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XX. CRITICISM OF THE LOKAYATAS
Having thus checked a few wrong starts on the part of the exponents who champion action, now, adducing at the end, because the lowest of all, the view of the Lokāyatas), who maintain non-action, he, by showing the futility of their root-doctrine, perception as Demonstrant, for refusal to adopt inference, etc., as Demonstrant, exhibits the error of their wisdom - XX. But of (for) the Năstika, who without inference
is not aware of the intent of others, it is not apposite even to speak: What of a movement,
what of a mere look! Alas! error! That perception alone is Demonstrant is the view of the Carvāka. For that he girds himself: anu-, 'after', following upon, apprehension and memory of the mark and the connection; -miyate, 'is measured', 'is outlined', a thing remote in place, time and own-nature by this species of cognition, accordingly anu-mana. From the context it is inference for self?). That, inference, proof with a Middle Term; without, lacking; intent of others, view of others; is not aware of, not correctly cognizing. The word but is for the purpose of pointing out the difference from the previous disputants; of those previous disputants, as they are affirmativist (astika)), he has made discussion on the points of disagreement. But of (for) the Negativist it is not even proper to speak; how is discussion with him possible ? So the meaning of the word 'but'. Or else, his view being that there is no future world, merit and sin, (because of the exception noted in the grammatical rule") concerning the formation of the three words "nastika-āstika-daistika" he is called Nästika), for that Negativist, the Laukayatika, to speak
2) Similarly in Haribhadra's Şad-darsana-samuccaya the Lokayata doctrine is placed last, as a sort of appendix to the six, and for the same reason it is first, as most elementary, in the order adopted in the Sarva-darsana-samgraha.
Concerning the Lokayata, definitely identified with the Carvāka, disputants, who reach back to the period of the earliest Buddhism, it may be sufficient to refer to Cārvāka-sasti, by Dakṣinaranjan Shastri (Calcutta), where the material available in different sources is collected. For confutations see Nyaya. manjari, pp. 467-9, Sammati-tarka, pp. 554-9, Prameya-kamala-martanda, fol. 46.
The Carvāka crude materialism, accompanied by criticism of religion and society and cynicism in regard to ethics, was expressed in blunt and often amusingly hybristic comments, some of which have beer preserved in the texts named.
) On the distinction of 'inference for sell' (svärthanumāna), which is a 'process of thought in one's own mind', and 'inference for others' (parārthānu māna), 'the process expressed in words for communication to others', 'see Randle, Indian Logic in the early Schools, pp. 160-1, and Index. The distinction is not stated in the Nyaya-sutra; but subsequently it was generally adopted: as regards the Buddhists see e. g. Nyāyabindu, II. 1, and as regards the Jains, e.g. Pramana-naya-tattväloka, III, 10 and 23 (M. L.), where 'inference for others' is qualified as being only metonymously (upacarad) 'inference'.
3) Astika, 'those who say''is", are differently defined according to the point of view. The negative term năstika sometimes denotes those who reject the Veda and its dharma, in which case it includes the Bud. dhists: more generally it is those who deny moral responsibility and a future life: which seems to be the sense here, as the Buddhists and the Jains themselves, escape.
- A reference to Hemacandra's Grammar, VI. iv. 66 (M. L.), expounding the form of the word nästika.
