce he was made to accept inference. Also in another way he must be made to accept it; as thus: The Carvaka, having observed certain instances of cognition as non-divergent (not erroneous) because of accordance (with fact), and others as divergent because of disaccord, again at another time would certainly lay down the provedness and otherwise of the like and other such instances of cognition. Nor can a perception, arising through force of a thing in proximity and without consideration of prior and posterior, serve to sub-define (165) a sign establishing the provedness or non-provedness of instances of cognition belonging to prior and posterior time. Nor has the man power to settle against an opponent the provedness or non-provedness even of the instances of cognition which are in the field of his own presentation. Therefore let him await another means of proof in the form of inference, settling the provedness or non-provedness of the present instances of cognition by way of their similarity to the instances of cognition as (previously) observed by him, and convincing to others. And denial of the future world, etc., cannot be effected by mere perception, because this has for object only what is proximate. And without denying a future world, etc., this person does not rest content, and yet he does not desire another Demonstrant; and that is childish pretence.
Moreover, perception also derives its authority merely from non-divergence from practice.. How otherwise is there not provedness in a cognition of water applied to a mirage mass, as possessed of practical efficacy for bathing, drinking and plunging? And why is it not simply
$) H's Grammar, V. i. 174 (M. L.) explains the use of Participial forms (cf. Latin factum, 'deed") as Nouns. *) H's Grammar, III. iii. 84 (M. L.).
7) Sc. in samvidänas ya in line 2 of the verse.
H's Grammar, V. ii. 24 (M. L.), justifying the -ana, in the sense of 'able to', with Transitive sense.
