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F. W. Thomas, Malliṣena's Syadvadamañjarī
to be non-different from the succession of moments, there is simply the succession of moments; and so nothing different would be mentioned by 'series'. But, if different, would that be ultimately real, or not ultimately real? If it is not ultimately real, there is the same refutation. because it is utterly ineffective. If ultimately real, it would either be lasting, or momentary. If momentary, it is entirely non-different from the members of the series; so what of this imitator of one afraid of a thief who seeks refuge with another thief' ?16) If lasting, a self is accepted, disguised under a different term. And so for the maintainers of momentary destruction memory does not fit in. And that, failing that, there is no opportunity for inference has been previously stated. Moreover in the absence of memory, the usages as to seeking back and giving back things deposited would be dissipated.
And what becomes of the text:
"In the ninety-first aeon from this a person was slain by my power;
Through that maturation of karma I have been wounded in the foot, O Bhiksu" 17).
Similarly, those also who advocate an entity of four moments, 'origin originates, lasting makes last, decay makes decay, destruction destroys', are to be refuted; *) because we see the the practice of asking and giving back things deposited even after four instants). So, whoever even with such incidence of plural faults approves of momentary annihilation displays great venturesomeness. This is the meaning of the verse.
*) Omited by AMP.
3) Not traced elsewhere.
17) The verse is quoted also in Manibhadra's comm. on Haribhadra's Sad-darśana-samuccaya, v. 5.
