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F. W. Thomas, Mallişeņa's Syadvadamañjari
the form of being non-both, there is the consequence of being non-entity, because of the nonactuality of another way distinct from the dual alternatives defined as difference and nondifference. For to non- Jains an entity must necessarily be either different or non-different; because what transcends both is like a barren woman's suckling. Therefore, as on all three suppositions there is no accounting for succession of moments and suffusion, by residual inference) the alternative of difference and non-difference must be embraced. Nor should it be said that 'Because of the text "the fault which would be in each case severally, how should it not exist in the case of both ?"'3), here also there is the identical fault'; because the 'equivocality' alternative is, like the cock-serpent and the man-lion), of a different genus.
If it is said, 'Surely the Jains do not even admit suffusion and succession of moments; so how does a consideration of difference and non-difference in regard to these work?', - Not so! The maintainers of the Quodammodo doctrine also actually approve of an origination of a succession moment by moment of ever new states; (160) and so of momentariness. And also a continuant substance combining the series of past, future and present states; and this, even though it get the synonym 'suffusion', is actually approved. Surely no contention of competent persons is from verbal distinctions. And this series of states arising manient by moment is in a way different from a continuant substance, in a way not different. Likewise that continuant) also may be (is quodammodo) different from it (sc. the series), or it may be non-different. And so there is a difference, because of being object of separate presentations and designations; and only on the part of the substance is there non-difference because it evolves in such and such ways. And this will be worked out infra®) in the exposition of complete and incomplete expression.
Moreover, in the Buddhist doctrine even suffusion, to begin with, does not fit. And so in regard to it a consideration of the alternatives of difference, etc., is groundless. For its definition is 'suffusedness of a later moment by a previous moment'. And for these, impermanent and, as occuring at different times, not mutually connected, a relation of suffused and suffuser is not logical: it is in a lasting and conjoined robe, etc., that suffusion by musk, etc., is seen. Or else 'From a particular act of thinking born along with a former thought, arises a thought qualified by a prior potency, and this origination of that thought qualified by its potency is suffusion. As thus: a prior thought having for object colour, etc., is a consciousness in action (pravrtti-vijñana) which is of six kinds, - five consciousness of colour, etc., unquestioning, and the sixth, questioning consciousness); and, born along with it, a contemporary particular act h ought, is the store-consciousness ), which is basis of egoity. Therefore origination of thought qualified by a prior potency is suffusion'. That also is not the case; because of non-lastingness, and because of non-connection with the suffuser. And, as for that particular act of thinking, accompanying the former thought, that is of no assistance to the present thought; because what is present, as it cannot be either averted or encouraged, is unmodifiable; for with what nature it is born, with that nature it perishes. Nor does it help a future (thought); because it is not connected therewith, and it is said that what is unconnected does not bring into being. Therefore in the Sugata-doctrine suffusion also does not fit. And here it must be supposed (161) that the author of the Laudation (Hemacandra),
2) The pariseşa-anumana is expounded in Nyāya-sutra, III. 11. 41. ") Quoted also in Pramana-mīmāmsä, I. i. 33.
) The 'cock-serpent' is said to be a particular species of serpent: the 'man-lion' is one of Vişnu's incarnations. On the maxim see Col. Jacob, A second handful ... p. 41. " See v. XXIII.
On nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka see note XIII 19. +) Store-consciousness: On ala ya-vijnana see Steherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 173, n. 4; 328-9, n. 7.
