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F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syadvádamañjari meaning; because there is no one belonging to a future world. For the future world is in accordance with deeds done in a previous birth: and by whom, pray, is that to be enjoyed in another birth, since the previous moments of cognition have perished without residue? As for the proof stated by Mokşākaragupta ") for the establishment of series of lives -
"What is a thought another thought replaces, as to-day's thought and the thought which will exist at the time of death"), - that is useless; because thought-moments which perish without residue are unfitted to replace (give place to?) (prali samdhūna) other thoughts. For between two actual things replacement is effected by some connecting factor (anugāmin): and the replacing factor between these two is not (155) accepted by hin; for that is a recurring self. For the sense of 'replacing' is not 'begetting', because of the consequence of its being a cause of an effect; for by that disputant cause was mentioned as being own-nature-cause (stabhāra-hetu)'), and own-nature-cause occurs when there is identity, and of a thought and another thought taking place at different times, how can there be identity? Because in the case of two things occurring together there is the objection of a failure of the relation of replaced and replacer; and as the occurrence together is not different in the two), what is here the restrictive circumstance, so that the replacer is one and the replaced another? Or let the meaning of 'replacing' be 'begetting'; that also is unaccountable: because with coincidence of time there is no relation of cause and fruit. But, with difference of time, how is the latter thought-moment, since the former thought-moment has perished, to come into existence without a basis? So that is just something.
Further, the fault of ruin to complete liberation'; - 'complete without recurrence, "liberation from the bond of karma, - is complete liberation'; of that also ruin results. On their view, of course, the very self does not exist; who will strive for a happy life after death? How will even the thought-moment, as belonging to mundane existence, qualify for the happy life of another thought-moment ? For a Devadatta in pain is not seen to be active for the happiness of Yajñadatta. Of a moment, again, the pain, being spontaneously perishable, has vanished along with it, and a series (santāna)) is not in any case real; while, if it is real, there results an acceptance of self.
Moreover, the Buddhists say that "Moksa is origination of a cognition purified from the inundation of the forms of objects which have passed away upon the annihilation of all suffusions"). And that does not fit, since simply from the absence of a cause that is unaccountable. For as cause is put forward an accumulation of realizations (bhavanā)'); and that, from lack of a single permanent base, not receiving any intensification, produced every moment as if without antecedent, perishing without residue, not effecting any progress, like practice of leaping over the sky, is unavailing for the begetting of a clear overthought: so that there is no justification in that; for (156) because of the natural potency of polluted thought-moments for setting in motion their similars and impotence for effecting the dissimilar, there is not a sudden annihilation. Furthermore, the previous polluted thoughtmoments having spontaneously attained full Nirvana, this one has been born without ante
) On Mokşākaragupta see note XVI *).
Source untraced. 6) On svabhāva-helu see note XVI 18).
The terni 'series' (santana) was used by the Buddhist maintainers of momentariness to account for the continuity constituting the individual: the Santānāntara-siddhi of Dharmakirti, whereof the Tibetan version has been edited by Steherbatsky Bibliotheca Buddhica, XIX (1916)), deals with the problem, on the thought-only hypothesis, of the existence of other series'.
*) Source untraced *) On vāsanā see note XV , and infra v. XIX. ")! e repeated envisaging or cultivation of a thought.
